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THREE TREATISES

THE FIRST
CONCERNING ART

THE SECOND
CONCERNING MUSIC
PAINTING AND POETRY

THE THIRD
CONCERNING HAPPINESS

BY IAMES HARRIS ESQ.

THE FIFTH EDITION
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In the Treatises here published, there is the following Connection. The first treats of Art in its most comprehensive Idea; when considered as a Genus to many subordinate Species. The second considers three of these subordinate Species, whose Beauty and Elegance are well known to all. The last treats of that Art, which respects the Conduct of Human Life, and which may justly be valued, as of all Arts the most important, if it can truly lead us to the End proposed.
TREATISE THE FIRST

A DIALOGUE CONCERNING ART

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE EARL OF SHAFTESBURY
CONCERNING ART
A DIALOGUE

TO THE RIGHT HONOVRABLE
THE EARL OF SHAFTESBURY

My Lord,

The following is a Conversation in its kind somewhat uncommon, and for this reason I have remembered it more minutely than I could imagine. Should the same Peculiarity prove a Reason to amuse your Lordship, I shall think myself well rewarded in the Labour of reciting. If not, you are candid enough to accept of the Intention, and to think there is some Merit even in the Sincerity of my Endeavours. To make no longer Preface, the Fact was as follows.

B 2 A Friend
A Friend from a distant Country having by chance made me a Visit, we were tempted by the Serenity of a cheerful Morning in the Spring, to walk from Salisbury to see Lord Pembroke's at Wilton. The Beauties of Gardening, Architecture, Painting, and Sculpture belonging to that Seat, were the Subject of great Entertainment to my Friend: Nor was I, for my own part, less delighted than he was, to find that our Walk had so well answered his Expectations. We had given a large Scope to our Curiosity, when we left the Seat, and leisurely began our return towards home.

And here, my Lord, in passing over a few pleasant Fields, commenced the Conversation which I am to tell you, and which fell at first, as was natural, on the many curious Works, which had afforded us both so elegant an Amusement. This led us insensibly to discoursing upon ART, for we both agreed, that whatever we had been admiring of Fair and Beautiful, could all be referred
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referred to no other Cause. And here, I well remember, I called upon my Friend to give me his Opinion upon the meaning of the word ART: A word it was (I told him) in the Mouth of every one; but that nevertheless, as to its precise and definite Idea, this might still be a Secret; that so it was in fact with a thousand Words beside, all no less common, and equally familiar, and yet all of them equally vague and undetermined. To this he answered, That as to the precise and definite Idea of Art, it was a Question of some Difficulty, and not so soon to be resolved; that, however, he could not conceive a more likely Method of coming to know it, than by considering those several Particulars, to each of which we gave the Name. It is hardly probable, said he, that Music, Painting, Medicine, Poetry, Agriculture, and so many more, should be all called by one common Name, if there was not something in each, which was common to all. It should seem so, replied I.

What then, said he, shall we pronounce this to be? At this, I remember, I was

B 3 under

And is not the same true, said he, of Music, of Statuary, of Architecture, and, in short, of every Art whatever? I confess, said I, it seems so. Suppose, then, said he, we should say, It was common to every Art to be a Cause—Should we err? I replied, I thought not. Let this then, said he, be remembered, that all Art is Cause. I promised him it should.

But how then, continued he, if all Art be Cause, is it also true, that all Cause is Art? At this again I could not help hesitating. You have heard, said he, without doubt, of that Painter famed in Story, who being to paint the Foam of a Horse, and not succeeding to his Mind, threw
threw at the Picture in Resentment a Sponge bedaubed with colours, and produced a Foam the most natural imaginable. Now, what say you to this Fact? Shall we pronounce Art to have been the Cause?

By no means, said I. What, said he, if instead of Chance, his Hand had been guided by mere Compulsion, himself dissenting and averse to the Violence? Even here, replied I, nothing could have been referred to his Art. But what, continued he, if instead of a casual Throw or involuntary Compulsion, he had willingly and designedly directed his Pencil, and so produced that Foam, which Story says he failed in?—Would not Art here have been the Cause? I replied, in this case, I thought it would. It should seem then, said he, that Art implies not only Cause, but the additional Requisite of Intention, Reason, Volition, and Consciousness; so that not every Cause is Art, but only voluntary or intentional Cause.

So, said I, it appears.
And shall we then, added he, pronounce every intentional Cause to be Art? I see no reason, said I, why not. Consider, said he; Hunger this Morning prompted you to eat. You were then the Cause, and that too the intentional Cause, of consuming certain Food: And yet will you refer this Consumption to Art? Did you chew by Art? Did you swallow by Art?

No certainly, said I. So by opening your Eyes, said he, you are the intentional Cause of Seeing, and by stretching your Hand, the intentional Cause of Feeling; and yet will you affirm, that these Things proceed from Art? I should be wrong, said I, if I did: For what Art can there be in doing, what every one is able to do by mere Will, and a sort of uninstructed Instinct? You say right, replied he, and the reason is manifest: Were it otherwise, we should make all Mankind universal Artists in every single Action of their Lives. And what can be a greater Absurdity than this? I confessed that the Absurdity appeared
peared to be evident. But if nothing then, continued he, which we do by Compulsion, or without intending it, be Art; and not even what we do intentionally, if it proceed from mere Will and uninstructed Instinct; what is it we have left remaining, where Art may be found conversant? Or can it indeed possibly be in any thing else, than in that which we do by Use, Practice, Experience and the like, all which are born with no one, but are all acquired afterward by advances unperceived. I can think, said I, of nothing else. Let therefore the Words Habit and Habitual, said he, represent this Requisite, and let us say, that Art is not only a Cause, but an intentional Cause; and not only an intentional Cause, but an intentional Cause founded in Habit, or in other Words, an habitual Cause. You appear, said I, to argue rightly.

But if Art, said he, be what we have now asserted, something learnt and acquired, if it be also a thing intentional or
Concerning ART, or voluntary, and not governed either by Chance or blind Necessity—If this, I say, be the Case, then mark the Consequences.

And what, said I, are they? The first, said he, is, that no Events, in what we call the natural World, must be referred to Art; such as Tides, Winds, Vegetation, Gravitation, Attraction, and the like. For these all happen by stated Laws; by a curious Necessity, which is not to be withstood, and where the nearer and immediate Causes appear to be wholly unconscious. I confess, said I, it seems so. In the next place, continued he, we must exclude all those admired Works of the Animal World, which, for their Beauty and Order, we metaphorically call artificial. The Spider's Web, the Bee's Comb, the Beaver's House, and the Swallow's Nest, must all be referred to another Source—For who can say, these ever learnt to be thus ingenious? or, that they were ignorant by Nature, and knowing only by Education? None, surely, replied I. But we have still, said he, a higher Consideration. And what, said I,
is that? It is, answered he, this—
Not even that Divine Power, which gave Form to all things, then acted by Art, when it gave that Form. For how, continued he, can that Intelligence, which has all Perfection ever in Energy, be supposed to have any Power, not original to its Nature? How can it ever have any thing to learn, when it knows all from the Beginning; or, being perfect and complete, admit of what is additional and secondary? I should think, said I, it were impossible. If so, said he, then Art can never be numbered among its Attributes: For all Art is something learnt, something secondary and acquired, and never original to any Being, which possesses it. So the fact, said I, has been established.

If this therefore, continued he, be true; if Art belong not either to the Divine Nature, the Brute Nature, or the Inanimate Nature,—to what Nature shall we say it does belong? I know not, said I, unless it be to the Human. You are right, said he;
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he; for every Nature else you perceive is either too excellent to want it, or too base to be capable of it. Beside, except the Human, what other Nature is there left? Or where else can we find any of the Arts already instanced, or indeed whatever others we may now fancy to enumerate? Who are Statuaries, but Men? Who Pilots, who Musicians? This seems, replied I, to be the Fact.

Let us then, continued he, say, not only that Art is a Cause, but that it is Man becoming a Cause; and not only Man, but Man intending to do what is going to be done, and doing it also by Habit; so that its whole Idea, as far as we have hitherto conceived it, is—Man becoming a Cause, Intentional and Habitual. I confess, said I, it has appeared so.

And thus, said he, have you had exhibited to you a Sketch of Art. You must remember however, it is but a Sketch: there is still something wanting to make it a finished
finished Piece. I begged to know what this was. In order to that, replied he, I cannot do better, than remind you of a Passage in your admired Horace. It is concerning Alfenus; who (if you remember) he tells us, though his tools were laid aside, and his Shop shut up, was still an Artist as much as ever.—

—Alfenus vafer omni
Abjettò instrumento Artis clausàq. taberna,
Sutor erat— I remember, said I, the Passage, but to what purpose is it quoted? Only, replied he, to shew you, that I should not be without Precedent, were I to affirm it not absolutely necessary to the being of Art, that it should be Man actually becoming a Cause; but that it was enough if he had the Power or Capacity of so becoming. Why then, said I, did you not settle it so at first? Because, replied he, Faculties, Powers, Capacities, (call them as you will) are in themselves, abstract from Action, but obscure and hidden things. On the contrary Energies and Operations lie open to the Senses, and cannot
Concerning ART, cannot but be observed, even whether we will or no. And hence therefore, when first we treated of Art, we chose to treat of it, as of a thing only in Energy. Now we better comprehend it, we have ventured somewhat farther. Repeat then, said I, if you please, the Alteration, which you have made. At first, answered he, we reasoned upon Art, as if it was only Man actually becoming a Cause intentional and habitual. Now we say it is a Power in Man of becoming such Cause; and that, though be be not actually in the Exercise of such a Power. I told him, his Amendment appeared to be just.

There is too another Alteration, added he, which, for the sake of Accuracy, is equally wanting; and that is with respect to the Epithet, Intentional or Voluntary. And what, said I, is that? We have agreed it, replied he, to be necessary, that all Art should be under the Guidance of Intention or Volition, so that no Man acting by Compulsion, or by Chance, should be called an.
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an Artist. We have. Now tho' this, said he, be true, yet it is not sufficient. We must limit this Intention or Volition to a peculiar Kind. For were every little Fancy, which we may work up into Habit, a sufficient Foundation to constitute an Art, we should make Art one of the lowest and most despicable of things. The meanest Trick of a common Juggler might, in such case, entitle a man to the character of an Artist. I confessed, that without some Limitation, this might be the Consequence. But how limit Intentions to a Kind or Species? What think you, replied he, if we were to do it by the Number and Dignity of the Precepts, which go to the directing of our Intentions? You must explain, said I, for your Meaning is obscure. Are there not Precepts, replied he, in Agriculture, about Ploughing and Sowing? Are there not Precepts in Architecture, about Orders and Proportions? Are there not the same in Medicine, in Navigation, and the rest? There are.

And what is your Opinion of these several
Concerning ART, several Precepts? Are they arbitrary and capricious; or rational and steady? Are they the Inventions of a Day; or well-approved by long Experience? I told him I should consider them for the most part as rational, steady, and well-approved by long Experience. And what, continued he, shall we say to their Number? Are they few? Or are they not rather so numerous, that in every particular Art, scarce any comprehend them all, but the several Artists themselves; and they only by length of time, with due Attendance and Application? I replied, it seemed so.

Suppose then We were to pronounce, that to every Art there was a System of such various and well-approved Precepts: Should we err? No certainly. And suppose we should say, that the Intention of every Artist, in his several Art, was directed by such a System: Would you allow this? Surely. And will not this limiting of Intentions to such only, as are so directed, sufficiently distinguish Art from any thing else which may resemble it?—In other words,
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words, Is it likely, under this Distinction, to be confounded with other Habits of a trifling, capricious and inferior Kind? I replied, I thought not.

Let us then see, said he, and collect all that we have said, together. We have already agreed, that the Power of acting after a certain manner is sufficient to constitute Art, without the actually operating agreeably to that Power. And We have now farther held the Intentions of every Artist to be directed by a System of various and well-approved Precepts. Besides all this, we settled it before, that all Art was founded in Habit; and was peculiar to Man; and was seen by becoming the Cause of some Effect. It should seem then, that the whole Idea of Art was this—An habitual Power in Man of becoming the Cause of some Effect, according to a System of various and well-approved Precepts.

I replied, That his Account appeared to be probable and just.

§ 2.
Concerning A R T,

§ 2. And now then, continued he, as we have gone thus far, and have settled between us what we believe Art to be; shall we go a little farther, or is your Patience at an end?

Oh! no, replied I, not if anything be left. We have walked so leisurely, that much remains of our Way; and I can think of no Method, how we may better amuse ourselves.

My Friend upon this proceeded with saying, that if Art were a Cause, (as we had agreed it was) it must be the Cause of something. Allow it, said I. And if it be the Cause of something, it must have a Subject to operate on. For every Agent has need of some Patient; the Smith of his Iron, the Carpenter of his Wood, the Statuary of his Marble, and the Pilot of his Ship.

I answered, it was true. If then, said he, the Subjects of particular Arts be thus evident: What Idea shall we form of that universal Subject, which is common to all Art? At this Question, it must be confessed, I was a little embarrassed.
This induced him to ask me, How many sorts of Subjects I allowed of? Here I could not help hesitating again: There is nothing, continued he, so difficult in the Question. You must needs perceive, that all Natures whatever can be but either contingent or necessary. This may be, replied I; but even yet I do not comprehend you. Not comprehend me! said he; then answer me a Question: Can you conceive any Medium between Motion and No-Motion, between Change and No-Change?

I replied, I could not. If not, can you conceive any thing in the whole Order of Being, which must not be either liable to these, or not liable? Nothing.

Call those things therefore, said he, which are liable to Change and Motion, contingent Natures; and those which are not liable, necessary Natures: And thus you have a Division, in which all things are included. We have so, said I.
In which therefore, said he, of these Natures shall we seek for this common Subject of Art? To this, I told him, I was unable to answer. Reflect, said he, a little. We have found Art to be a Cause.

We have. And is it not essential to every Cause to operate? or can it be a Cause, and be the Cause of nothing? Impossible.

Wherever therefore there is Cause, there is necessarily implied some Operation. There is. And can there possibly be Operation, without Motion and Change?

There cannot. But Change and Motion must needs be incompatible with what is necessary and immutable. They must. So therefore is Cause. It must.

And so therefore Art. It must.

Truth therefore, said he, and Knowledge; Principles and Demonstrations; the general and intellectual Essences of Things; in short, the whole immutable and necessary Nature is no part of it reducible to a Subject of Art. It seems so, said I.
If therefore Art, said he, have nothing to do with the steady, abstract, and necessary Nature, it can have only to do with the transient, the particular, and contingent one. It is true, said I; for there is no other left. And shall we then say, replied he, it has to do with all contingent Natures existing in the Universe?

For aught, replied I, which to me appears contrary. What think you, said he, of those Contingents of higher Order? such as the grand Planetary System; the Succession of the Seasons; the regular and uniform Course of all superior Natures in the Universe? Has Art any Ability to intermeddle here? No certainly, said I.

These superior Contingents then, which move without Interruption, are, it seems, above it. They are.

And shall we say the same of those of lower Sort; those, whose Course we see often interrupted; those, which the Strength and Cunning of Man are able to influence and controul? Give Instances, said I, of what you
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you mean. I mean, said he, Earth, Water, Air, Fire; Stones, Trees; Animals; Men themselves. Are these Contingents within the reach of Art, or has Art here no Influence? I should think, said I, a very great one.

If this, continued he, be true, it should seem that the common or universal Subject of Art was—all those contingent Natures, which lie within the reach of the human Powers to influence. I acknowledge, said I, it appears so.

Thus far then, said he, we have advanced with tolerable Success. We have gained some Idea of Art, and some Idea of its Subject. Our Inquiry, on the whole, has informed us, that Art is—an habitual Power in Man of becoming a certain Cause—and that its Subject is—every such contingent Nature, which lies within the reach of the human Powers to influence.

§ 3.
§ 3. It is true, said I, this appears to have been the result of our Inquiry, and a full and ample one it seems to have been. A long one, replied he, if you please, but not a full and ample one. Can any thing, said I, be wanting, after what you have said already? Certainly, replied he, a great deal. We have talked much indeed of Art, considered as a Cause; and much of the Subject, on which it operates; but what moves these Operations to commence, and where it is they end, these are Topics, which we have as yet little thought of. I begged him then, that we might now consider them.

He was willing, he said, for his Part, and immediately went on by asking, What I thought was the Beginning of Art? I mean, said he, by Beginning, that Cause for the Sake of which it operates, and which being supposed away, Men would be never moved to follow it. To this, I told him, I was unable to answer. You will not think
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think it, said he, so difficult, when you have a little more considered. Reflect with yourself—Was it not the Absence of Health, which excited Men to cultivate the Art of Medicine? I replied, it was.

What then, said he, if the Human Body had been so far perfect and self-sufficient, as never to have felt the Vicissitudes of Well and Ill: Would not then this Art have been wholly unknown?

I replied, I thought it would. And what, said he, if we extend this Perfection a Degree farther, and suppose the Body not only thus healthful, but withal so robust, as to have felt no Uneasiness from all Inclemencies of Weather: Would not then the Arts of Building also and Cloathing have been as useless as that of Medicine?

I replied, it seemed they would. But what, said he, if we bound not this Perfection of ours even here? What if we suppose, that not only Things merely necessary, but that those also conducive to Elegance and Enjoyment were of course all implied in the Constitution of Human Nature;
ture; that they were all steady, constant, and independent from without, and as inseparable from our Being, as Perspiring, or Circulation: In such case would not the Arts of Music, Painting, and Poetry, with every other Art passing under the Denomination of Elegant, have been as useless, as we have held those others of Medicine, Clothing, and Architecture? I replied, It seems they would. It was then the Absence of Joys, Elegancies, and Amusements from our Constitution, as left by Nature, which induced us to seek them in these Arts of Elegance and Entertainment.

It was. And what, said he, are Joys, Elegancies, Amusements, Health, Robustness, with those several other Objects of Desire, whose Absence leads to Art, but so many different Names of that complex Being called Good, under its various, and multifarious, and popular Appearances? I replied, it seemed so.

If this then, said he, be granted, it should seem that the Beginning or Principle
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ciple of Art was the Absence of something thought Good; because it has appeared that it is for the Sake of some such absent Good that every Art operates; and because, if we suppose no such Absence to have been, we should never have known any Art.
I confess, said I, it seems so,

But how then, continued he? If it be true that all Art implies such Principle, it is reciprocally true, that every such Principle should imply Art? I see no Reason, said I, why not. Consider, said he. It might be thought a Good by some perhaps, to be as strong as those Horses, which are ploughing yonder Field; to be as tall as those Elms, and of a Nature as durable.—Yet would the Absence of Goods like these, lead to Art? Or is it not absurd to suppose, there should be an Art of Impossibilities? Absurd, said I, certainly. If so, said he, when we define the Beginning or Principle of Art, it is not enough to call it the Absence of Something thought Good, unless we add, that the Good be
be a Good Possible; a Thing attainable by Man; a Thing relative to Human Life, and consistent with Human Nature: Or does not this also appear a Requisite? I replied, I thought it did.

But still, continued he——Is it a sufficient Motive to Art, that the Good desired should be attainable? In other Words, does every Absence of Good attainable lead to Art, or is our Account still too loose, and in need of stricter Determination? Of none, said I, which appears to me. Reflect, said he; there are some of the possible Goods so obvious and easy, that every Man, in an ordinary State of common natural Perfection, is able to acquire them, without Labour or Application. You will hardly deny but that a fair Apple, tempting to eat, may be gathered; or a clear Spring, tempting to drink, may be drank at, by the mere Suggestions of Will and uninstructed Instinct. I granted, they might.

It would be therefore impertinent, said he, to suppose that Goods, like these, should
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should lead to Art, because Art would be superfluous, and in no respect necessary. Indeed, said I, it seems so.

If therefore, said he, neither Impossibles lead to Art, because of such there can be no Art; nor Things easily possible, because in such Nature can do without Art: what is it we have left, to which we may refer it? Or can it indeed be to any other than to that middle Class of Things, which, however possible, are still not so easy, but to be beyond the Powers of Will, and Instructed? I replied, it seemed so.

That there are many such Things, said he, is evident past Doubt. For what Man would pay Artists so largely for their Arts, were he enabled by Nature to obtain whatever he desired? Or who would study to be skilled in Arts, were Nature's original Powers to be of themselves alone sufficient? I told him, it was not likely.

It should seem then, said he, according to this Reasoning, that the Beginning, Motive,
tive, or Principle of Art; that Cause, which first moves it to Action, and, for the Sake of which its several Operations are exerted, is—the Want or Absence of Something appearing Good; relative to Human Life, and attainable by Man, but superior to his Natural and uninstructed Faculties.

I replied, I could not deny, but that the Account appeared probable.

§ 4. Let this then, said he, suffice, as to the Beginning of Art. But how shall we describe its End? What is it we shall pronounce this? My Answer, I replied, must be the same as often already; which was indeed, that I could not resolve the Question. It should seem, said he, not so difficult, now we have discovered what Beginning is. For if Beginning and End are Contraries and opposed, it is but to invert, as it were, the Notion of Beginning, and we gain of course the Notion of End. I asked him in what Manner?

Thus, said he, the Beginning of Art has been
Concerning ART, been held to be Something, which, if supposed away, Men would be never moved to apply to ART. By Inversion therefore the End of Art must be Something, which, while supposed away, Men would never cease applying to Art; because, were they to cease, while the End was wanting, they would cease with Imperfection, and their Performance would be incomplete. To this I answered, That the Account, however true, was by far too general, to give me much Intelligence.

He replied, If it was, he would endeavour to be more particular. And what, continued he, should we say, that every Art, according to its Genius, will of course be accomplished either in some Energy, or in some Work; that, besides these two, it can be accomplished in Nothing else; and consequently that one of these must of necessity be its End? I could not here but answer him with a Smile, That the Matter was now much obscurer than ever. I find then, said he, it is proper we should be more explicit in our Inquiries, and deduce our
A Dialogue.

Reasonnings from some clearer Point of View. I told him, It was quite neceffary, if he intended to be intelligible.

Thus then, said he. You will grant, that every Art, being a Cause, must be productive of some Effect; for instance, Music, of a Tune; Dancing, of a Dance; Architecture, of a Palace; and Sculpture, of a Statue.

It is allowed, said I. You will grant also, said he, that in these Productions they are all accomplished and ended: Or, in other Words, that as Music produces a Tune, so it is ended and accomplished in a Tune; and as Sculpture produces a Statue, so is it ended and accomplished in a Statue.

It is admitted, said I. Now these Productions, continued he, if you will examine, are not like Units or Mathematical Points; but, on the contrary, all consist of a certain Number of Parts, from whose accurate Order is derived their Beauty and Perfection. For Example; Notes, ranged after such a Manner, make a Tune in Music; and Limbs, ranged after such a Manner, make a Statue
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Statue or a Picture. I replied, They did.

If then the Productions, continued he, of every Art thus consist of certain Parts, it will follow, that these Parts will be either co-existent, or not; and if not co-existent, then of course successive. Assist me, said I, by another Instance, for you are growing again obscure. Co-existent, replied he, as in a Statue, where Arms, Legs, Body, and Head all subsist together at one individual Instant: Successive, as in a Tune or Dance, where there is no such Co-existence, but where some Parts are ever passing away, and others are ever succeeding them.

Can any Thing be said to exist, said I, whose Parts are ever passing away? Surely, replied he, or how else exist Years and Seasons, Months and Days, with their common Parent, Time itself? Or indeed what is Human Life, but a Compound of Parts thus fleeting; a Compound of various and multiform Actions, which succeed each other in a certain Order? The Fact, said I, appears so.

This
This then, continued he, being the case, and there being this Difference in Productions, call every Production, the Parts of which exist successively, and whose Nature hath its Being or Essence in a Transition, call it, what it really is, a Motion or an Energy—Thus a Tune and a Dance are Energies; thus Riding and Sailing are Energies; and so is Elocution, and so is Life itself. On the contrary, call every Production, whose Parts exist all at once, and whose Nature depends not on a Transition for its Essence, call it a Work, or Thing done, not an Energy or Operation.—Thus a House is a Work, a Statue is a Work, and so is a Ship, and so a Picture. I seem, said I, to comprehend you.

If then there be no Productions, said he, but must be of Parts, either co-existent or successive; and the one of these be, as you perceive, a Work, and the other be an Energy; it will follow, there will be no Production, but will be either a Work or an Energy.
Concerning Art, Energy. There will not, said I. But every Art, said he, you have granted, is accomplished and ended in what it produces?

I replied, I had. And there are no Productions, but Works or Energies?

None.

It will follow then, said he, that every Art will be accomplished and ended in a Work or Energy.

To this I answered, That his Reasoning I could not impeach; but that still the Distinction of Work and Energy was what I did not well comprehend. There are several Circumstances, said he, which will serve sufficiently to make it clear.

I begged he would mention some.

Thus then, said he—When the Production of any Art is an Energy, then the Perfection of the Art can be only perceived during that Energy. For instance, the Perfection of a Musician is only known, while he continues playing. But when the Production
duction of any Art is a Work, then is not the Perfection visible during the Energy, but only after it. Thus the Perfection of the Statuary is not seen during his Energies as a Statuary, but when his Energies are over, when no Stroke of the Chizzel is wanting, but the Statue is left as the Result of all. It is true, said I.

Again, continued he,—in consequence of this, where the Production is an Energy, there the Production is of Necessity co-eval with the Artist. For how should the Energy survive the Man? the Playing remain, when the Musician is dead? But where the Production is a Work, then is there no such Necessity. The Work may well remain, when the Artist is forgotten; there being no more reason, that the Statue and the Artist should be co-eval, than the Man and the rude Marble, before it received a regular Figure. You seem now, said I, to have explained yourself.
If then, said he, Work and Energy be made intelligible Terms, you cannot but perceive the Truth of what we before asserted—that every Art, according to its Genius, must needs be accomplished in one of these; that, except in these two, it can be accomplished in nothing else; and consequently that one of these must of necessity be its End. I answered, That the Reasoning appeared justly deduced. So much then, replied he, for the Ending or Accomplishment of Art; and so much also for a long, and, I fear, an intricate Disquisition.

§ 5. He had no sooner said this, than I was beginning to applaud him; especially on his having treated a Subject so copiously, started, as it were, by Chance, and without any apparent Preparation. But I had not gone far, before he interrupted me, by saying, That as to my Praisés they were more than he deserved; that he could pretend to no great Merit for having been, as I called it,
A DIALOGUE.

it, so copious, when he had so often before thought, on what at present we had been talking. In short, says he, to tell you a Secret, I have been a long time amusing myself, in forming an Essay upon this Subject. I could not here forbear reproaching him, for having hitherto concealed his Intentions. My Reproaches produced a sort of amicable Controversy, which at length ended in his offering, That, to make me some amends, he would now recite me (if I pleased) a small fragment of the Piece: a Fragment which he had happened accidentally to have about him. The Proposal, on my part, was willingly accepted, and without farther Delay, the Papers were produced.

As to the Performance itself, it must be confessed, in point of Stile, it was somewhat high and florid, perhaps even bordering upon an Excess. At the time however of recital, this gave me less Offence, because it seemed, as it were, to palliate the Dryness of what had passed before, and in some sort
Concerning ART,
to supply the Place of an Epilogue to our Conference. Not however to anticipate, he began reading as follows:

"O Art! Thou distinguishing Attribute and Honour of Human Kind! who art not only able to imitate Nature in her Graces, but (what is more) even to adorn her with Graces of thy own. Possessed of Thee, the meanest Genius grows deserving, and has a just Demand for a Portion of our Esteem. Devoid of Thee, the Brightest of our Kind lie lost and useless, and are but poorly distinguished from the most Despicable and Base. When we inhabited Forests in common with Brutes, nor otherwise known from them than by the Figure of our Species; Thou taughtest us to assert the Sovereignty of our Nature, and to assume that Empire, for which Providence intended us. Thousands of Utilities owe their Birth to Thee; thousands of Elegancies, Pleasures, and Joys, without which Life itself would be but an insipid Possession."
"Wide and extensive is the Reach of thy Dominion. No Element is there either so violent or so subtle, so yielding or so sluggish, as by the Powers of its Nature to be superior to thy Direction. Thou dreadest not the fierce Impetuosity of Fire, but compellest its Violence to be both obedient and useful. By it Thou softeneatest the stubborn Tribe of Minerals, so as to be formed and moulded into Shapes innumerable. Hence Weapons, Armour, Coin; and previous to these, and other Thy Works and Energies, hence all those various Tools and Instruments which empower Thee to proceed to farther Ends more excellent. Nor is the subtle Air less obedient to Thy Power, whether Thou willest it to be a Minister to our Pleasure, or Utility. At Thy Command it giveth Birth to Sounds, which charm the Soul with all the Powers of Harmony. Under thy Instruction it moves the Ship o'er Seas, while that yielding Element, where otherwise we sink,
Concerning ART,

"sink, even WATER itself is by Thee
taught to bear us; the vast Ocean to pro-
mote that Intercourse of Nations, which
Ignorance would imagine it was destined
to intercept. To say how thy Influence
is seen on EARTH, would be to teach
the meanest, what he knows already.
Suffice it but to mention Fields of Arable
and Pasture; Lawns and Groves, and
Gardens, and Plantations; Cottages, Vil-
lages, Castles, Towns; Palaces, Temples,
and spacious Cities.

"NOR does thy Empire end in Subjects
thus inanimate. Its Power also extends
thro' the various Race of Animals,
who either patiently submit to become
thy Slaves, or are sure to find Thee an ir-
resistible Foe. The faithful Dog, the
patient Ox, the generous Horse, and the
mighty Elephant, are content all to re-
ceive their Instrucitions from Thee, and
readily to lend their natural Instincts or
Strength, to perform those Offices, which
thy Occasions call for. If there be found
any
A D I A L O G U E. 41

"any Species, which are serviceable when 
"dead, Thouuggestest the Means to in-
"vestigate and take them. If any be so 
"savage, as to refuse being tamed; or of 
"Natures fierce enough to venture an At-
"tack; Thou teachest us to scorn their 
"brutal Rage; to meet, repel, pursue, and 
"conquer.

"And such, O Art! is thy amazing 
"Influence, when Thou art employed only 
"on these inferior Subjects; on Natures In-
"animate, or at best Irrational. But when-
"e'er Thou choosest a Subject more noble, 
"and settest to the cultivating of Mind 
"itself, then it is Thou becomest truly ami-
"table and divine; the ever-flowing Source 
"of those sublimer Beauties, of which no 
"Subject but Mind alone is capable. Then 
"it is Thou art enabled to exhibit to Man-
"kind the admired Tribe of Poets and of 
"Orators; the sacred Train of Patriots and 
"of Heroes; the godlike List of Philoso-
"phers and Legislators; the Forms of vir-
"tuous and equal Polities, where private 
"Wel-
"Concerning ART, "

"Welfare is made the same with public; "

"where Crowds themselves prove dis- "

"interested and brave, and Virtue is made "

"a national and popular Characteristic. "

"HAIL! sacred Source of all these "

"Wonders! Thyself instruct me to praise "

"Thee worthily, thro' whom whate'er we "

"do, is done with Elegance and Beauty; "

"without whom, what we do, is ever grace- "

"less and deformed.—Venerable Power! "

"By what Name shall I address Thee? "

"Shall I call thee Ornament of Mind; "

"or art Thou more truly Mind itself?— "

"IT IS MIND THOU ART, most perfect "

"Mind; not rude, untaught, but fair and "

"polished; in such Thou dwellest, of such "

"Thou art the Form; nor is it a Thing "

"more possible to separate Thee from such, "

"than it would be to separate Thee from "

"thy own Existence."——

My good Friend was now arrived to a very exalted Pitch, and was pursuing his Panegyric with great Warmth and Fluency; when
when we entered the Suburbs, our Walk being near finished. The People, as we went along, began to look at us with Surprize; which I, who was less engaged, having leisure to observe, thought it was proper to admonish my Friend, that he should give over. He immediately ceased reading; put his Papers up; and thanked me for stopping him at so seasonable a Time.

§ 6. What remained of our Discourse passed off with less Rapture, and was indeed no more, than a kind of short Recapitulation.

He observed to me, that our Inquiries had furnished out an Answer to four different Questions. For thus, said he, if it be asked us, What Art is? We have to Answer, it is—an habitual Power in Man, of becoming the Cause of some Effect, according to a System of various and well-approved Precepts. If it be asked us, On what Subject Art operates? We can answer,
Concerning ART,

On a contingent, which is within the reach of the Human Powers to influence. If it be asked us, For what Reason, for the sake of what, Art operates? We may reply, For the sake of some absent Good, relative to Human Life, and attainable by Man, but superior to his natural and uninstructed Faculties. Lastly, if it be asked, Where it is the Operations of Art end? We may say, Either in some Energy, or in some Work.

He added, That if he were not afraid of the Imputation of Pedantry, he could be almost tempted to say, That we had been considering Art, with respect to those four Causes, so celebrated once among Professors in the Schools. By these, upon Inquiry, I found that he meant certain Causes, called the *Efficient, the †Material, the ‡Final, and the ||Formal.

But

* P. 17. † P. 22. ‡ P. 28, 29. || P. 34, 36.
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But here, without farther explaining, he begged for the present that we might conclude, being sufficiently, as he said, fatigued with the Length of what had passed already. The Request was reasonable I could not but own, and thus ended our Conversation, and soon after it our Walk.

The E N D.
TREATISE THE SECOND:

A DISCOURSE

On MUSIC, PAINTING, and POETRY.
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Introduction.—Design and Distribution of
the Whole.—Preparation for the following
Chapters.

ALL Arts have this in common, that they respect Human Life. Some contribute to its Necessi-
ties, as Medicine and Agriculture; others to its Elegance, as Music, Painting, and Poetry.

Now, with respect to these two different Species, the necessary Arts seem to have been prior in time; if it be probable, that Men
Men consulted how to live and to support themselves, before they began to deliberate how to render Life agreeable. Nor is this indeed unconfirmed by Fact, there being no Nation known so barbarous and ignorant, as where the Rudiments of these necessary Arts are not in some degree cultivated. And hence possibly they may appear to be the more excellent and worthy, as having claim to a Preference, derived from their Seniority.

The Arts however of Elegance cannot be said to want Pretensions, if it be true, that Nature framed us for something more than mere Existence. Nay, farther*, if Well-being be clearly preferable to Mere-being, and this without it be but a thing contemptible, they may have reason perhaps to aspire even to a Superiority. But enough of this, to come to our Purpose.

§ 2.

* 'Οu τὸ ζῆν ἡπὶ μὴ εἰσὶν ἡμιλέου, 'Αλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζῆν. Plat. in Critone.
§ 2. The Design of this Discourse is to treat of Music, Painting, and Poetry; to consider in what they agree, and in what they differ; and which upon the whole, is more excellent than the other two.

In entering upon this Inquiry, it is first to be observed, that the Mind is made conscious of the natural World and its Affections, and of other Minds and their Affections, by the several Organs of the Senses (a). By the same Organs, these Arts exhibit to the Mind Imitations, and imitate either Parts or Affections of this natural World.

(a) To explain some future Observations, it will be proper here to remark, that the Mind from these Materials thus brought together, and from its own Operations on them, and in consequence of them, becomes fraught with Ideas—and that many Minds so fraught, by a sort of Compact assigning to each Idea some Sound to be its Mark or Symbol, were the first Inventors and Founders of Language. See Vol. II. or Hermes, Lib. iii. cap. 3. 4.
A Discourse on Music,

Ch. I. World, or else the Passions, Energies, and other Affections of Minds. There is this Difference however between these Arts and Nature; that Nature passes to the Percipient thro' all the Senses; whereas these Arts use only two of them, that of Seeing and that of Hearing. And hence it is that the sensible Objects or Media, thro' which they imitate, can be such only, as these two Senses are framed capable of perceiving; and these Media are Motion, Sound, Colour, and Figure.

Paint-

(b) To prevent Confusion it must be observed, that in all these Arts there is a Difference between the sensible Media, thro' which they imitate, and the Subjects imitated. The sensible Media, thro' which they imitate, must be always relative to that Sense, by which the particular Art applies to the Mind; but the Subject imitated may be foreign to that Sense, and beyond the Power of its Perception. Painting, for instance, (as is shewn in this Chapter) has no sensible Media, thro' which it operates, except Colour and Figure: But as to Subjects, it may have Motions, Sounds, moral Affections and Actions; none of which are either Colours or Figures, but which however are all capable of being imitated thro' them. See Chapter the second, Notes (b), (c), (d).
PAINTING, and POETRY.

Painting, having the Eye for its Organ, cannot be conceived to imitate, but thro' the Media of visible Objects. And farther, its Mode of imitating being always motionless, there must be subtracted from these the Medium of Motion. It remains then, that Colour and Figure are the only Media, thro' which Painting imitates.

Music, passing to the Mind thro' the Organ of the Ear, can imitate only by Sounds and Motions.

Poetry, having the Ear also for its Organ, as far as Words are considered to be no more than mere Sounds, can go no farther in Imitating, than may be performed by Sound and Motion. But then, as these its Sounds stand by * Compact for the various Ideas with which the Mind is fraught, it is enabled by this means to imitate, as far as Lan-

* See Note (a) Page 55.
A Discourse on Music,

Ch. I. Language can express; and that it is evident will, in a manner, include all things.

Now from hence may be seen, how these Arts agree, and how they differ.

They agree, by being all Mimetic, or Imitative.

They differ, as they imitate by different Media; Painting by Figure and Colour; Music, by Sound and Motion; Painting and Music, by Media which are Natural; Poetry, for the greatest Part, by a Medium which is Artificial (c).

§ 3.

(c) A Figure painted, or a Composition of Musical Sounds have always a natural Relation to that, of which they are intended to be the Resemblance. But a Description in Words has rarely any such natural Relation to the several Ideas, of which those Words are the Symbols. None therefore understand the Description, but those who speak the Language. On the contrary, Musical and Picture-Imitations are intelligible to all Men.
§ 3. As to that Art, which upon the whole is *most excellent of the three*; it must be observed, that among these various Media of imitating, some will naturally be *more accurate*, some *less*; some will *best* imitate one Subject; some, another. Again, among the Number of Subjects there will be naturally also a Difference, as to *Merit* and *Demerit*. There will be some *sublime*, and some *low*; some *copious*, and some *short*; some *pathetic*, and others *void of Passion*; some formed to *instruct*, and others *not capable of it*.

Now, from these two Circumstances; that is to say, from the *Accuracy of the Imitation*, and the *Merit of the Subject imitated*, the Question concerning *which Art is most excellent*, must be tried and determined.

**This**

*Why it is said that Poetry is not universally, but only for the greater part artificial, see below, Chapter the Third, where what Natural Force it has, is examined and estimated.*
A Discourse on MUSIC,

Ch. I. This however cannot be done, without a Detail of Particulars, that so there may be formed, on every part, just and accurate Comparisons.

To begin therefore with Painting.
PAINTING, and POETRY.

CHAP. II.

On the Subjects which Painting imitates.—
On the Subjects which Music imitates.—
Comparison of Music with Painting.

THE FITTEST SUBJECTS FOR
Painting, are all such Things, and Incidents, as are * peculiarly characterised by Figure and Colour.

Of this kind are the whole Mass (a) of Things inanimate and vegetable; such as Flowers, Fruits, Buildings, Landskips—The various Tribes of Animal Figures; such as Birds, Beasts, Herds, Flocks—The Motions and Sounds peculiar to each Animal Species, when accompanied with Configurations, which are obvious and remarkable (b)—

The

* P. 57.

(a) The Reason is, that these things are almost wholly known to us by their Colour and Figure. Besides, they are as motionless, for the most part, in Nature, as in the Imitation.

(b) Instances of this kind are the Flying of Birds, the Galloping of Horses, the Roaring of Lions, the Crowing of Cocks. And the Reason is, that though
A Discourse on Music,

Ch. II. The Human Body in all its appearances (as Male, Female; Young, Old; Handsome, Ugly;) and in all its attitudes, (as Laying, Sitting, Standing, &c.)—The natural sounds peculiar to the Human Species, (such as Crying, Laughing, Hollowing, &c.) (c)—All Energies, Passions, and Affections, of the Soul, being in any degree more intense or violent though to paint Motion or Sound be impossible, yet the Motions and Sounds here mentioned having an immediate and natural connection with a certain visible configuration of the parts, the mind, from a prospect of this configuration, conceives insensibly that which is concomitant; and hence it is that, by a sort of fallacy, the Sounds and Motions appear to be painted also. On the contrary, not so in such motions, as the Swimming of many kinds of Fish; or in such Sounds, as the purring of a Cat; because here is no such special configuration to be perceived.—Homer in his Shield describing the picture of a Bull seized by two Lions, says of the Bull—ο δὲ μαχητὴς μεμυκτὴν Ἑγεμονίαν—He, bellowing loudly, was dragged along. Where Eustathius, in commenting on this Bellowing, says, ὡς εἶδος τῆς χώρας, as he (the Bull) made manifest (in the picture) by his Figure or Attitude. Eust. in J. Σ. p. 1224. (c) The reason is of the same kind, as that given in the Note immediately preceding; and by the same Rule, the Observation must be confined to natural Sounds only. In Language, few of the Speakers know the configurations, which attend it.
PAINTING, and POETRY.

violent than ordinary (d)—All Actions and Events, whose Integrity or Wholeness depends upon a short and self-evident Succession of Incidents (e)—Or if the Succession be extended, then such Actions at least, whose Incidents are all along, during that Succession, similar (f)—All Actions which being qualified as above, open themselves into a large Variety of Circumstances,

---

(d) The Reason is still of the same kind, viz. from their Visible Effects on the Body. They naturally produce either to the Countenance a particular Redness or Paleness; or a particular Modification of its Muscles; or else to the Limbs, a particular Attitude. Now all these Effects are solely referable to Colour and Figure, the two grand sensible Media, peculiar to Painting. See Raphael's Cartoons of St. Paul at Athens, and of his striking the Sorcerer Elymas blind: See also the Crucifixion of Polycrates, and the Sufferings of the Consul Regulus, both by Salvator Rosa.

(e) For of necessity every Picture is a Punctum Temporis or Instant.

(f) Such, for instance, as a Storm at Sea; whose Incidents of Vision may be nearly all included in foaming Waves, a dark Sky, Ships out of their erect Posture, and Men hanging upon the Ropes. Or as a Battle; which from Beginning to End presents nothing else, than Blood, Fire, Smoak, and Disorder. Now such Events may be well imitated all
Discourse on Music,
Ch. II. concurring all in the same Point of Time (g).
—All Actions which are known, and known universally, rather than Actions newly invented or known but to few (b).

All at once; for how long soever they last, they are but Repetitions of the same—Nicias, the Painter, recommended much the same Subjects, viz. a Sea-fight or a Land-battle of Cavalry. His reasons too are much the same with those mentioned in Note (g). He concludes with a Maxim, (little regarded by his Successors, however important,) that the Subject itself is as much a Part of the Painter’s Art, as the Poet’s Fable is a Part of Poetry. See Demetrius Phal. p. 53. Edit. Ox.

(g) For Painting is not bounded in Extension, as it is in Duration. Besides, it seems true in every Species of Composition, that, as far as Perplexity and Confusion may be avoided, and the Wholeness of the Piece may be preserved clear and intelligible; the more ample the Magnitude, and the greater the Variety, the greater also, in proportion, the Beauty and Perfection. Noble instances of this are the Pictures above-mentioned in Note (d). See Aristot. Poet. cap. 7. ‘Ο δὲ καθ’ ἀληθὴν φωνὴν τα ἄφαγματος ὑψητος, ἀνθρώπων: &c. See also Characterristicks, V. I. p. i43. and Bossu, B. I. cap. 16. L’Achille d’Homère est si grand, &c.

(b) The Reason is, that a Picture being (as has been said) but a Point or Instant, in a Story well known the Spectator’s Memory will supply the previous and the subsequent. But this cannot be done, where
PAINTING, and POETRY.

And thus much as to the Subjects of Ch. II. Painting.

§ 2. In MUSIC, the Fittest Subjects of Imitation are all such Things and

where such Knowledge is wanting. And therefore it may be justly questioned, whether the most celebrated Subjects, borrowed by Painting from History, would have been any of them intelligible thro' the Medium of Painting only, supposing History to have been silent, and to have given no additional Information.

It may be here added, that Horace, conformably to this Reasoning, recommends even to Poetic Imitation a known Story, before an unknown.

Tuque
Reelius Iliacum carmen deducis in actus,
Quam si proferres ignota, inditaque primus.
Art. Poet. v. 128.

And indeed as the being understood to others, either Hearers or Spectators, seems to be a common Requisite to all Mimetic Arts whatever; (for to those, who understand them not, they are in Fact no Mimetic Arts) it follows, that Perplicity must be Essential to them all; and that no prudent Artist would neglect, if it were possible, any just Advantage to obtain this End. Now there can be no Advantage greater, than the Notoriety of the Subject imitated.

F
Motion may be either slow or swift, even or uneven, broken or continuous. — Sound may be either soft or loud, high or low. Wherever therefore any of these Species of Motion or Sound may be found in an eminent (not a moderate or mean) degree, there will be room for Musical Imi-
tation.

Thus, in the Natural or Inanimate World, Music may imitate the Glidings, Murmurings, Tossings, Roarings, and other Accidents of Water, as perceived in Fountains, Cataracts, Rivers, Seas, &c. — The fame of Thunder — the fame of Winds, as well the stormy as the gentle. — In the Animal World, it may imitate the Voice of some Animals, but chiefly that of Singing Birds — It may also faintly copy some of their Motions. — In the Human Kind, it can also
also imitate some \textit{Motions (i)} and \textit{Sounds (k)}; \textit{Ch. II.}

and of Sounds those most perfectly, which are expressive of \textit{Grief and Anguish (l)}. 

\textbf{AND thus much as to the Subjects, which Music imitates.}

\textbf{§ 3. It remains then, that we compare these two Arts together. And here indeed, as to Musical Imitation in general, it must be confessed that—as it can, from its Genius, imitate only Sounds and Motions—as there are not many Motions either in the Animal}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{(i) As the Walk of the Giant Polyphemus, in the Pastoral of \textit{Acis and Galatea}.—See what ample Strides he takes, &c.}
  \item \textit{(k) As the Shouts of a Multitude, in the Coronation Anthem of, \textit{God save the King}, &c.}
  \item \textit{(l) The Reason is, that this Species of Musical Imitation most nearly approaches Nature. For Grief, in most Animals, declares itself by Sounds, which are not unlike to long Notes in the Chromatic System. Of this kind is the Chorus of \textit{Baal's Priest}s in the Oratorio of \textit{Deborah}, \textit{Doleful Tidings, how ye wound}, &c.}
\end{itemize}
Animal or in the Inanimate World, which are exclusively peculiar even to any Species and scarcely any to an Individual—as there are no Natural Sounds, which characterise at least lower than a Species (for the Natural Sounds of Individuals are in every Species the same)—farther, as Music does but imperfectly imitate even these Sounds and Motions (m)—On the contrary, as Figures, Postures of Figures, and Colours characterise not only every sensible Species, but even every Individual; and for the most part also the various* Energies and Passions of every Individual—and farther, as Painting is able, with the highest Accuracy and Exactness, to imitate all these Colours and Figures; and while Musical Imita-

(m) The Reason is from the Diffimilitude between the Sounds and Motions of Nature, and those of Music. Musical Sounds are all produced from Even Vibration, most Natural from Uneven; Musical Motions are chiefly Definite in their Measure, most Natural are Indefinite.

* See Note (d) of this Chapter.
Imitation pretends at most to no more, than the raising of Ideas similar, itself aspires to raise Ideas the very same—in a word, as Painting, in respect of its Subjects, is equal to the noblest Part of Imitation, the Imitating regular Actions consisting of a Whole and Parts; and of such Imitation, Music is utterly incapable—from all this it must be confessed, that Musical Imitation is greatly below that of Painting, and that at best it is but an imperfect thing.

As to the Efficacy therefore of Music, it must be derived from another Source, which must be left for the present, to be considered of hereafter *

There remains to be mentioned Imitation by Poetry.

* Ch. VI.
On the Subjects which Poetry imitates, but imitates only thro' natural Media, or mere Sounds—Comparison of Poetry in this Capacity, first with Painting, then with Music.

POETIC Imitation includes every thing in it, which is performed either by Picture-Imitation or Musical; for its Materials are Words, and Words are Symbols by Compact of all Ideas.

Farther as Words, beside their being Symbols by Compact, are also Sounds variously distinguished by their Aptness to be rapidly or slowly pronounced, and by the respective Prevalence of Mutes, Liquids, or Vowels in their Composition; it will follow that, beside their Compact-Relation, they will

* See Note (a) Chap. I.
PAINTING, and POETRY.

will have likewise a Natural Relation to all such Things, between which and themselves there is any Natural Resemblance. Thus, for instance, there is Natural Resemblance between all sorts of harsh and grating Sounds. There is therefore (exclusive of its Signification) a Natural Relation between the Sound of a vile Hautboy, and of that Verse in * Virgil,

\[\text{Stridenti miserum stipulâ disperdere Carmen.}\]

or of that other in † Milton.

\[\text{Grate on their Scrannel Pipes of wretched Straw.}\]

So also between the smooth swift Gliding of a River, and of that Verse in || Horace,

\[\text{at ille Labitur, & labetur in omne volubilis ævum.}\]

And thus in part even Poetic Imitation has its Foundation in Nature. But then this

* Ecl. 3. ver. 27. † In his Lycidas.

|| Epist. 2. 1. i. ver. 42, 43.
this Imitation goes not far: and taken
without the Meaning derived to the Sounds
from Compact, is but little intelligible, how-
ever perfect and elaborate.

§ 2. If therefore Poetry be compared
with Painting, in respect of this its
merely Natural and Inartificial Resem-
blance, it may be justly said that—In as
much as of this sort of Resemblance,
Poetry (like Music) has no other Sources,
than those two of Sound and Motion—
in as much as it often wants these Sources
themselves (for Numbers of Words neither
have, nor can have any Resemblance to
those Ideas, of which they are the Sym-
bols)—in as much as Natural Sounds
and Motions, which Poetry thus imitates,
are themselves but * loose and indefinite Acci-
dents of those Subjects, to which they
belong, and consequently do but loosely and
indefinitely characterise them—lastly, in
as much as Poetic Sounds and Motions do

* P. 67, 68.
PAINTING, and POETRY.

but faintly resemble those of Nature, which are themselves confessed to be so imperfect and vague.—From all this it will follow (as it has already followed of Music) that—Poetic Imitation founded in mere Natural Resemblance is much inferior to that of Painting, and at best but very imperfect.

§ 3. As to the Preference, which such Poetic Imitation may claim before Musical, or Musical Imitation before that; the Merits on each Side may appear perhaps equal. They both fetch their Imitations from † Sound and Motion. Now Music seems to imitate Nature better as to Motion, and Poetry as to Sound. The Reason is, that in Motions (a) Music has

† P. 57.

(a) Music has no less than five different Lengths of Notes in ordinary use, reckoning from the Semi-brief to the Semi-quaver; all which may be infinitely
A Discourse on Music, has a greater Variety; and in Sounds, those of Poetry approach nearer to Nature (b).

If therefore in Sound the one have the Preference, in Motion the other, and the Merit of Sound and Motion be supposed nearly equal; it will follow, that the Merit of the two Imitations will be nearly equal also.

\[
\text{\textit{Chap. III.}}
\]

\[\text{nately compounded, even in any one Time, or Measure—Poetry, on the other hand, has but two Lengths or Quantities, a long Syllable and a short, (which is its Half) and all the Variety of Verse arises from such Feet and Metres, as these two Species of Syllables, by being compounded, can be made produce.}\]

\[\text{(b) Musical Sounds are produced by even Vibrations, which scarcely any Natural Sounds are—on the contrary, Words are the Product of uneven Vibration, and so are most Natural Sounds—Add to this, that Words are far more numerous, than Musical Sounds. So that Poetry, as to imitation by Sound, seems to exceed Music, not only in nearness of Resemblance, but even in Variety also.}\]

\[\text{CHAP.}\]
C H A P. IV.

On the Subjects which Poetry imitates, not by mere Sounds or natural Media, but by Words significant; the Subjects at the same time being such, to which the Genius of each of the other two Arts is most perfectly adapted—Its Comparison in these Subjects, first with Painting, then with Music.

The Mimetic Art of Poetry has been hitherto considered, as fetching its Imitation from mere Natural Resemblance. In this it has been shewn much inferior to Painting, and nearly equal to Music.

It remains to be considered, what its Merits are, when it imitates not by mere Natural Sound, but by Sound significant; by Words, the compact Symbols of all kinds of Ideas. From hence depends its genuine Force.
A Discourse on MUSIC,

Ch. IV. Force. And here, as it is able to find Sounds expressive of every Idea, so is there no Subject either of Picture-Imitation, or Musical, to which it does not aspire; all Things and Incidents whatever being, in a manner, to be described by Words.

Whether therefore Poetry, in this its proper sphere, be equal to the Imitation of the other two Arts, is the question at present, which comes in order to be discussed.

Now as Subjects are infinite, and the other two Arts are not equally adapted to imitate all; it is proposed, first to compare Poetry with them in such Subjects, to which they are most perfectly adapted.

§ 2. To begin therefore with Painting. A Subject, in which the Power of this Art may be most fully exerted, (whether it be taken from the Inanimate, or the Animal, or the Moral World) must be a Subject, which is principally and eminently characterised by certain Colours, Figures,
Figures, and Postures of Figures—whose Comprehension depends not on a Succession of Events; or at least, if on a Succession, on a short and self-evident one—which admits a large Variety of such Circumstances, as all concur in the same individual Point of Time, and relate all to one principal Action.

As to such a Subject therefore—In as much as Poetry is forced to pass thro' the Medium of Comparison, while Painting applies immediately thro' the Medium of Nature; the one being understood to all, the other to the Speakers of a certain Language * only—in as much as Natural Operations must needs be more affecting, than Artificial—in as much as Painting helps our own rude Ideas by its own, which are consummate and wrought up to the Perfection of Art; while Poetry can raise no other (a) than what every Mind is furnished with

* Note (c) p. 58.

(a) When we read in Milton of Eve, that Grace was in all her Steps, Heav'n in her Eye, In ev'ry Gesture Dignity and Love; we
with before—in as much as Painting shews all the minute and various concurrent Circumstances of the Event in the same individual Point of Time, as they appear in Nature; while Poetry is forced to want this Circumstance of Intelligibility, by being ever obliged to enter into some degree of Detail—in as much as this Detail creates often the Dilemma of either becoming tedious, to be clear; or if not tedious, then obscure—lastly, in as much as all Imitations more similar, more immediate,

we have an Image not of that Eve, which Milton conceived, but of such an Eve only, as every one, by his own proper Genius, is able to represent, from reflecting on those Ideas, which he has annexed to these several Sounds. The greater Part, in the mean time, have never perhaps bestowed one accurate Thought upon what Grace, Heaven, Love, and Dignity mean; or ever enriched the Mind with Ideas of Beauty, or asked whence they are to be acquired, and by what Proportions they are constituted. On the contrary, when we view Eve as painted by an able Painter, we labour under no such Difficulty; because we have exhibited before us the better Conceptions of an Artist, the genuine Ideas of perhaps a Titian or a Raphael.
PAINTING, and POETRY.

diate, and more intelligible, are preferable to those which are less so; and for the Reasons above, the Imitations of Poetry are less similar, less immediate, and less intelligible than those of Painting—From all this it will follow, that—in all Subjects where Painting can fully exert itself, the Imitations of Painting are superior to those of Poetry, and consequently in all such Subjects that Painting has the Preference.

§ 3. And now to compare Poetry with Music, allowing to Music the same Advantage of a well-adapted Subject, which has already been allowed to Painting in the Comparison just preceding.

What such a Subject is, has already been * described. And as to Preference, it must

* See Chap. II. § 2.
must be confessed, that—In as much as Musical Imitations, tho' Natural, aspire not to raise the same Ideas, but only Ideas similar and analogous; while Poetic Imitation, tho' Artificial, raises Ideas the very same—in as much as the Definite and Certain is ever preferable to the Indefinite and Uncertain; and that more especially in Imitations, where the principal
(b) Delight is in recognizing the Thing imitating

|| P. 68, 69.
(b) That there is an eminent Delight in this very Recognition itself, abstract from any thing pleasing in the Subject recognized, is evident from hence—that, in all the Mimetic Arts, we can be highly charmed with Imitations, at whose Originals in Nature we are shocked and terrified. Such, for instance, as Dead Bodies, Wild Beasts, and the like.

The Cause, assigned for this, seems to be of the following kind. We have a Joy, not only in the Sanity and Perfection, but also in the just and natural Energies of our several Limbs and Faculties. And hence, among others, the Joy in Reasoning; as being the Energy of that principal Faculty, our Intellect or Understanding. This Joy extends, not only to the Wise, but to the Multitude. For all Men have an Aversion to Ignorance and Error, and
PAINTING, and POETRY.  

imitated—it will follow from hence that—

EVEN IN SUBJECTS THE BEST ADAPTED 

to Musical Imitation, the Imitation of Poetry will be still more excellent:

and in some degree; however moderate, are glad to 

learn and to inform themselves.

HENCE therefore the Delight, arising from these 

Imitations; as we are enabled, in each of them, to 

exercise the Reasoning Faculty; and, by com-

paring the Copy with the Archetype in our Minds, to 

infer that this is such a thing; and, that, 

another; a Fact remarkable among Children, 

even in their first and earliest Days.

Τὸ, τε γὰρ μμεῖσθαι, σύμφωνας τῶις ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παιδῶν 

ἐτί, καὶ τότε διαφέρεισι τῶις ἄλλως ἡμών, ὡτι μμηματο- 

τάτα ἐτί, καὶ τάς μαθήσεις τοιούτας διὰ μμημήσεως τὰς πρώτας· 

καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μμημαται πάντας. Σημείον δὲ τότε τὸ 

συμβαίνον ἐπὶ τῶις ἐργον. "Α γὰρ αὕτα λυπηρῶς ὀρώμεν, 

τότων τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ὑπορεμένας, χαίρομεν Θεω-

ρίσις σύν ἡμῖν τοῖς μορφὰς τῶις ἀγρυπνότων, καὶ νεκρῶν. 

"Ἄλλον δὲ καὶ τότε, ὅτι μανθάνειν ὡς μόνον τοῖς 

φιλοσόφοις ἰδίον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως· ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ βραχυδ 

κοινώνω- 

σιν αὐτὰ. Διὰ γὰρ τότε χαίρειν τὰς εἰκόνας ὀρώμεν, ὃτι 

συμβαίνει Θεωρίασας μανθάνειν καὶ συνογιζομένων, τῷ ἑνακόοι 

ἢν, ὡς ἐτό ἐκείνῳ. Ἀριστ. Poet. c. 4.
CHAP. V.

On the Subjects which Poetry imitates by Words significant, being at the same time Subjects not adapted to the Genius of either of the other Arts—The Nature of those Subjects—The Abilities of Poetry to imitate them—Comparison of Poetry in these Subjects, first with Painting, then with Music.

Ch. V. THE MIMETIC ART of POETRY has now been considered in two Views—First, as imitating by mere natural Media: and in this it has been placed on a level with Music, but much inferior to Painting—It has been since considered as imitating thro' Sounds significant by Compact, and that in such Subjects respectively, where Painting and Music have the fullest Power to exert themselves.

Here
PAINTING, and POETRY.

Here to Painting it has been held inferior, but to Music it has been preferred.

It remains to be considered—what other Subjects Poetry has left, to which the Genius of the other two Arts is less perfectly adapted—How far Poetry is able to imitate them—and whether from the Perfection of its Imitation, and the Nature of the Subjects themselves, it ought to be called no more than equal to its Sister Arts; or whether, on the whole, it should not rather be called superior.

§ 2. To begin, in the first place, by comparing it with Painting.

The Subjects of Poetry, to which the Genius of Painting is not adapted, are—all Actions, whose (a) Whole is of so lengthened

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(a) For a just and accurate Description of Wholeness and Unity, see Arist. Poet. Ch. 7 & 8. and Bossu, his best Interpreter, in his Treatise on the Epic Poem. B. II. ch. 9, 10, 11.
lengthened a Duration, that no Point of Time, in any part of that Whole, can be given fit for Painting; neither in its Beginning, which will teach what is Subsequent; nor in its End, which will teach what is Previous; nor in its Middle, which will declare both the Previous and the Subsequent. Also all Subjects so framed, as to lay open the internal Constitution of Man, and give us an Insight into (b) Characters, Manners, Passions, and Sentiments.

The

(b) For a Description of Character, see below, Note (d) of this Chapter.

As for Manners, it may be said in general, that a certain System of them makes a Character; and that as these Systems, by being differently compounded, make each a different Character, so is it that one Man truly differs from another.

Passions are obvious; Pity, Fear, Anger, &c.

Sentiments are discoverable in all those Things, which are the proper Business and End of Speech or Discourse. The chief Branches of this End are to Assert and Prove; to Solve and Refute; to express or excite Passions; to amplify Incidents,
The Merit of these Subjects is obvious. They must necessarily of all be the most affecting; the most improving; and such of which the Mind has the strongest Comprehension.

For as to the affecting Part—if it be true, that all Events more or less affect us, as the Subjects, which they respect, are more or less nearly related to us; then surely those Events must needs be most affecting, to whose Subjects we are of all the most intimately related. Now such is the Relation, which we bear to Mankind; and Men and Human Actions are the Subjects, here proposed for Imitation.

G 3

As incidents, and to diminish them. It is in these things therefore, that we must look for Sentiment. See Arist. Poet. c. 19.—ἐτι δὲ καὶ τὴν Διάνοιαν ταῦτα ὡσα ὑπὸ τῇ λογίᾳ δὴ ἠφαρασκευασθήναι. Μέρη δὲ τῶν, τὸ, τῇ ἀποδεικνύναι, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ τῷ πάθη ἠφαρασκευάζειν,—καὶ ἐτὶ μέγεθος, καὶ σμικρότητα.
As to Improvement—there can be none surely (to Man at least) so great, as that which is derived from a just and decent Representation of Human Manners, and Sentiments. For what can more contribute to give us that Master-Knowledge (c), without

(c) ΓΝΩΘΙ ΣΑΤΤΩΝ. But farther, besides obtaining this moral Science from the Contemplation of Human Life; an End common both to Epic, Tragic, and Comic Poetry; there is a peculiar End to Tragedy, that of eradicating the Passions of Pity and Fear. "Εστι οὐ τραγῳδία μίμησις πράξεως οπωδαιας καὶ τελειας—δι’ ἐλεός καὶ φόβος περαινοια τήν τῶν τοιῶν παθημάτων κάθαρσιν. Arisf. Poet. c. 6. Tragedy is the Imitation of an Action important and perfect, thro’ Pity and Fear working the Purification of such-like Passions.

There are none, it is evident, so devoid of these two Passions, as those perpetually conversant, where the Occasions of them are most frequent; such, for instance, as the Military Men, the Professors of Medicine, Chirurgery, and the like. Their Minds, by this Intercourse, become as it were callous; gaining an Apathy by Experience, which no Theory can ever teach them.
PAINTING, and POETRY.

out which, all other Knowledge will prove of little or no Utility.

G 4

As

Now that, which is wrought in these Men by the real Disasters of Life, may be supposed wrought in others by the Fictions of Tragedy; yet with this happy Circumstance in favour of Tragedy, that, without the Disasters being real, it can obtain the same End.

It must however, for all this, be confessed, that an Effect of this kind cannot reasonably be expected, except among Nations, like the Athenians of old, who lived in a perpetual Attendance upon these Theatrical Representations. For it is not a single or occasional Application to these Passions, but a constant and uninterrupted, by which alone they may be lessened or removed.

It would be improper to conclude this Note, without observing, that the Philosopher in this place by Pity means not Philanthropy, Natural Affection, a Readiness to relieve others in their Calamities and Distress; but, by Pity, he means that Senseless Effeminate Consternation, which seizes weak Minds, on the sudden Prospect of any thing disastrous; which, in its more violent Effects, is seen in Shrickings, Swoonings, &c. a Passion, so far from laudable, or from operating to the Good of others, that it is certain to deprive the Party, who labours under its Influence, of all Capacity to do the least good Office.
As to our Comprehension—there is nothing certainly, of which we have so strong Ideas, as of that which happens in the Moral or Human World. For as to the Internal Part, or Active Principle of the Vegetable, we know it but obscurely; because there we can discover neither Passion, nor Sensation. In the Animal World indeed this Principle is more seen, and that from the Passions and Sensations which there declare themselves. Yet all still rests upon the mere Evidence of Sense; upon the Force only of external and unassisted Experience. But in the Moral or Human World, as we have a Medium of Knowledge far more accurate than this; so from hence it is, that we can comprehend accordingly.

With regard therefore to the various Events which happen here, and the various Causes, by which they are produced—in other Words, of all Characters, Manners, Human Passions, and Sentiments; besides the Evidence of Sense, we have the highest Evidence
PAINTING, and POETRY.

Evidence additional, in having an express

Consciousness of something similar within;

of something homogeneous in the Recesses of

our own Minds; in that, which constitutes

to each of us his true and real Self.

These therefore being the Subjects, not

adapted to the Genius of Painting, it comes

next to be considered, how far Poetry can

imitate them.

And here, that it has Abilities clearly
equal, cannot be doubted; as it has that

for the Medium of its Imitation, through

which Nature declares herself in the same

Subjects. For the Sentiments in real Life

are only known by Men's * Discourse.

And the Characters, Manners, and Passions

of Men being the Prompters to what they

say; it must needs follow, that their Discourse will be a constant Specimen of those Characters, Manners, and Passions.

Format

* P. 84, Note (b).
A Discourse on MUSIC,

Ch. V. * Format enim Natura prius nos intus ad omnem Fortunarum habitum; juvat, aut impellit ad iram: Post effert Animi Motus, INTERPRETE LINGUA.

Not only therefore Language is an adequate Medium of Imitation, but in Sentiments it is the only Medium; and in Manners and Passions there is no other, which can exhibit them to us after that clear, precise, and definite Way, as they in Nature stand allotted to the various sorts of Men, and are found to constitute the several Characters of each (d).

§ 3.

* Hor. de Arte Poet. vers. 108.

(d) It is true indeed that (besides what is done by Poetry) there is some Idea of Character, which even Painting can communicate. Thus there is no doubt, but that such a Countenance may be found by Painters for Aeneas, as would convey upon view a mild,
§ 3. To compare therefore Poetry, in Ch. V. these Subjects, with Painting—In as much as no Subjects of Painting are * wholly superior

mild, humane, and yet a brave Disposition. But then this Idea would be vague and general. It would be concluded, only in the gross, that the Hero was Good. As to that System of Qualities peculiar to Æneas only, and which alone properly constitutes his true and real Character, this would still remain a Secret, and be no way discoverable. For how deduce it from the mere Lineaments of a Countenance? Or, if it were deducible, how few Spectators would there be found so sagacious? It is here, therefore, that Recourse must be had, not to Painting, but to Poetry. So accurate a Conception of Character can be gathered only from a Succession of various, and yet consistent Actions; a Succession, enabling us to conjecture, what the Person of the Drama will do in the future, from what already he has done in the past. Now to such an Imitation, Poetry only is equal; because it is not bounded, like Painting, to short, and as it were, instant Events, but may imitate Subjects of any Duration whatever. See Arist. Poet. cap. 6. *Εσι δὲ ήθος μὲν τὸ τοιῶτον, ὃ δῆλοι τὴν αφοσίεσσιν ἐποίη τις ἐσιν, ἐν οἷς ἐκ ἐσι δῆλον, ἐς αφοσίεται ἢ φέωγες ὀ λέγων. See also the ingenious and learned Boëthius, Book 4. ch. 4.
Discourse on Music, Ch. V. prior to Poetry; while the Subjects, here described, far exceed the Power of Painting—in as much as they are of all Subjects the most affecting, and improving, and such of which we have the strongest Comprehension—further, in as much as Poetry can most accurately imitate them—in as much as, besides all Imitation, there is a Charm in Poetry, arising from its very Numbers (e); whereas Painting has Pretence

† P. 85, &c.
‡ P. 89, &c.

(e) That there is a Charm in Poetry, arising from its Numbers only, may be made evident from the five or six first Lines of the Paradise Lost; where, without any Pomp of Phrase, Sublimity of Sentiment, or the least Degree of Imitation, every Reader must find himself to be sensibly delighted; and that, only from the graceful and simple Cadence of the Numbers, and that artful Variation of the Caesura or Pause, so essential to the Harmony of every good Poem.

An English Heroic Verse consists of ten Semipeds, or Half-feet. Now in the Lines above-mentioned the
PAINTING, and POETRY.

tence to no Charm, except that of Imitation only—lastly, (which will soon be * shewn) in as much as Poetry is able to associate Music, as a most powerful Ally; of which Assistance, Painting is utterly incapable—From all this it may be fairly concluded, that—Poetry is not only Equal, but that it is in fact far superior to its Sister Art of Painting.

§ 4. But if it exceed Painting in Subjects, to which Painting is not adapted; no doubt will it exceed Music in Subjects to Music

* Chap. VI.

the Pauses are varied upon different Semipeds in the Order, which follows; as may be seen by any, who will be at the Pains to examine.

PARADISE LOST, B. I.

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has its Pause fall upon
Ch. V. Music not adapted. For here it has been *preferred, even in those Subjects, which have been held adapted the best of all.

§ 5. Poetry is therefore, on the whole much superior to either of the other Mimetic Arts; it having been shewn to be equally excellent in the ✠Accuracy of its Imitation; and to imitate Subjects, which far surpass, as well in ✠Utility, as in ||Dignity.

* Ch. IV. § 3. † P. 89. ‡ P. 86. 
|| See p. 83, 84. and p. 64, Note (g). See also p. 59.
C H A P. VI.

On Music considered not as an Imitation, but as deriving its Efficacy from another Source.—On its joint Operation by this means with Poetry.—An Objection to Music solved.—The Advantage arising to it, as well as to Poetry, from their being united.—Conclusion.

In the above Discourse, Music has been mentioned as an *Ally to Poetry. It has also been said to derive its †Efficacy from another Source, than Imitation. It remains, therefore, that these things be explained.

Now, in order to this, it is first to be observed, that there are various Affections, which may be raised by the Power of Music.

* P. 93. † P. 69.
There are Sounds to make us cheerful, or sad; martial, or tender; and so of almost every other Affection, which we feel.

It is also further observable, that there is a reciprocal Operation between our Affections, and our Ideas; so that, by a sort of natural Sympathy, certain Ideas necessarily tend to raise in us certain Affections; and those Affections, by a sort of Counter-Operation, to raise the same Ideas. Thus Ideas derived from Funerals, Tortures, Murders, and the like, naturally generate the Affection of Melancholy. And when, by any Physical Causes, that Affection happens to prevail, it as naturally generates the same doleful Ideas.

And hence it is, that Ideas, derived from external Causes, have at different times, upon the same Person, so different an Effect. If they happen to suit the Affections, which prevail within, then is their Impression most sensible, and their Effect most
most lasting. If the contrary be true, then Ch. VI. is the Effect contrary. Thus, for instance, a Funeral will much more affect the same Man, if he see it when melancholy, than if he see it when cheerful.

Now this being premised, it will follow, that whatever happens to be the Affection or Disposition of Mind, which ought naturally to result from the Genius of any Poem, the same probably it will be in the Power of some Species of Music to excite. But whenever the proper Affection prevails, it has been allowed that then all kindred Ideas, derived from external Causes, make the most sensible Impression. The Ideas therefore of Poetry must needs make the most sensible Impression, when the (a) Affections, peculiar to them, are already

(a) Quintilian elegantly, and exactly apposite to this Reasoning, says of Music——Namque et voce et modulatione grandia elate, jucunda dulciter, moderata

H
ready excited by the Music. For here a double Force is made co-operate to one End. A Poet, thus assisted, finds not an Audience in a Temper, averse to the Genius of his Poem, or perhaps at best under a cool Indifference; but by the Preludes, the Symphonies, and concurrent Operation of the Music in all its Parts, roused into those very Affections, which he would most desire.

An Audience, so disposed, not only embrace with Pleasure the Ideas of the Poet, when exhibited; but, in a manner, even anticipate them in their several Imaginations. The Superstitious have not a more previous Tendency to be frightened at the sight of Spectres, or a Lover to fall into Raptures at the sight of his Mistress; than a Mind, thus tempered by the Power of Music,

moderata leniter canit, totâque arte consentit cum eorum, quae dicuntur, Affectibus. Infl. Orator. 1. 1. cap. 10.
PAINTING, and POETRY.

Music, to enjoy all Ideas, which are suitable to that Temper.

And hence the genuine Charm of Music, and the Wonders which it works, thro' its great Professors (b). A Power, which consists not in Imitations, and the raising Ideas; but in the raising Affections, to which Ideas may correspond. There are few to be found so insensible, I may even say so inhumane, as when good Poetry is justly set to Music, not in some degree to feel the Force of so amiable an Union. But to the Muses Friends it is a Force irresistible, and penetrates

(b) Such, above all, is George Frederick Handel; whose Genius, having been cultivated by continued Exercife, and being itself far the sublimeft and most universal now known, has justly placed him without an Equal, or a Second. This transient Testimony could not be denied fo excellent an Artist, from whom this Treatife has borrowed fuch eminent Examples, to justify its Afections in what it has offered concerning Music.
¶ 2. Now this is that Source, from whence Music was said formerly to derive its greatest Efficacy. And here indeed, not in (c) Imitation, ought it to be chiefly cultivated. On this account also it has been called a powerful Ally to Poetry. And farther, it is by the help of this Reasoning, that the Objection is solved, which is raised against the Singing of Poetry (as in Opera's, Oratorio's, &c.) from the want of

* Horat. Epift. I. I. 2. vers. 211.
† P. 69.  ‡ P. 93.

(c) For the narrow Extent and little Efficacy of Music, considered as a Mimetic or Imitative Art, see Ch. II. ¶ 3.
PAINTING, and POETRY.

of Probability and Resemblance to Nature. Ch. VI.

To one indeed, who has no musical Ear, this Objection may have Weight. It may even perplex a Lover of Music, if it happen to surprize him in his Hours of Indifference. But when he is feeling the Charm of Poetry so accompanied, let him be angry (if he can) with that which serves only to interest him more feelingly in the Subject, and support him in a stronger and more earnest Attention; which enforces, by its Aid, the several Ideas of the Poem, and gives them to his Imagination with unusual Strength and Grandeur. He cannot surely but confess, that he is a Gainer in the Exchange, when he barters the want of a single Probability, that of Pronunciation (a thing merely arbitrary and everywhere different) for a noble Heightening of Affections which are suitable to the Occasion, and enable him to enter into the Subject with double Energy and Enjoyment.
§ 3. From what has been said it is evident, that these two Arts can never be so powerful singly, as when they are properly united. For Poetry, when alone, must be necessarily forced to waste many of its richest Ideas, in the mere raising of Affections, when, to have been properly relished, it should have found those Affections in their highest Energy. And Music, when alone, can only raise Affections, which soon languish and decay, if not maintained and fed by the nutritive Images of Poetry. Yet must it be remembered, in this Union, that Poetry ever have the Precedence; its *Utility, as well as Dignity, being by far the more considerable.

§ 4. And thus much, for the present, as to †Music, Painting, and Poetry, the

* Ch. V. § 2. p. 83.
† P. 55.
PAINTING, and POETRY.

the Circumstances, in which they *agree*, Ch. VI. and in which they *differ*; and the *preference, due to one of them above the other two.*

The END.
TREATISE THE THIRD:

Concerning HAPPINESS,

A DIALOGUE.
Concerning Happiness, A Dialogue.

PART the First.

J. H. to F. S.

Nature seems to treat Man, as a painter would his disciple, to whom he commits the outlines of a Figure lightly sketched, which the Scholar for himself is to colour and complete. Thus from Nature we derive Senses, and Passions, and an Intellect, which each of us for himself has to model into a Character. And hence (the reverse
Concerning Happiness,

Part I.

of every Species beside) Human Characters alone are infinitely various; as various indeed, as there are Individuals to form them. Hence too, the great Diversity of Systems, and of Doctrines, respecting the Laws and Rules, and Conduct of Human Life.

It is in the History of these, my Friend, you have so successfully employed yourself. You have been studious to know, not so much what Greeks, Romans, or Barbarians have done; as what they have reasoned, and what they have taught. Not an Epicure has more Joy in the Memory of a delicious Banquet, than I feel in recollecting, what we have discoursed on these Subjects.

And here you cannot forget (for we were both unanimous) the Contempt, in which we held those superficial Censurers, who profess to refute, what they want even Capacities to comprehend. Upon the Faith of their own Boasting (could that be credited)
A Dialogue. 109

Part I.

Propositions are exposed, Opinions demolished, and the whole Wisdom of Antiquity lies vanquished at their Feet. Like Opera Heroes, upon their own Stage, they can with ease dispatch a Lion, or discomfit a whole Legion. But alas! were they to encounter, not the Shadow, but the Substance, what think you would be the Event then?—Little better, I fear, than was the Fortune of poor Priam, when the feeble Old Man durst attack the Youthful Pyrrhus.

Among the many long exploded and obsolete Systems, there was one, you may remember, for which I professed a great Esteem. Not in the least degree convinced by all I had heard against it, I durst

* Aeneid. 1. 2. verl. 544.
Concerning **Happiness**, Part I.

durft venture to affirm, that no System was more plausible; that grant but its Principles, and the rest followed of course; that none approached nearer to the Perfection of our own Religion, as I could prove, were there occasion, by Authority not to be controverted. As you, I knew, were the Favourer of an Hypothesis somewhat different; so I attempted to support my own, by reciting you a certain Dialogue. Not succeeding however so happily in the Recollection, as I could with, I have since endeavoured to transcribe, what at that time I would have rehearsed. The result of my Labour is the following Narrative, which I commit with Confidence to your Friendship and Candour.

§ 2. It was at a time, when a certain Friend, whom I highly value, was my Guest. We had been sitting together, enter-

† *Viz.* the Platonic.
Among many of his Characters, we had looked into that of Woolsey. How soon, says my Friend, does the Cardinal in Disgrace abjure that Happiness, which he was lately so fond of? Scarcely out of Office, but he begins to exclaim

*Vain Pomp and Glory of the World! I hate ye."

So true is it, that our Sentiments ever vary with the Season; and that in Adversity we are of one Mind, in Prosperity, of another.

As for his mean Opinion, said I, of Human Happiness, it is a Truth, which small Reflection might have taught him long before. There seems little need of Distress to inform us of this. I rather commend the seeming Wisdom of that Eastern Monarch, who in the Affluence of Prosperity, when he was proving every Pleasure, was yet so sensible of their Emptiness, their In sufficiency to make him happy, that he pro-

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* Shakespear's Henry the Eighth.
† Tyche. Disp. v. 7.
Concerning Happiness,

Part I. proclaimed a Reward to the Man, who should invent a new Delight. The Reward indeed was proclaimed, but the Delight was not to be found. If by Delight, said he, you mean some Good; something conducive to real Happiness; it might have been found perhaps, and yet not hit the Monarch's Fancy.

Is that, said I, possible? It is possible, replied he, tho' it had been the Sovereign Good itself—And indeed what wonder? Is it probable that such a Mortal, as an Eastern Monarch; such a pampered, flattered, idle Mortal; should have Attention, or Capacity to a Subject so delicate? A Subject, enough to exercise the Subtlest and most Acute?

What then is it you esteem, said I, the Sovereign Good to be? It should seem, by your Representation, to be something very uncommon. Ask me not the Question, said he, you know not where it will carry us. Its general Idea indeed is easy and plain; but the Detail of Particulars is perplexed
perplexed and long—Passions, and Opinions for ever thwart us—a Paradox appears in almost every Advance. Besides, did our Inquiries succeed ever so happily, the very Subject itself is always enough to give me Pain. That, replied I, seems a Paradox indeed. It is not, said he, from any Prejudice, which I have conceived against it; for to Man I esteem it the noblest in the World. Nor is it for being a Subject, to which my Genius does not lead me; for no Subject at all times has more employed my Attention. But the Truth is, I can scarce ever think on it but an unlucky Story still occurs to my Mind. “A certain Star-gazer, with his Telescope was once viewing the Moon; and describing her Seas, her Mountains, and her Territories. Says a Clown to his Companion, Let him spy what he pleases; we are as near to the Moon, as he and all his Brethren.” So fares it alas! with these, our moral Speculations. Practice too often creeps, where Theory can soar. The Philosopher proves as weak,

I
Concerning Happiness,

Part I. as those, whom he most contemns. A mortifying Thought to such as well attend it. Too mortifying, replied I, to be long dwelt on. Give us rather your general Idea of the Sovereign Good. This is easy from your own Account, however intricate the Detail.

Thus then, said he, since you are so urgent, it is thus that I conceive it. The Sovereign Good is that, the Possession of which renders us Happy.

And how, said I, do we possess it? Is it Sensual, or Intellectual? There you are entering, said he, upon the Detail. This is beyond your Question. Not a small Advance, said I, to indulge poor Curiosity? Will you raise me a Thirst, and be so cruel not to allay it? It is not, replied he, of my raising, but your own. Besides I am not certain, should I attempt to proceed, whether you will admit such Authorities, as it is possible I may vouch.

That, said I, must be determined by their Weight, and Character. Suppose,
pose, said he, it should be MANKIND; the whole Human Race. Would you not think it something strange, to seek of those concerning Good, who pursue it a thousand Ways, and many of them contradictory? I confess, said I, it seems so.

And yet, continued he, were there a Point, in which such Diffentients ever agreed, this Agreement would be no mean Argument in favour of its Truth and Justness. But where, replied I, is this Agreement to be found?

He answered me by asking, What if it should appear, that there were certain Original Characteristics and Preconceptions of Good, which were Natural, Uniform and Common to all Men; which all recognized in their various Pursuits; and that the Difference lay only in the applying them to Particulars? This requires, said I, to be illustrated. As if, continued he, a Company of Travellers, in some wide Forest, were all intending for one City,
Concerning **Happiness**, Part I. but each by a Route peculiar to himself. The Roads indeed would be *various*, and many perhaps *false*; but all who travelled, would have *one End in view*. It is evident, said I, they would. So fares it then, added he, with Mankind in pursuit of **Good**. The Ways indeed are *Many*, but what they seek is **One**.

For instance: Did you ever hear of any, who in pursuit of their **Good**, were for living the Life of a Bird, an **Insect**, or a **Fish**? None. And why not? It would be inconsistent, answered I, with their Nature. You see then, said he, they *all agree* in this—that what they pursue, ought to be *consistent, and agreeable to their proper Nature*. So ought it, said I, undoubtedly. If so, continued he, one *Pre-conception* is discovered, which is *common to Good in general*—It is, that *all Good is supposed something agreeable to Nature*. This indeed, replied I, seems to be agreed on all hands.

**But**
But again, said he,—Is there a Man scarcely to be found of a Temper so truly mortified, as to acquiesce in the lowest, and shortest Necessaries of Life? Who aims not, if he be able, at something farther, something better? I replied, Scarcely one.

Do not Multitudes pursue, said he, infinite Objects of Desire, acknowledged, every one of them, to be in no respect Necessaries?—Exquisite Viands, delicious Wines, splendid Apparel, curious Gardens; magnificent Apartments adorned with Pictures and Sculpture; Music and Poetry, and the whole Tribe of Elegant Arts?

It is evident, said I. If it be, continued he, it should seem that they all considered the Chief or Sovereign Good, not to be that, which conduces to bare Existence or mere Being; for to this the Necessaries alone are adequate. I replied they were.

But if not this, it must be somewhat conducive to that, which is superior to mere Being. It must. And what, continued he, can this be, but Well-Being?
Concerning \textbf{Happiness},

Part I. Well-Being, under the various Shapes, in which \emph{differing} Opinions paint it? Or can you suggest any thing else? I replied, I could not. Mark here, then, continued he, another \emph{Pre-conception}, in which they all agree—the \textit{Sovereign Good} is somewhat \emph{conducive, not to mere Being, but to Well-Being}. I replied, it had so appeared.

\textit{Again}, continued he. What labour, what expence, to procure those rarities, which our own poor country is unable to afford us? How is the world ransacked to its utmost Verges, and luxury and arts imported from every quarter?—Nay more—How do we baffle \textit{Nature} herself; invert her Order; seek the Vegetables of Spring in the rigours of Winter, and Winter's Ice, during the heats of Summer? I replied, We did. And what disappointment, what remorse, when endeavours fail? It is true. If this then be evident, said he, it should seem, that whatever we desire as our \textit{Chief} and
Sovereign Good, is something which, as far as possible, we would accommodate to all Places and Times. I answered, so it appeared.

See then, said he, another of its Characteristics, another Pre-conception.

But farther still—What contests for Wealth? What scrambling for Property? What perils in the pursuit; what solicitude in the maintenance?—And why all this? To what Purpose, what End?—Or is not the reason plain? Is it not that Wealth may continually procure us, whatever we fancy Good; and make that perpetual, which would otherwise be transient?

I replied, it seemed so. Is it not farther desired, as supplying us from ourselves; when, without it, we must be beholden to the benevolence of others, and depend on their caprice for all that we enjoy?

It is true, said I, this seems a reason.

Again—Is not Power of every degree as much contested for, as Wealth? Are not magistracies, honours, principalities, and
Concerning Happiness,

Part I. empire, the subjects of strife, and everlastin\^g contention? I replied, They were. And why, said he, this? To obtain what End?—Is it not to help us, like wealth, to the Possession of what we desire? Is it not farther to ascertain, to secure our enjoyments; that when others would deprive us, we may be strong enough to resist them? I replied, it was.

Or to invert the whole—Why are there, who seek recesses the most distant and retired? fly courts and power, and submit to Parcimony and Obscurity? Why all this, but from the same intention? From an Opinion that small possessions, used moderately, are permanent—that larger possessions raise envy, and are more frequently invaded—that the Safety of Power and Dignity is more precarious, than that of Retreat; and that therefore they have chosen, what is most eligible upon the whole? It is not, said I, improbable, that they act by some such motive.

Do
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Do you not see then, continued he, two or three more Pre-conceptions of the Sovereign Good, which are sought for by all, as essential to constitute it? And what, said I, are these? That it should not be transient, nor derived from the Will of others, nor in their Power to take away; but be durable, self-derived, and (if I may use the Expression) indeprivable.

I confess, said I, it appears so. But we have already found it to be considered, as something agreeable to our Nature; conducive, not to mere Being, but to Well-Being; and what we aim to have accommodate to all Places and Times. We have.

There may be other Characteristics, said he, but these I think sufficient. See then its Idea; behold it, as collected from the Original, Natural, and Universal Pre-conceptions of all Mankind. The Sovereign Good, they have taught us, ought to be something—agreeable to our Nature; conducive to Well-Being; Accom-
Concerning HAPPINESS,

Part I. Accommodate to all Places and Times; Durable, Self-derived, and Indeprivable. Your account, said I, appears just.

It matters, continued he, little, how they err in the Application—if they covet that as agreeable to Nature, which is in itself most Contrary—if they would have that as Durable, which is in itself most Transient—that as Independent, and their own, which is most precarious and Servile. It is enough for us, if we know their Aim—enough, if we can discover, what it is they propose—the Means and Method may be absurd, as it happens. I answered, their Aim was sufficient to prove what he had asserted.

It is true, replied he, it is abundantly sufficient. And yet perhaps, even tho' this were ever so certain, it would not be altogether foreign, were we to examine, how they act; how they succeed in applying these Universals to Particular Subjects.
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je£s. Should they be found just in the Application, we need look no farther——
The true Sovereign Good would of course be Plain and Obvious; and we should have no more to do, than to follow the beaten road. It is granted, replied I. But what if they err? Time enough for that, said he, when we are satisfied that they do. We ought first to inform ourselves, whether they may not possibly be in the right. I submitted, and begged him to proceed his own way.

§ 3. Will you then, said he, in this disquisition into Human Conduct, allow me this——That such, as is the Species of Life, which every one chooses; such is his Idea of Happiness, such his Conception of the Sovereign Good? I seem, said I, to comprehend You, but should be glad You would illustrate. His Meaning, he answered, was no more than this——If a Man prefer a Life of Industry, it is because he has an Idea of Happiness in Wealth; if he prefers a Life of Gaiety, it is from a like
Concerning Happiness,

Part I. like Idea concerning Pleasure. And the same, we say, holds true in every other Instance. I told him, it must certainly.

And can you recollect, said he, any Life, but what is a Life of Business, or of Leisure? I answered, None. And is not the great End of Business either Power or Wealth? It is. Must not every Life therefore of Business be either Political or Lucrative? It must.

Again—Are not Intellect and Sense, the Soul's leading Powers? They are.

And in Leisure are we not ever seeking, to gratify one or the other? We are. Must not every Life therefore of Leisure be either Pleasurable, or Contemplative? If you confine Pleasure, said I, to Sense, I think it necessarily must.

If it be not so confined, said he, we confound all Inquiry. Allow it.

Mark then, said he, the two grand Genera, the Lives of Business and of Leisure.
Leisure—mark also the subordinate Species; the Political and Lucrative, the Contemplative and Pleasurable—Can you think of any other, which these will not include? I replied, I knew of none. It is possible indeed, said he, that there may be other Lives framed, by the blending of these, two or more of them together. But if we separate with accuracy, we shall find that here they all terminate. I replied, so it seemed probable.

If then, continued he, we would be exact in our Inquiry, we must examine these four Lives, and mark their Consequences. It is thus only we shall learn, how far those, who embrace them, find that Good and Happiness, which we know they all pursue. I made answer, it seemed necessary, and I should willingly attend him.

§ 4. To begin then, said he, with the Political Life. Let us see the Good, usually
Concerning 

Part I. usually sought after here. To a private 

Man, it is the favour of some Prince, or 

Commonwealth; the honours and emo-
luments derived from this favour; the 
court and homage of mankind; the 
power of commanding others——To a 

Prince, it is the same thing nearly, only 
greater in Degree; a larger command; a 

stricter and more servile homage; glory, 

conquest, and extended empire——Am I 

right in my description? I replied, 

I thought he was. Whether then, said 
he, all this deserves the Name of Good or 
not, I do not controvert. Be it one, or 

the other, it affects not our Inquiry. All 

that I would ask concerning it, is this—— 

Do you not think it a Good (if it really 
be one) derived from Foreign and External 

Causes? Undoubtedly, replied I. 

It cannot come then from ourselves, or be 

self-derived. It cannot. And what 
shall we say as to its Duration and Stabi-

lity? Is it so firm and lasting, that we can-

not be deprived of it? I should imagine, 

said I, quite otherwise. You insist not 

then,
then, said he, on my appealing to History.  You acknowledge the Fate of Favourites, of Empires, and their Owners.  I replied, I did.

If so, said he, it should seem that this Political Good, which they seek, corresponds not to the Pre-conceptions of being Durable, and Indeprivable.  Far from it.  But it appeared just before, not to be self-derived.  It did.  You see then, said he, that in three of our Pre-conceptions it entirely fails.  So indeed, said I, it appears.

But farther, said he—We are told of this Good, that in the Possession it is attended with Anxiety; and that when lost, it is usually lost with Ignominy and Disgrace; nay, often with prosecutions and the bitterest resentments; with mulcts, with exile, and death itself.  It is frequently, said I, the case.  How then, said he, can it answer that other Pre-conception, of contributing to our Well-Being?  Can that contribute
Concerning **Happiness**, contribute to **Well-Being**, whose **Consequences** lead to **Calamity**, and whose **Presence** implies **Anxiety**? This, it must be confessed, said I, appears not probable.

But once more, said he——There are certain **Habits** or **Dispositions of Mind**, called Sincerity, Generosity, Candour, Plain-dealing, Justice, Honour, Honesty, and the like. There are. And it has been generally believed, that these are **agreeable to Nature**. Assuredly. But it has been as generally believed, that the **Political Good**, we speak of, is often not to be acquired but by **Habits**, contrary to these; and which, if these are **Natural**, must of necessity be **unnatural**. What Habits, said I, do you mean? Flattery, answered he, Dissimulation, Intrigue: upon occasion, perhaps Iniquity, Falseness, and Fraud. It is possible, indeed, said I, that these may sometimes be thought necessary. How then, said he, can that **Good** be **agreeable to Nature**, which cannot be **acquired**, but by **Habits contrary to Nature**?
Nature? Your Argument, said I, Part I.
seems just.

If then, said he, we have reasoned rightly, and our Conclusions may be depended on; it should seem that the supposed Good, which the Political Life pursues, corresponds not, in any Instance, to our Pre-conceptions of the Sovereign Good.
I answered, So it appeared.

§ 5. Let us quit then, said he, the Political Life, and pass to the Lucrative. The Object of this is Wealth. Admit it.
And is it not too often, said he, the Case, that to acquire this, we are tempted to employ some of those Habits, which we have just condemned as Unnatural? Such, I mean, as Fraud, Falsity, Injustice, and the like? It must be owned, said I, too often.

Besides, continued he—What shall we say to the Esteem, the Friendship, and Love of Mankind? Are they worth having?
Concerning Happiness,

Part I.

Is it agreeable, think you, to Nature, to endeavour to deserve them? Agreeable, said I, to Nature, beyond dispute. If so, then to merit Hatred and Contempt, said he, must needs be contrary to Nature.

Undoubtedly. And is there any thing which so certainly merits Hatred and Contempt, as a mere Lucrative Life, spent in the uniform Pursuit of Wealth?

I replied, I believed there was nothing. If so, said he, then as to corresponding with our Pre-conceptions, the Lucrative Good, in this respect, fares no better than the Political. It appears not.

And what shall we say as to Anxiety? Is not both the Possession and Pursuit of Wealth, to those who really love it, ever anxious? It seems so. And why anxious, but from a Certainty of its Instability; from an Experience, how obnoxious it is to every cross Event; how easy to be lost and transferred to others, by the same Fraud and Rapine, which acquired it to ourselves?—This is indeed the tritest of all
all Topics. The Poets and Orators have long ago exhausted it. It is true, said I, they have. May we not venture then, said he, upon the whole, to pass the same Sentence on the Lucrative Life, as we have already on the Political—that it proposes not a Good, correspondent to those Pre-conceptions, by which we would all be governed in the Good, which we are all seeking? I answered, we might justly.

§ 6. If then neither the Lucrative Life, nor the Political, said he, procure that Good which we desire: shall we seek it from the Pleasurable? Shall we make Pleasure our Goddess?

Pleasure,
Whom Love attends, and soft Desire, and Words
Alluring, apt the steadiest Heart to bend.

So says the Poet, and plausible his Doctrine. Flausible, said I, indeed.
Concerning HAPPINESS,

Part I. Let it then, continued he, be a pleasurable World; a Race of harmless, loving Animals; an Elysian Temperature of Sunshine and Shade. Let the Earth, in every Quarter, resemble our own dear Country; where never was a Frost, never a Fog, never a Day, but was delicious and serene.

I was a little embarrassed at this unexpected Flight, 'till recollecting myself, I told him, (but still with some Surprize) that, in no degree to disparage either my Country or my Countrymen, I had never found Either so exquisite, as he now supposed them. There are then, it seems, said he, in the Natural World, and even in our own beloved Country, such Things as Storms and Tempests; as pinching Colds, and scorching Heats.

I replied, there were. And consequent to these, Disease, and Famine, and infinite Calamities. There are.

And in the Civil or Human World, we have Discord and Contention; or (as the Poet
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Poet better * describes it)

Cruel Revenge, and rancorous Despite,
Disloyal Treason, and heart-burning Hate.

We have. Alas! then, poor Pleasure! Where is that Good, accommodated to every Time; suited to every Place; self-derived, not dependent on Foreign External Causes? Can it be Pleasure, on such a changeable, such a turbulent Spot, as this? I replied, I thought not.

And what indeed, were the World, said he, modelled to a Temperature the most exact? Were the Rigours of the Seasons never more to be known; nor Wars, Devastations, Famines, or Diseases? Admitting all this, (which we know to be impossible) can we find still in Pleasure that lengthened Duration, which we consider as an Essential, to constitute the Sovereign Good?—Ask the Glutton, the Drinker, the

*Spencer's Fairy Queen, B. 2. Cant. 7. Stanz. 22.
Concerning **Happiness**, Part I.

the Man of Gaiety and Intrigue, whether they know any *Enjoyment*, not to be cancelled by *Satiety*? Which does not hastily pass away into the tedious Intervals of *Indifference*?—-Or yielding all this too, (which we know *cannot be yielded*) where are we to find our *Good*, how possess it in *Age*? In that Eve of Life, declining *Age*, when the *Power of Sense*, on which all depends, like the setting Sun, is gradually forsaking us?

I *should* imagine, said I, that *Pleasure* was no mean Adversary, since you employ, in attacking her, so much of your *Rhetoric*. Without heeding what I said, he pursued his Subject—-Begone, if this be our *Good*, our *Happiness*, and our *End*; to what purpose *Powers*, which bear no *Relation* to it?—-Why *Memory*? Why *Reason*? *Mere Sensation* might have been as *exquisite*, had we been *Flies* or *Earthworms*—-Or can it be proved otherwise?

I replied, I could not say. *No Animal*, continued he, *possesses its Faculties in vain*. 
A DIALOGUE.

vain. And shall Man derive no Good from his best, his most eminent? From That, which of all is peculiar to himself? For as to Growth and Nutrition, they are not wanting to the meanest Vegetable; and for Senses, there are Animals, which perhaps exceed us in them all.

§ 7. This seems, said I, no mean Argument in favour of Contemplation. The Contemplative Life gives Reason all the Scope, which it can desire. And of all Lives, answered he, would it surely be the best, did we dwell, like Milton's Uriel, in the Sun's bright Circle. Then might we plan indeed the most Romantic Kind of Happiness. Stretched at Ease, without Trouble or Molestation, we might pass our Days, contemplating the Univerze; tracing its Beauty; lost in Wonder; ravished with Ecstasy, and I know not what—But here alas! on this sublunary, this turbulent Spot, (as we called it not long since) how little is this, or any thing like it, practicable?—Fogs arise, which dim
Concerning **Happiness**, Part I.

—are our Prospects—the Cares of Life perpetually molest us—Is Contemplation suited to a Place, like this? It must be owned, said I, not extremely. How then is it the Sovereign Good, which should be Accommodate to every Place? I replied, it seemed not probable.

But farther, said he—Can we enjoy the Sovereign Good, and be at the same time vexed, and agitated by Passion? Does not this seem a Paradox? I answered, it did. Suppose then an Event were to happen—not an Inundation, or Massacre—but an Acquaintance only drop a disrespectful Word; a Servant chance to break a favourite Piece of Furniture—What would instruct us to endure this?—Contemplation, Theory, Abstractions? Why not, said I? No, replied he with Warmth, (quoting the Poet) not

—* Tho' all the Stars
Thou know'lt by Name; and all the Etherial Powers.*

*Par. Lost, B. 12. ver. 576.*
For does not Experience teach us, abundantly teach us, that our deepest Philosophers, as to Temper and Behaviour, are as very Children for the most part, as the meanest and most illiterate? A little more Arrogance perhaps, from Presumption of what they know, but not a grain more of Magnanimity, of Candour and calm Indurance.

You are somewhat too severe, said I, in cenfuring of all. There are better and worse among Them, as among Others.

The Difference is no way proportioned, said he, to the Quantity of their Knowledge; so that whatever be its Cause, it can't be imputed to their Speculations.—Besides, can you really imagine, we came here only to Think? Is Acting a Circumstance, which is foreign to our Character?—Why then so many Social Affections, which all of us feel, even in spite of ourselves? Are we to suppress them All, as useless and unnatural? The Attempt, replied I, must needs be found impracticable.
Concerning HAPPINESS,

Part I.

cable. Were they once suppressed, said he, the Consequences would be somewhat strange. We should hear no more of Father, Brother, Husband, Son, Citizen, Magistrate, and Society itself. And were this ever the Case, ill (I fear) would it fare with even Contemplation itself. It would certainly be but bad Speculating, among lawless Barbarians—Unassociated Animals—where Strength alone of Body was to constitute Dominion, and the Contest came to be (as * Horace describes it)

--- glandem atque cubilia propter,
Unguibus & pugnis, dein fustibus—

Bad enough, replied I, of all con-
science.

It should seem then, said he, that not even the best Contemplative Life, however noble its Object, was agreeable to our present Nature, or consistent with

* Sat. 3. l. i. ver. 99.
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with our present Situation. I confefs, Part I.
said I, you appear to have proved fo.
But if this be allowed true of the Best, the moft Excellent; what shall we say to the Mockery of Monkery; the Farce of Friars; the ridiculous Mummery of being fequeftered in a Cloyfter? This surely is too low a Thing, even to merit an Examination. I have no Scruples here, said I, you need not waste your Time.

§ 8. If that, said he, be your Opinion, let us look a little backward. For our memory's fake it may be proper to recapitulate. I replied, it would be highly acceptable. Thus then, said he—
We have examined the four grand Lives, which we find the Generality of Men embrace; the Lucrative, and the Political; the Pleafurable, and the Contemplative. And we have aimed at proving that—to such a Being as Man, with such a Body, such Affections, such Senses, and such an Intelleét—placed in such a World, subject to such Incidents—not one of these Lives is pro-
Concerning **Happiness**, which we find all Men to recognize thro' the same uniform Pre-conceptions; and which thro' one or other of these Lives they all of them pursue.

§ 9. You have justly, said I, collected the Sum of your Inquiries. And happy, said he, should I think it, were they to terminate here. I asked him, Why? Because, replied he, to insinuate first, that *all Mankind* are in the wrong; and then to attempt afterwards, to shew *one's self* only to be right; is a Degree of Arrogance, which I would not willingly be guilty of. I ventured here to say, That I thought he need not be so diffident—that a Subject, where *one's own Interest* appeared concerned so nearly, would well justify every *Scruple*, and even the severest Inquiry. There, said he, you say something—there you encourage me indeed. For what;—Are we not cautioned against Counterfeits, even in Matters of meanest Value? If a Piece of Metal be tendered us, which seems doubtful, do
we not hesitate? Do we not try it by the Test, before we take it for Current?—And is not this deemed Prudence? Are we not censured, if we act otherwise?—How much more then does it behave us not to be imposed on here? To be diffident and scrupulously exact, where Imposiure, if once admitted, may tempt us to far worse Bargain, than ever Glaucus made with Diomed?

What Bargain, said I, do you mean?

The Exchange, replied he, not of Gold for Bras, but of Good for Evil, and of Happiness for Misery—But enough of this, since you have encouraged me to proceed—We are seeking that Good, which we think others have not found. Permit me thus to pursue my Subject.

§ 10. Every Being on this our Terrestial Dwelling, exists encompassed with infinite Objects; exists among Animals tame, and Animals wild; among Plants and Vegetables of a thousand different Qualities, among Heats and Colds, Tempefts and Calms, the Friendships and Discords of hetero-
Concerning Happiness,

Part I. heterogeneous Elements—What say you? Are all these Things exactly the same to it; or do they differ, think you in their Effects and Consequences? They differ, said I, widely. Some perhaps then, said he, are Apt, Congruous, and Agreeable to its Natural State. I replied, they were. Others are In-apt, Incongruous, and Disagreeable. They are. And others again are Indifferent. They are.

It should seem then, said he, if this be allowed, that to every individual Being, without the least Exception, the whole Mafs of things External, from the greatest to the meanest, stood in the Relations of either Agreeable, Disagreeable, or Indifferent. I replied, so it appeared.

But tho' this, continued he, be true in the general, it is yet as certain when we descend to Particulars, that what is Agreeable to one Species is Disagreeable to another; and not only so, but perhaps Indifferent to a
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a third. Instances of this kind, he said, were too obvious to be mentioned.

I replied, it was evident. Whence then, said he, this Diversity?— It cannot arise from the Externals— for Water is equally Water, whether to a Man, or to a Fish; whether, operating on the one, it suffocate, or on the other, it give Life and Vigour. I replied, it was. So is Fire, said he, the same Fire, however various in its Consequences; whether it harden or soften, give Pleasure or Pain.

I replied, it was. But if this Diversity, continued he, be not derived from the Externals, whence can it be else?— Or can it possibly be derived otherwise than from the peculiar Constitution, from the Natural State of every Species itself?

I replied, it appeared probable.

Thus then, said he, is it that Every particular Species is, itself to itself, the Measure of all things in the Universe—that as Things vary their Relations to it, they vary
Concerning **Happiness**, Part I.

Vary too in their value—and that if their value be ever doubtful, it can no way be adjusted, but by recurring with accuracy to the natural state of the species, and to those several relations, which such a state of course creates. I answered, he argued justly.

§ 11. To proceed then, said he—Tho' it be true, that every species has a natural state, as we have asserted; it is not true, that every species has a sense or feeling of it. This feeling or sense is a natural eminence or prerogative, denied the vegetable and inanimate, and imparted only to the animal. I answered, it was.

And think you, continued he, that as many as have this sense or feeling of a natural state, are alienated from it, or indifferent to it? Or is it not more probable, that they are well-affectèd to it? Experience, said I, teaches us, how well they are all affected. You are right, replied he. For what would be more absurd,
absurd, than to be indifferent to their own Welfare; or to be alienated from it, as tho' it was Foreign and Unnatural? I replied, Nothing could be more. But, continued he, if they are well-affected to this their proper Natural State, it should seem too they must be well-affected to all those Externals, which appear apt, congruous, and agreeable to it. I answered, They must. And if so, then ill-affected or adverse to such, as appear the contrary. They must. And to such as appear indifferent, indifferent. They must.

But if this, said he, be allowed, it will follow, that in consequence of these Appearances, they will think some Externals worthy of Pursuit; some worthy of Avoidance; and some worthy of neither.

It was probable, said I, they should.

Hence then, said he, another Division of Things external; that is, into Pursuible, Avoidable, and Indifferent—a Division only belonging to Beings Sensitive and Animato, because all, below these, can neither avoid L nor
Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part I.

nor pursue. I replied, They could not.

If, then, said he, Man be allowed in the Number of these Sensitive Beings, this Division will affect Man—or to explain more fully, the whole Mass of Things external will, according to this Division, exist to the Human Species in the Relations of Pursuible, Avoidable, and Indifferent. I replied, They would.

Should we therefore desire, said he, to know what these things truly are, we must first be informed, what is Man's truly Natural Constitution. For thus, you may remember, it was settled not long since—that every Species was its own Standard, and that when the Value of Things was doubtful, the Species was to be studied; the Relations to be deduced, which were consequent to it; and in this manner the Value of Things to be adjusted and ascertained. I replied, We had so agreed it. I fear then, said he, we are engaged
gaged in a more arduous Undertaking, a Task of more difficulty, than we were at first aware of—But Fortuna Fortes—we must endeavour to acquit ourselves as well as we are able.

§ 12. That Man therefore has a Body, of a Figure and internal Structure peculiar to itself; capable of certain Degrees of Strength, Agility, Beauty, and the like; this I believe is evident, and hardly wants a Proof. I answered, I was willing to own it. That he is capable too of Pleasure and Pain; is possessed of Senses, Affections, Appetites, and Aversions; this also seems evident, and can scarcely be denied. I replied, it was admitted.

We may venture then to range Him in the Tribe of Animal Beings. I replied, We might.

And think you, said he, without Society, you or any Man could have been born? Most certainly not. Without Society, when born, could you have been brought
Concerning Happiness,

Part I. 

brought to Maturity? Most certainly not. Had your Parents then had no Social Affections towards you in that perilous State, that tedious Infancy, (so much longer than the longest of other Animals) you must have inevitably perished thro' Want and Inability. I must. You perceive then that to Society you, and every Man are indebted, not only for the Beginning of Being, but for the Continuance. We are.

Suppose then we pass from this Birth and Infancy of Man, to his Maturity and Perfection—Is there any Age, think you, so self-sufficient, as that in it he feels no Wants? What Wants, answered I, do you mean? In the first and principal place, said he, that of Food; then perhaps that of Raiment; and after this, a Dwelling, or Defence against the Weather. These Wants, replied I, are surely Natural at all Ages. And is it not agreeable to Nature, said he, that they should at all Ages be supplied? Assuredly.
And is it not more agreeable to have them well supplied, than ill? It is. And most agreeable, to have them best supplied? Certainly. If there be then any one State, better than all others, for the supplying these Wants; this State, of all others, must needs be most Natural. It must.

And what Supply, said he, of these Wants, shall we esteem the meanest, which we can conceive?—Would it not be something like this? Had we nothing beyond Acorns for Food; beyond a rude Skin, for Raiment; or beyond a Cavern, or hollow Tree, to provide us with a Dwelling? Indeed, said I, this would be bad enough. And do you not imagine, as far as this, we might each supply ourselves, tho' we lived in Woods, mere solitary Savages?

I replied, I thought we might.

Suppose then, continued he, that our Supplies were to be mended—for instance, that we were to exchange Acorns for L 3 Bread—
Concerning **Happiness**, Part I.

Bread—Would our **Savage** Character be sufficient *here*? Must we not be a little better disciplined; Would not some Art be requisite?—The Baker's, for example. It would. And *previously* to the Baker's that of the Miller? It would. And *previously* to the Miller's that of the Husbandman? It would.

*Three Arts* then appear *necessary*, even upon the *lowest* Estimate. It is admitted.

But a Question farther, said he—Can the Husbandman work, think you, without his *Tools*? Must he not have his Plough, his Harrow, his Reap-hook, and the like? He must. And must not those other Artists too be furnished in the same manner? They must. And whence must they be furnished? From their *own* Arts?—Or are not the *making* Tools, and the *using* them, two different Occupations? I believe, said I, they are. You may be convinced, continued he, by small Recollection. Does *Agriculture*
A Dialogue.

*tire make its own Plough, its own Harrow? Or does it not apply to other Arts, for all Necessaries of this kind? It does.

Again—Does the Baker build his own Oven; or the Miller frame his own Mill?

It appears, said I, no part of their Business.

What a Tribe of Mechanics then, said he, are advancing upon us?—Smiths, Carpenters, Masons, Mill-wrights—and all these to provide the single Necessary of Bread. Not less than seven or eight Arts, we find, are wanting at the fewest. It appears so. And what if to the providing a comfortable Cottage, and Raiment suitable to an industrious Hind, we allow a dozen Arts more? It would be easy, by the same Reasoning, to prove the Number double. I admit the Number, said I, mentioned.

If so, continued he, it should seem, that towards a tolerable Supply of the three Primary and Common Necessaries, Food, Raiment,
Concerning Happiness, Part I.

and a Dwelling, not less than twenty Arts were, on the lowest Account, requisite. It appears so.

And is one Man equal, think you, to the Exercise of these twenty Arts? If he had even Genius, which we can scarce imagine, is it possible he should find Leisure?

I replied, I thought not. If so, then a solitary, unsocial State can never supply tolerably the common Necessaries of Life. It cannot.

But what if we pass from the Necessaries of Life, to the Elegancies? To Music, Sculpture, Painting, and Poetry?—What if we pass from all Arts whether Necessary or Elegant, to the large and various Tribe of Sciences? To Logic, Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics?—Can one Man, imagine you, master all this? Absurd, said I, impossible. And yet in this Cycle of Sciences and Arts, seem included all the Comforts, as well as Ornaments of Life; included all conducive, either to Being, or to Well-Being.
**A Dialogue.**

It must be confessed, said I, it has the Appearance.

What then, said he, must be done? In what manner must we be supplied?

I answered, I knew not, unless we made a Distribution—Let one exercise one Art; and another a different——Let this Man study such a Science; and that Man, another——Thus the whole Cycle (as you call it) may be carried easily into Perfection.

It is true, said he, it may; and every Individual, as far as his own Art or Science, might be supplied completely, and as well as he could wish. But what avails a Supply in a single Instance? What in this case are to become of all his numerous other Wants? You conceive, replied I, what I would have said, but partially. My Meaning was, that Artist trade with Artist; each supply where he is deficient, by exchanging where he abounds; so that a Portion of every thing may be dispersed throughout all. You intend then a State, said
Concerning Happiness,

Part I. said he, of Commutation and Traffic.

I replied, I did.

If so, continued he, I see a new Face of things. The Savages, with their Skins and their Caverns, disappear. In their place I behold a fair Community rising. No longer Woods, no longer Solitude, but all is Social, Civil, and Cultivated—And can we doubt any farther, whether Society be Natural? Is not this evidently the State, which can best supply the Primary Wants? It has appeared so. And did we not agree some time since, that this State, whatever we found it, would be certainly of all others the most agreeable to our Nature? We did. And have we not added, since this, to the Weight of our Argument, by passing from the Necessary Arts to the Elegant; from the Elegant to the Sciences?

We have. The more, said he, we consider, the more shall we be convinced, that All these, the noblest Honours and Ornaments of the Human Mind, without that Leisure, that Experience, that Emu-
A DIALOGUE.

Let it not be forgot then, said he, in favour of Society, that to it we owe, not only the Beginning and Continuation, but the Well-being, and (if I may use the Expression) the very Elegance and Rationality of our Existence. Indeed, said I, I believe not.

And what then? continued he.——If Society be thus agreeable to our Nature, is there nothing, think you, within us, to excite and lead us to it? No Impulse, no Preparation of Faculties? It would be strange, answered I, if there should not.

It would be a singular Exception, said he, with respect to all other herding Species—Let us however examine—Pity, Benevolence, Friendship, Love; the general Dislike of Solitude, and Desire of Company;
Concerning Happiness,

Part I. pany; are they Natural Affection, which
come of themselves; or are they taught us by
Art, like Music and Arithmetic?
I should think, replied I, they were Na-
tural, because in every Degree of Men some
Traces of them may be discovered.
And are not the Powers and Capacities of
Speech, said he, the same? Are not all
Men naturally formed, to express their Sen-
timents by some kind of Language?
I replied, They were.

If then, said he, these several Powers,
and Dispositions are Natural, so should seem
too their Exercise. Admit it. And
if their Exercise, then so too that State,
where alone they can be exercised. Ad-
mit it. And what is this State, but the
Social? Or where else is it possible to con-
verse, or use our Speech; to exhibit Actions
of Pity, Benevolence, Friendship or Love;
to relieve our Aversion to Solitude, or gratify
our Desire of being with others?
I re-
plied, It could be no where else.
You see then, continued he, a Preparation of Faculties is not wanting. We are fitted with Powers and Dispositions, which have only Relation to Society; and which, out of Society, can nowhere else be exercised.

I replied, it was evident. You have seen too the superior Advantages of the Social State, above all others. I have.

Let this then be remembered, said he, throughout all our future Reasonings, remembered as a first Principle in our Ideas of Humanity, that Man by Nature is truly a Social Animal. I promised it should.

§ 13. Let us now, said he, examine, what farther we can learn concerning Him. As Social indeed, He is distinguished from the Solitary and Savage Species; but in no degree from the rest, of a milder and more friendly Nature. It is true, replied I, He is not. Does He then differ no more from these
Concerning HAPPINESS,

Part I.

these several Social Species, than they, each of them, differ from one another? Must we range them all, and Man among the rest, under the same common and general Genus? I see no Foundation, said I, for making a Distinction.

Perhaps, said he, there may be none; and it is possible too there may. Consider a little—Do you not observe in all other Species, a Similarity among Individuals? a surprizing Likeness, which runs thro' each Particular? In one Species they are all Bold; in another, all Timorous; in one all Ravenous; in another, all Gentle. In the Bird-kind only, what a Uniformity of Voice, in each Species, as to their notes; of Architecture, as to building their Nests; of Food, both for themselves, and for supporting their Young? It is true, said I.

And do you observe, continued he, the same Similarity among Men? Are these all as Uniform, as to their Sentiments and Actions? I replied, by no means.
One Question more, said he, as to the Character of Brutes, if I may be allowed the Expression—are these, think you, what we behold them, by Nature or otherwise? Explain, said I, your Question, for I do not well conceive you. I mean, replied he, is it by Nature that the Swallow builds her Nest, and performs all the Offices of her Kind: Or is she taught by Art, by Discipline, or Custom? She acts, replied I, by pure Nature undoubtedly. And is not the same true, said he, of every other Bird and Beast in the Universe? It is. No wonder then, continued he, as they have so wise a Governess, that a uniform Rule of Action is provided for each Species. For what can be more worthy the Wisdom of Nature, than ever to the same Substances to give the same Law? It appears, said I, reasonable.

But what, continued he, shall we say as to Man? Is He too actuated by Nature purely? I answered, Why not?
Concerning **Happiness**, Part I.

If He be, replied he, it is strange in *Nature* that with respect to *Man* alone, she should follow so *different* a Conduct. The Particulars in other Species, we agree, she renders *Uniform*; but in *Our's*, every *Particular* seems a sort of *Model by himself*. If Nature, said I, do not actuate us, what can we suppose else? Are *Local Customs*, said he, *Nature*? Are the *Polities* and *Religions* of particular Nations, *Nature*? Are the *Examples* which are set before us; the *Preceptors* who instruct us; the *Company and Friends*, with whom we converse, all *Nature*?

No surely, said I. And yet, said he, it is evident that by these, and a thousand *incidental* Circumstances, equally *foreign* to *Nature*, our *Actions*, and *Manners*, and *Characters* are adjusted. Who then can imagine, we are actuated by *Nature only*?

I confess, said I, it appears contrary.

You see then, said he, one remarkable *Distinction* between *Man* and *Brutes* in general—In the *Brute*, *Nature* does *all*; in *Man,*
But farther, continued he—Let us consider the Powers or Faculties, possessed by each—Suppose I was willing to give a Brute the same Instruction which we give a Man. A Parrot perhaps, or Ape, might arrive to some small Degree of Mimicry; but do you think, upon the whole, they would be much profited or altered? I replied, I thought not. And do you perceive the same, said he, with respect to Man? Or does not Experience shew us the very reverse? Is not Education capable of moulding us into any thing—of making us greatly Good, or greatly Bad; greatly Wise, or greatly Absurd? The Fact, said I, is indisputable.

Mark then, said he, the Difference between Human Powers and Brutal—The Leading Principle of Brutes appears to tend in each Species to one single Purpose—to this, in general, it uniformly arrives; and
Concerning HAPPINESS,

Part I. Here, in general, it as uniformly stops—it needs no Precepts or Discipline to instruct it; nor will it easily be changed, or admit a different Direction. On the contrary, the Leading Principle of Man is capable of infinite Directions—is convertible to all sorts of Purposes—equal to all sorts of Subjects—neglected, remains ignorant, and void of every Perfection—cultivated, becomes adorned with Sciences and Arts—can raise us to excel, not only Brutes, but our own Kind—with respect to our other Powers and Faculties, can instruct us how to use them, as well as those of the various Natures, which we see existing around us. In a word, to oppose the two Principles to each other—The Leading Principle of Man, is Multiform, Originally Uninstructed, Pliant and Docil—the Leading Principle of Brutes is Uniform, Originally Instructed; but, in most Instances afterward, Inflexible and Indocil—Or does not Experience plainly shew, and confirm the Truth of what we assert? I made answer, it did.
You allow then, said he, the Human Principle, and the Brutal, to be things of different Idea. Undoubtedly. Do they not each then deserve a different Appellation? I should think so. Suppose therefore we call the Human Principle Reason; and the Brutal, Instinct: would you object to the Terms? I replied, I should not. If not, continued he, then Reason being peculiar to Man, of all the Animals inhabiting this Earth, may we not affirm of Him, by way of Distinction, that He is a Rational Animal? I replied, We might justly.

Let this too then be remembered, said he, in the Course of our Inquiry, that Man is by Nature a Rational Animal. I promised it should.

§ 14. In consequence of this, said he, as often as there is Occasion, I shall appeal as well to Reason, as to Nature, for a Standard. What, said I, do you mean by Nature?
Concerning **Happiness**, 

Its Meanings, replied he, are many and various. As it stands at present opposed, it may be enough perhaps to say, that *Nature* is that, which is the Cause of every thing, except those Things alone, which are the immediate Effects of *Reason*. In other words, whatever is not *Reason*, or the *Effect* of *Reason*, we would consider as *Nature*, or the *Effect* of *Nature*. I answered, as he so distinguished them, I thought he might justly appeal to either.

And yet, continued he, there is a remarkable **Difference** between the Standard of *Reason*, and that of *Nature*; a Difference, which at no time we ought to forget. What Difference, said I, do you mean? It is this, answered he—-In *Nature*, the Standard is sought from among the Many; in *Reason*, the Standard is sought from among the Few. You must explain, said I, your Meaning, for I must confess you seem obscure.

Thus
Thus then, said he—Suppose, as an Anatomist, you were seeking the Structure of some internal Part—To discover this, would you not inspect a Number of Individuals? I should. And would you not inform yourself, what had been discovered by others? I should. And suppose, after all, you should find a Multitude of Instances for one Structure, and a few singular for a different: By which would you be governed? By the Multitude, said I, undoubtedly. Thus then, continued he, in Nature the Standard, you see, exists among the many. I replied, it had so appeared.

And what, said he, were we to seek the Perfection of Sculpture, or of Painting?—Where should we inquire then?—Among the numerous common Artists, or among the few and celebrated? Among the Few, said I. What if we were to seek the Perfection of Poetry, or Oratory—Where then? Among the Few still.
Concerning HAPPINESS,

Part I.

What if we were to seek the perfection of true Argument, or a found Logic—Where then? Still among the Few. And is not true Argument, or a found Logic, one of Reason's greatest Perfections? It is. You see then, continued he, whence the Standard of Reason is to be sought—it is from among the Few, as we said before, in contradiction to the Standard of Nature.

I confess, said I, it appears so.

And happy, said he, for us, that Providence has so ordered it—happy for us, that what is Rational, depends not on the Multitude; or is to be tried by so pitiful a Test, as the bare counting of Noses. It is happy, said I, indeed—But whence pray the Difference? Why are the Many to determine in Nature, and the Few only, in Reason?

To discuss this at large, said he, would require some time. It might insensibly perhaps draw us from our present Inquiry. I will endeavour to give you the Reason, in as few words as possible; which should they chance to be obscure, be not too
A D I A L O G U E. 

too solicitous for an Explanation. 

begged him to proceed his own way.

The Case, said he, appears to be this—

In Natural Works and Natural Operations, we hold but one Efficient Cause, and that consummately wise. This Cause in every Species recognizing what is best, and working ever uniformly according to this Idea of Perfection, the Productions and Energies, in every Species where it acts, are for the most part similar and exactly correspondent. If an Exception ever happen, it is from some hidden higher Motive, which transcends our Comprehension, and which is seen so rarely, as not to injure the general Rule, or render it doubtful and precarious. On the contrary, in the Productions and Energies of Reason, there is not one Cause but infinite—as many indeed, as there are Agents of the Human Kind. Hence Truth being but one, and Error being infinite, and Agents infinite also: what wonder they should oftener miss, than hit the Mark?—that Multitudes should fail, where one alone
Concerning Happiness,

Part I.

succeeds, and Truth be only the Possession of the chosen, fortunate Few? You seem to have explained the Difficulty, said I, with sufficient Perspicuity.

Let us then go back, said he, and re-collect ourselves; that we may not forget, what it is we are seeking. I replied, Most willingly. We have been seeking, continued he, the Sovereign Good. In consequence of this Inquiry, we have discovered—that all Things whatever exist to the Human Species in the Relations of either Pursuable, Avoidable, or Indifferent. To determine these Relations with Accuracy we have been scrutinizing the Human Nature; and that, upon this known Maxim, that every Species was its own proper Standard; and that where the Value of Things was dubious, there the Species was to be studied, and the Relations to be deduced, which naturally flow from it. The Result of this Scrutiny has been—that we have first agreed Man to be a Social Animal; and since, to be a Rational. So that if we can
can be content with a descriptive, concise Sketch of Human Nature, it will amount to this—that "Man is a Social Rational Animal." I answered, it had appeared so.

§ 15. If then, said he, we pursue our Disquisitions, agreeably to this Idea of Human Nature, it will follow that all Things will be Pursuable, Avoidable, and Indifferent to Man, as they respect the Being and Welfare of such a Social, Rational Animal. I replied, They must.

Nothing therefore in the first place, said he, can be Pursuable, which is destructive of Society. It cannot. Acts therefore of Fraud and Rapine, and all acquired by them, whether Wealth, Power, Pleasure, or any thing, are evidently from their very Character not fit to be pursued. They are not. But it is impossible not to pursue many such things, unless we are furnished with some Habit or Disposition of Mind, by which
Concerning Happiness,

Part I. which we are induced to render to all Men their own, and to regard the Welfare, and Interest of Society. It is impossible.

But the Habit or Disposition of rendering to all their own, and of regarding the Welfare and Interest of Society, is Justice. It is. We may therefore fairly conclude, that Nothing is naturally Pursuable, but what is either correspondent to Justice, or at least not contrary.

I confess, said I, so it appears.

But farther, said he,—It is possible we may have the best Disposition to Society; the most upright Intentions; and yet thro' Want of Ability to discern, and know the Nature of Particulars, we may pursue many things inconsistent, as well with our Private Interest, as the Public. We may even pursue what is Right, and yet pursue it in such a manner, as to find our Endeavours fruitless, and our Purposes to fail, I answered, it was possible.

But this would ill befit the Character of a Rational Animal. It would. It is neces-
necessary therefore, we should be furnished with some Habit or Faculty, instructing us how to discern the real difference of all Particulars, and suggesting the proper Means, by which we may either avoid or obtain them. It is. And what is this, think you, but Prudence?

I believe, said I, it can be no other.

If it be, said he, then it is evident from this Reasoning, that Nothing can be pursuable which is not correspondent to Prudence.

I replied, He had shewn it could not.

But farther still, said he—It is possible we may neither want Prudence, nor Justice to direct us; and yet the Impulses of Appetite; the Impetuosities of Refentment, the Charms and Allurements of a thousand flattering Objects, may tempt us, in spite of ourselves, to pursue what is both Imprudent, and Unjust. They may. But if so, it is necessary, would we pursue as becomes our Character, that we should be furnished with some Habit, which may moderate our Excesses; which may temper our
Concerning Happiness,

Part I. our Actions to the Standard of a Social State, and to the Interest and Welfare, not of a Part, but of the Whole Man.

Nothing, said I, more necessary. And what, said he, can we call this Habit, but the Habit of Temperance? You name it, said I, rightly. If you think so, replied he, then Nothing can be Pursuable, which is not either correspondent to Temperance, or at least not contrary.

I replied, so it seemed.

Once more, continued he, and we have done—It is possible that not only Resentment and Appetite, not only the Charms and Allurements of external Objects, but the Terrors too, and Dread of them may marr the Restitude of our Purposes. It is possible.

Tyranny and Superstition may affail us on one hand; the Apprehensions of Ridicule, and a False Shame on the other—It is expedient, to withstand these, we should be armed with some Habit, or our wisest, best Pursuits may else at all times be defeated. They may. And what is that
that generous, manlike and noble Habit, which sets us at all times above Fear and Danger; what is it but Fortitude?

I replied, it was no other. If so then, continued he, besides our former Conclusions, Nothing farther can be pursuable, as our Inquiries now have shewn us, which is not either correspondent to Fortitude, or at least not contrary. I admit, said I, it can not.

Observe then, said he, the Sum, the Amount of our whole Reasoning——Nothing is truly pursuable to such an Animal as Man, except what is correspondent, or at least not contrary, to Justice, Prudence, Temperance and Fortitude. I allow, said I, it appears so. But if nothing pursuable, then nothing avoidable or indifferent, but what is tried and estimated after the same manner. For Contraries are ever recognized thro' the same Habit, one with another. The same Logic judges of Truth and Falsity; the same Musical Art, of Concord and Discord. So the same Mental
Concerning HAPINESS,

Part I. Mental Habitudes, of Things Avoidable and Pursuible. I replied, it appeared probable.

To how unexpected a Conclusion then, said he, have our Inquiries insensibly led us?—In tracing the Source of Human Action, we have established it to be those Four Grand Virtues, which are esteemed, for their Importance, the very Hinges of all Morality. We have.

But if so, it should follow, that a Life, whose Pursuings and Avoidings are governed by these Virtues, is that True and Rational Life, which we have so long been seeking; that Life, where the Value of all things is justly measured by those Relations, which they bear to the Natural Frame and real Constitution of Mankind—in fewer Words, a Life of Virtue appears to be the Life according to Nature. It appears so.
But in such a Life every Pursuit, every Avoiding, (to include all) every Action will of course admit of being rationally justified.

It will. But That, which being Done, admits of a Rational Justification, is the Essence or genuine Character of an Office, or Moral Duty. For thus long ago it has been defined by the best * Authorities. Admit it. If so, then a Life according to Virtue, is a Life according to Moral Offices or Duties. It appears so.

But we have already agreed it, to be a Life according to Nature. We have. Observe then: A Life according to Virtue, according to Moral Offices, and according to Nature, mean all the same Thing, tho' varied in the Expression. Your Remark, said I, seems just.

§ 16. We need never therefore, replied he, be at a loss how to choose, tho' the

* By Tully in his Offices, and by other Authors of Antiquity.
Concerning Happiness,

Part I.

the Objects of Choice be ever so infinite and diversified. As far as nothing is inconsistent with such a Life and such a Character, we may justly set Existence before Death; prefer Health to Sickness; Integrity of the Limbs, to being maimed and debilitated; Pleasure to Pain; Wealth to Poverty; Fame to Dishonour; Free Government to Slavery; Power and Magistracy, to Subjection and a private State— Universally, whatever tends either to Being, or to Well-Being, we may be justified, when we prefer to whatever appears the contrary. And when our several Energies, exerted according to the Virtues just mentioned, have put us in Possession of all that we require: when we enjoy, subjoined to a right and honest Mind, both Health of Body, and Competence of Externals: what can there be wanting to complete our Happiness; to render our State perfectly consonant to Nature; or to give us a more Sovereign Good, than that which we now enjoy? Nothing, replied I, that I can at present think of.
There would be nothing indeed, said he, were our Energies never to fail; were all our Endeavours to be ever crowned with due Success. But suppose the contrary—Suppose the worst Success to the most upright Conduct; to the wisest Rectitude of Energies and Actions. It is possible, nay Experience teaches us it is too often fact, that not only the Pursuers of what is contrary to Nature, but that those who pursue nothing but what is strictly congruous to it, may miss of their Aims, and be frustrated in their Endeavours. Inquisitors and Monks may detest them for their Virtue, and pursue them with all the Engines of Malice and Inhumanity. Without these, Pests may afflict their Bodies; Inundations o'erwhelm their Property; or what is worse than Inundations, either Tyrants, Pirates, Heroes, or Banditti. They may see their Country fall, and with it their bravest Countrymen; themselves pillaged, and reduced to Extremities, or perishing
Concerning Happiness,

Part I. perishing with the rest in the general Massacre.

—* cadit & Ripheus, justissimus unus
Qui fuit in Teucris, & servantissimus æqui.

It must be owned, said I, this has too often been the Case.

Or grant, continued he, that these greater Events never happen—that the Part allotted us, be not in the Tragedy of Life, but in the Comedy. Even the Comic Distresses are abundantly irksome—Domestic Jars, the ill Offices of Neighbours—Suspicions, Jealousies, Schemes defeated—The Folly of Fools; the Knavery of Knaves; from which, as Members of Society, it is impossible to detach ourselves.

Where

* Aeneid. l. 2. ver. 426.
Where then shall we turn, or what have we to imagine? We have at length placed Happiness, after much Inquiry, in attaining the primary and just Requisites of our Nature, by a Conduct suitable to Virtue and Moral Office. But as to corresponding with our Pre-conceptions (which we have made the Test) does this System correspond better, than those others, which we have rejected? Has it not appeared from various Facts, too obvious to be disputed, that in many Times and Places it may be absolutely unattainable? That in many, where it exists, it may in a moment be cancelled, and put irretrievably out of our Power, by Events not to be resisted? If this be certain, and I fear it cannot be questioned, our specious long Inquiry, however accurate we may believe it, has not been able to shew us a Good, of that Character which we require; a Good Durable, Indeprivable, and Accommodate to every Circumstance—Far from it—Our Speculations
Part I. (I think) rather lead us to that low Opinion of Happiness, which you may remember you * expressed, when we first began the subject. They rather help to prove to us, that instead of a Sovereign Good, it is the more probable sentiment, there is no such Good at all. I should indeed, said I, fear so. For where, continued he, lies the difference, whether we pursue what is congruous to Nature, or not congruous; if the Acquisition of one be as difficult, as of the other, and the Possession of both equally doubtful and precarious? If Cæsar fall, in attempting his Country's Ruin; and Brutus fare no better, who only fought in its Defence? It must be owned, said I, these are melancholy Truths, and the Instances, which you allege, too well confirm them.

We were in the midst of these serious Thoughts, descanting upon the Hardships and

* See p. 111.
A D I A L O G U E.

and Miseries of Life, when by an Incident, not worth relating, our Speculations were interrupted. Nothing at the time, I thought, could have happened more unluckily—our Question perplexed—its Issue uncertain—and myself impatient to know the Event. Necessity however was not to be resisted, and thus for the present our Inquiries were postponed.
CONCERNING HAPPINESS,

A DIALOGUE.

PART the SECOND.

BRUTUS perished untimely, and Part II.
Cæsar did no more—These Words

I was repeating the next Day to myself, when my Friend appeared, and cheerfully bade me Good-Morrow. I could not return his Compliment with an equal Gaiety, being intent, somewhat more than usual, on what had passed the day before. Seeing this, he proposed a Walk into the Fields. The Face of Nature, said he, will perhaps dispel these Gloom. No Assistance, on my part, shall be wanting, you
Concerning Happiness,

Part II. you may be assured. I accepted his Proposal; the Walk began; and our former Conversation insensibly renewed.

Brutus, said he, perished untimely, and Caesar did no more.—It was thus, as I remember, not long since you were expressing yourself. And yet suppose their Fortunes to have been exactly parallel—Which would you have preferred? Would you have been Caesar or Brutus?

Brutus, replied I, beyond all Controversy. He asked me, Why? Where was the Difference, when their Fortunes, as we now supposed them, were considered as the same?

There seems, said I, abstract from their Fortunes, something, I know not what, intrinsically preferable in the Life and Character of Brutus. If that, said he, be true, then must we derive it, not from the Success of his Endeavours, but from their Truth and Rectitude. He had the Comfort to be conscious, that his Cause was a just one. It was impossible the other should have
have any such Feeling. I believe, Part II. said I, you have explained it.

Suppose then, continued he, (it is but merely an Hypothesis) suppose, I say, we were to place the Sovereign Good in such a Realitude of Conduct—in the Conduct merely, and not in the Event. Suppose we were to fix our Happiness, not in the actual Attainment of that Health, that Perfection of a Social State, that fortunate Concurrence of Externals, which is congruous to our Nature, and which we have a Right all to pursue; but solely fix it in the mere Doing whatever is correspondent to such an End, even tho' we never attain, or are near attaining it. In fewer words—What if we make our Natural State the Standard only to determine our Conduct; and place our Happiness in the Rectitude of this Conduct alone?—On such an Hypothesis (and we consider it as nothing farther) we should not want a Good perhaps, to correspond to our Pre-conceptions; for this, it is evident, would be correspondent to them all.
Concerning Happiness,

Part II. all. Your Doctrine, replied I, is so new and strange, that tho’ you have been copious in explaining, I can hardly yet comprehend you.

It amounts all, said he, but to this—Place your Happiness, where your Praise is. I asked, Where he supposed that? Not, replied he, in the Pleasures which you feel, more than your Disgrace lies in the Pain—not in the casual Prosperity of Fortune, more than your Disgrace in the casual Adversity—but in just complete Action throughout every Part of Life, what ever be the Face of Things, whether favourable or the contrary.

But why then, said I, such Accuracy about Externals? So much Pains to be informed, what are Pursuible, what Avoidable? It behoves the Pilot, replied he, to know the Seas and the Winds; the Nature of Tempests, Calms, and Tides. They are the Subjects, about which his Art...
is conversant. Without a just Experience of them, he can never prove himself an Artist. Yet we look not for his Reputation either in fair Gales, or in adverse; but in the Skilfulness of his Conduct, be these Events as they happen. In like manner fares it with this the Moral Artist. He, for a Subject has the Whole of Human Life—Health and Sickness; Pleasure and Pain; with every other possible Incident, which can befall him during his Existence. If his Knowledge of all these be accurate and exact, so too must his Conduct, in which we place his Happiness. But if this Knowledge be defective, must not his Conduct be defective also? I replied, so it should seem. And if his Conduct, then his Happiness? It is true.

You see then, continued he, even tho' Externals were as nothing; tho' it was true, in their own Nature, they were neither Good nor Evil; yet an accurate Knowledge of them is, from our Hypothesis, absolutely necessary.
Concerning **Happiness**, necessary. Indeed, said I, you have proved it.

He continued—Inferior Artists may be at a stand, because they want Materials. From their Stubbornness and Intractability, they may often be disappointed. But as long as Life is passing, and Nature continues to operate, the Moral Artist of Life has at all times, all he desires. He can never want a Subject fit to exercise him in his proper Calling; and that, with this happy Motive to the Constancy of his Endeavours, that, the crosser, the harsher, the more untoward the Events, the greater his Praise, the more illustrious his Reputation.

All this, said I, is true, and cannot be denied. But one Circumstance there appears, where your Similes seem to fail. The Praise indeed of the Pilot we allow to be in his Conduct; but it is in the Success of that Conduct, where we look for his Happiness. If a Storm arise, and the Ship be
be lost, we call him not *happy*, how well
soever he may have conducted. It is then
only we congratulate him, when he has
reached the desired Haven.

Your Distinction, said he, is just. And it is here
lies the *noble Prerogative of Moral Artists*,
above all others—But yet I know not how
to explain myself, I fear my Doctrine will
appear so strange. You may proceed,
said I, safely, since you advance it but as an
Hypothesis.

Thus then, continued he—The *End*
in other Arts is ever distant and removed.
It consists not in the *mere Conduct*, much
less in a single *Energy*; but is the just Re-
sult of many *Energies*, each of which are
essential to it. Hence, by *Obstacles un-
avoidable*, it may often be *retarded*: Nay
more, may be so *embarrassed*, as never pos-
sibly to be attained. But in the *Moral Art*
of Life, the very *Conduct* is the *End*;
the very *Conduct*, I say, itself, throughout
every its *minute* *Energy*; because each of
these, however *minute*, partake as truly of

Restitude,
Concerning **Happiness,** Part II. Rectitude, as the largest Combination of them, when considered collectively. Hence of all Arts is this the only one perpetually complete in every Instant, because it needs not, like other Arts, Time to arrive at that Perfection, at which in every Instant it is arrived already. Hence by Duration it is not rendered either more or less perfect; Completion, like Truth, admitting of no Degrees, and being in no sense capable of either Intension or Remission. And hence too by necessary Connection (which is a greater Paradox than all) even that Happiness or Sovereign Good, the End of this Moral Art, is itself too, in every Instant, Consummate and Complete; is neither heightened or diminished by the Quantity of its Duration, but is the same to its Enjoyers, for a Moment or a Century.

Upon this I smiled. He asked me the Reason. It is only to observe, said I, the Course of our Inquiries—A new Hypothesis has been advanced—Appearing somewhat strange, it is desired to be explained—
plained—You comply with the Request, and in pursuit of the Explanation, make it ten times more obscure and unintelligible, than before. It is but too often the Fate, said he, of us Commentators. But you know in such cases what is usually done. When the Comment will not explain the Text, we try whether the Text will not explain itself. This Method, it is possible, may assist us here. The Hypothesis, which we would have illustrated, was no more than this—That the Sovereign Good lay in Rectitude of Conduct; and that this Good corresponded to all our Preconceptions. Let us examine then, whether, upon trial, this Correspondence will appear to hold; and, for all that we have advanced since, suffer it to pass, and not perplex us.

Agreed, said I, willingly, for now I hope to comprehend you.

§ 2. Recollect then, said he. Do you not remember that one Pre-conception of the Sovereign Good was, to be accommodate to all Times and Places? I remember it.

And
Concerning Happiness,

Part II.

And is there any Time, or any Place, whence Restitude of Conduct may be excluded? Is there not a right Action in Prosperity, a right Action in Adversity?—May there not be a decent, generous, and laudable behaviour, not only in Peace, in Power, and in Health; but in War, in Oppression, in Sickness and in Death?

There may.

And what shall we say to those other Pre-conceptions—to being Durable, Self-derived, and Indeprivable? Can there be any Good so Durable, as the Power of always doing right? Is there any Good conceivable, so entirely beyond the Power of others? Or, if you hesitate, and are doubtful, I would willingly be informed, into what Circumstances may Fortune throw a brave and honest Man, where it shall not be in his Power to act bravely and honestly?

If there are no such, then Restitude of Conduct, if a Good, is a Good Indeprivable. I confess, said I, it appears so.

But
But farther, said he—Another Pre-
conception of the Sovereign Good was, to be
Agreeable to Nature. It was. And
can any thing be more agreeable to a
Rational and Social Animal, than Rational
and Social Conduct? Nothing. But
Rectitude of Conduct is with us Rational
and Social Conduct. It is.

Once more, continued he—Another
Pre-conception of this Good was, to be Con-
ducive, not to Mere-being, but to Well-
being. Admit it. And can any
thing, believe you, conduce so probably to
the Well-being of a Rational Social Animal,
as the right Exercise of that Reason, and of
those Social Affections? Nothing.
And what is this same Exercise, but the
highest Rectitude of Conduct? Certainly.

§ 3. You see then, said he, how well
our Hypothesis, being once admitted, tall-
lies with our Original Pre-conceptions of
the Sovereign Good. I replied, it in-
deed
Concerning **Happiness**, Part II. deed appeared so, and could not be denied. But who, think you, ever dreamt of a Happiness like this? A Happiness dependent, not on the Success, but on the Aim?

Even common and ordinary Life, replied he, can furnish us with Examples. Ask of the Sportsman where lies his Enjoyment? Ask whether it be in the Possession of a slaughtered Hare, or Fox? He would reject, with Contempt, the very Supposition—He would tell you, as well as he was able, that the Joy was in the Pursuit—in the Difficulties which are obviated; in the Faults, which are retrieved; in the Conduct and Direction of the Chace thro' all its Parts—that the Completion of their Endeavours was so far from giving them Joy, that instantly at that Period all their Joy was at an End. For Sportsmen, replied I, this may be no bad Reasoning. It is not the Sentiment, said he, of Sportsmen alone. The Man of Gallantry not unoften has been found to think after the same manner.

—*Meus est amor huic similis; nam*
A DIALOGUE.

Transvolat in medio posit, & fugientia captat *.

To these we may add the Tribe of Builders and Projectors. Or has not your own Experience informed you of Numbers, who, in the Building and Laying-out, have expressed the highest Delight; but shewn the utmost Indifference to the Result of their Labours, to the Mansion or Gardens, when once finished and complete?

The Truth, said I, of these Examples is not to be disputed. But I could wish your Hypothesis had better than these to support it. In the serious View of Happiness, do you ever imagine there were any, who could fix it (as we said before) not on the Success, but on the Aim? More, even in this light, said he, than perhaps at first you may imagine. There are Instances innumerable of Men, bad as well as good, who having fixed, as their Aim, a certain Conduct of their own, have

* Hor. Sat. II. L. i. v. 107.
Concerning Happiness,

Part II. so far attached their Welfare and Happiness to it, as to deem all Events in its Prosecution, whether fortunate or unfortunate, to be mean, contemptible, and not worthy their Regard. I called on him for Examples.

What think you, said he, of the Affassin, who flew the first Prince of Orange; and who, tho' brought by his Conduct to the most exquisite Tortures, yet conscious of what he had done, could bear them all unmoved? Or (if you will have a better Man) what think you of that sturdy Roman, who would have dispatched Porfenna; and who, full of his Design, and superior to all Events, could thrust a Hand into the Flames with the steadiest Intrepidity? I replied, That these indeed were very uncommon Instances.

Attend too, continued he, to Epicurus dying, the Founder of a Philosophy, little favouring of Enthusiasm — "This I write you (says he, in one of his Epistles) while the last Day of Life is passing, and that
that a Happy One. The Pains indeed of my Body are not capable of being heightened. Yet to these we oppose that joy of the Soul, which arises from the Memory of our past Speculations."—Hear him, consonant to this, in another Place asserting, that a Rational Adversity was better than an Irrational Prosperity.

And what think you?—Had he not placed his Good and Happiness in the supposed Rectitude of his Opinions, would he not have preferred Prosperity, at all rates, to Adversity? Would not the Pains, of which he died, have made his Happiness perfect Misery?—And yet, you see, he disowns any such thing. The Memory of his past Life, and of his Philosophical Inventions were, even in the Hour of Death it seems, a Counterpoise to support him.

It must be owned, said I, that you appear to reason justly.

Pass from Epicurus, continued he, to Socrates. What are the Sentiments of that divine
divine Man, speaking of his own unjust Condemnation; "O Crito, says he, if it "be pleasing to the Gods this way, then be "it this way." And again—"Anytus "and Melytus, I grant, can kill me; but "to hurt or injure me, is beyond their "Power." It would not have been bey- "ond it, had he thought his Welfare de- "pendent on any thing they could do; for "they were then doing their worst — "Whence then was it beyond them? — "Because his Happiness was derived not from without, but from within; not from the Success, which perhaps was due to the Rectitude of his Life, but from that Recti- "tude alone, every other thing disregarded. "He had not, it seems, so far renounced his own Doctrine, as not to remember his "former Words; that—"To whom ever "all things, conducive to Happiness, are de- "rived solely, or at least nearly from him- "self, and depend not on the Welfare or "Adversity of others, from the Variety of "whose Condition his own must vary also: "He it is, who has prepared to himself the "most
"most excellent of all Lives—He it is, who
" is the Temperate, the Prudent, and the
" Brave—He it is, who, when Wealth or
" Children either come or are taken away,
" will best obey the Wise Man’s Precept—
" For neither will be be seen to grieve, nor
" to rejoice in excess, from the Trust and
" Confidence which he has reposed in himself."
—You have a Sketch at least of his Meaning, tho’ far below his own Attic and truly elegant Expression. I grant, said I, your Example; but this and the rest are but single Instances. What are three or four in Number, to the whole of Human Kind?

If you are for Numbers, replied he, what think you of the numerous Race of Patriots, in all Ages and Nations, who have joyfully met Death, rather than desert their Country, when in danger? They must have thought surely on another Happiness than Success, when they could gladly go, where they saw Death often inevitable. Or what think you of the many Martyrs

for
Concerning *Happiness*,

Part II. for Systems wrong as well as right, who have dared defy the worst, rather than swerve from their Belief? You have brought indeed, said I, more Examples than could have been imagined.

Besides, continued he, what is that *Comfort of a Good Conscience*, celebrated to such a height in the Religion which we profess, but the Joy arising from a Conscience of right *Energies*; a Conscience of having done nothing, but what is consonant to our Duty? I replied, It indeed appeared so.

Even the Vulgar, continued he, recognize a *Good* of this very Character, when they say of an Undertaking, tho' it *succeed not*, that they are *contented*; that they have *done their best*, and can accuse themselves of nothing. For what is this, but placing their *Content*, their *Good*, their *Happiness*, not in the *Success* of Endeavours, but in the *Rectitude*? If it be not the *Rectitude* which contents them, you must tell
tell me what it is else. It appears, Part II.
replied I, to be that alone.

I hope then, continued he, that tho' you accede not to this Notion of Happiness, which I advance; you will at least allow it not to be such a Paradox, as at first you seemed to imagine. That indeed, replied I, cannot be denied you.

§ 4. Granting me this, said he, you encourage me to explain myself—We have supposed the Sovereign Good to lie in Rectitude of Conduct. We have. And think you there can be Rectitude of Conduct, if we do not live consistently? In what Sense, said I, would you be understood? To live consistently, said he, is the same with me, as To live agreeably to some one single and consonant Scheme or Purpose. Undoubtedly, said I, without this, there can be no Rectitude of Conduct. All Rectitude of Conduct then, you say, implies such Consistence. It does. And does all Consistence, think you, imply such
Concerning Happiness,

Part II.

such Rectitude? I asked him, Why not? It is possible, indeed it may, said he, for aught we have discovered yet, to the contrary. But what if it should be found that there may be numberless Schemes, each in particular consistent with itself, but yet all of them different, and some perhaps contrary? There may, you know, be a consistent Life of Knavery, as well as a consistent Life of Honesty; there may be a uniform Practice of Luxury, as well as of Temperance, and Abstemiousness. Will the Conscience, common to all of these Lives, render the Conduct in each, right? It appears, said I, an Absurdity, that there should be the same Rectitude in two Contraries. If so, said he, we must look for something more than mere Conscience, when we search for that Rectitude which we at present talk of. A consistent Life indeed is requisite, but that alone is not enough. We must determine its peculiar Species, if we would be accurate and exact. It indeed appears, said I, necessary.

Nor
Nor is any thing, continued he, more easy to be discussed. For what can that peculiar Consistence of Life be else, than a Life, whose several Parts are not only consonant to each other, but to the Nature also of the Being, by whom that Life has been adopted? Does not this last Degree of Consistence appear as requisite as the former? I answered, it could not be otherwise.

You see then, said he, the true Idea of right Conduct. It is not, merely To live consistently; but it is To live consistently with Nature. Allow it.

But what, continued he, Can we live consistently with Nature, and be at a loss how to behave ourselves? We cannot. And can we know how to behave ourselves, if we know nothing of what befals us; nothing of those Things and Events, which perpetually surround, and affect us? We cannot. You see then,
Concerning H A P P I N E S S,
Part II. then, continued he, how we are again fallen insensibly into that Doctrine, which proves the Necessity of scrutinizing and knowing the Value of Externals. I replied, it was true. If you assent, said he, to this, it will of course follow, that, To live consistently with Nature, is, To live agreeably to a just Experience of those Things, which happen around us. It appears so.

But farther still, said he.—Think you any one can be deemed to live agreeably to such Experience, if he select not, as far as possible, the things most congruous to his Nature? He cannot. And by the same Rule, as far as possible, must he not reject such as are contrary? He must. And that not occasionally, as Fancy happens to prompt; but steadily, constantly, and without Remission. I should imagine so. You judge, said he, truly. Were he to act otherwise in the least instance, he would falsify his Professions; he would not live according to that Experience, which we now sup-
It should seem then, said he, from hence, as a natural Consequence of what we have admitted, that the *Essence of right Conduct* lay in *Selection* and *Rejection*. So, said I, it has appeared. And that such *Selection* and *Rejection* should be *consonant with our proper Nature*. It is true. And be *steady and perpetual*, not occasional and interrupted. It is true. But if this be the *Essence of Right Conduct*, then too it is the *Essence of our Sovereign Good*; for in such Conduct we have supposed this Good to consist. We have.

*See* then, said he, the Result of our Inquiry.—*The Sovereign Good*, as constituted by *Rectitude of Conduct*, has, on our strictest Scrutiny, appeared to be this—*To live perpetually selecting, as far as possible, what is congruous to Nature, and rejecting what is*...
Concerning Happiness,

Part II. Contrary, making our end that selecting and that rejecting only. It is true, said I, so it appears.

§ 5. Before we hasten then farther, said he, let us stop to recollect, and see whether our present conclusions accord with our former.—We have now supposed the Sovereign Good to be Rectitude of Conduct, and this Conduct we have made consist in a certain Selecting and Rejecting.

We have. And do you not imagine that the Selecting and Rejecting, which we propose, as they are purely governed by the Standard of Nature, are capable in every instance of being rationally justified?

I replied, I thought they were. But if they admit a rational justification, then are they Moral Offices or Duties; for thus* you remember yesterday a Moral Office was defined. It was. But if so, To live in the Practice of them, will be

* Sup. p. 175.
be To live in the Discharge of Moral Offices. 

It will. But To live in the Discharge of these, is the same as Living according to Virtue, and Living according to Nature. It is. So therefore is Living in that Selection, and in that Rejection, which we propose. It is.

We need never therefore be at a loss, said he, for a Description of the Sovereign Good.—We may call it, Rectitude of Conduct.—If that be too contracted, we may enlarge and say, it is—To live perpetually Selecting and Rejecting according to the Standard of our Being.—If we are for still different Views, we may say it is—To live in the Discharge of Moral Offices—To live according to Nature—To live according to Virtue—To live according to just Experience of those Things, which happen around us.—Like some finished Statue, we may behold it every way; it is the same Object, tho' variously
Concerning *Happiness*,

Part II. variously viewed; nor is there a View, but is natural, truly graceful, and engaging.

§ 6. I cannot deny, said I, but that as you now have explained it, your Hypothesis seems far more plausible, than when first it was proposed. You will believe it, said he, more so still, by considering it with more Attention.—In the first place, tho' perhaps it esteem nothing *really Good* but *Virtue*, nothing *really Evil*, but *Vice*, yet it in no manner takes away the *Difference*, and *Distinction* of other Things. So far otherwise, it is for establishing their Distinction to the greatest Accuracy. For were this neglected, what would become of *Selection* and *Rejection*, those important Energies, which are its very Soul and Essence? Were there no *Difference*, there could be no *Choice*.

It is true, said I, there could not.

Again, said he. It is no meagre, mortifying System of *Self-denial*—It suppresses no
no Social and Natural Affections, nor takes away any Social and Natural Relations—
It prescribes no Abstainings, no Forbearances out of Nature; no gloomy, sad, and lonely Rules of Life, without which it is evident Men may be as honest as with, and be infinitely more useful and worthy Members of Society.—It refuses no Pleasure, not inconsistent with Temperance—
It rejects no Gain, not inconsistent with Justice.—Universally, as far as Virtue neither forbids nor diffuades, it endeavours to render Life, even in the most vulgar Acceptation, as cheerful, joyous, and easy as possible. Nay, could it mend the Condition of Existence in any the most trivial Circumstance, even by adding to the amplest Possessions the poorest meanest Utensil, it would in no degree contemn an Addition even so mean. Far otherwise—It would consider, that to neglect the least Acquisition, when fairly in its power, would be to fall short of that perfect and accurate Conduct, which it ever has in view, and on which alone all depends.
Part II. And yet, tho' thus exact in every the minutest Circumstance, it gives us no Solicitude as to what Rank we maintain in Life. Whether noble or ignoble, wealthy or poor; whether merged in Business, or confined to Inactivity, it is equally consistent with every Condition, and equally capable of adorning them all. Could it indeed choose its own Life, it would be always that, where most Social Affections might extensively be exerted, and most done to contribute to the Welfare of Society. But if Fate order otherwise, and this be denied; its Intentions are the same, its Endeavours are not wanting; nor are the Social, Rational Powers forgotten, even in Times and Circumstances, where they can least become conspicuous.

It teaches us to consider Life, as one great important Drama, where we have each our Part allotted us to act. It tells us that our Happiness, as Actors in this Drama, consists not in the Length of our Part,
A DIALOGUE.

Part, nor in the State and Dignity, but in the just, the decent, and the natural Performance.

If its Aims are successful, it is thankful to Providence. It accepts all the Joys, derived from their Success, and feels them as fully, as those who know no other Happiness. The only Difference is, that having a more excellent Good in view, it fixes not, like the Many, its Happiness on Success alone, well knowing that in such case, if Endeavours fail, there can be nothing left behind but Murmurings and Misery. On the contrary, when this happens, it is then it retires into itself, and reflecting on what is Fair, what is Laudable and Honest (the truly beatific Vision, not of mad Enthusiasts, but of the Calm, the Temperate, the Wise and the Good) it becomes superior to all Events; it acquiesces in the Consciousness of its own Rectitude; and, like that Mansion founded, not on the Sands, but on the Rock, it defies all the Terrors of Tempest and Inundation.

P 2 § 7.
§ 7. Here he paused, and I took the Opportunity to observe, how his Subject had warmed him into a degree of Rapture; how greatly it had raised both his Sentiments and his Stile, No wonder, said he. Beauty of every kind excites our Love and Admiration; the Beauties of Art, whether Energies or Works; the Beauties of Nature, whether Animal or Inanimate. And shall we expect less from this Supreme Beauty; this moral, mental, and original Beauty; of which all the rest are but as Types or Copies?—Not however by high Flights to lose Sight of our Subject, the whole of what we have argued, may be reduced to this—

All Men pursue Good, and would be happy, if they knew how; not happy for Minutes, and miserable for Hours, but happy, if possible, thro' every Part of their Existence. Either therefore there is a Good of this steady durable Kind, or there is none. If none, then all Good must be transient.
transient and uncertain; and if so, an Object of lowest Value, which can little deserve either our Attention, or Inquiry. But if there be a better Good, such a Good as we are seeking; like every other thing, it must be derived from some Cause; and that Cause must be either external, internal, or mixt, in as much as except these three, there is no other possible. Now a steady, durable Good, cannot be derived from an external Cause, by reason all derived from Externals must fluctuate, as they fluctuate. By the same Rule, not from a Mixture of the Two; because the Part which is external will proportionally destroy its Essence. What then remains but the Cause internal; the very Cause which we have supposed, when we place the Sovereign Good in Mind; in Rectitude of Conduct; in just Selecting and Rejecting? There seems indeed no other Cause, said I, to which we can possibly assign it.

Forgive me then, continued he, should I appear to boast——We have proved,
Concerning Happiness,

Part II. proved, or at least there is an Appearance we have proved, that either there is no Good except this of our own; or that, if there be any other, it is not worthy our Regard. It must be confessed, said I, you have said as much, as the Subject seems to admit.

§ 8. By means then, said he, of our Hypothesis, behold one of the fairest, and most amiable of Objects, behold the True and Perfect Man: that Ornament of Humanity; that Godlike Being; who, without regard either to Pleasure or Pain, uninfluenced equally by either Prosperity or Adversity, superior to the World and its best and worst Events, can fairly rest his All upon the Rectitude of his own Conduct; can constantly, and uniformly, and manfully maintain it; thinking that, and that alone, wholly sufficient to make him happy.

And do you seriously believe, said I, there ever was such a Character? And what, replied he, if I should admit, there never
never was, is, or will be such a Character? —
that we have been talking the whole time
of a Being, not to be found;

A faultless Monster, which the World ne'er
saw?

Supposing, I say, we admit this, what then?

Would not your System in such a case,
said I, a little border upon the chimerical?
I only ask the Question. You need
not be so tender, he replied, in expressing
yourself. If it be false, if it will not en-
dure the Test, I am as ready to give it up,
as I have been to defend it. He must be a
poor Philosopher indeed, who, when he sees
Truth and a System at variance, can ever
be solicitous for the Fate of a System.

But tell me, I pray——Do you object
to mine, from its Perfection, or from its
Imperfection? From its being too excel-
 lent for Human Nature, and above it; or
from its being too base, and below it?
It seems to require, said I, a Perfection,
to which no Individual ever arrived.
That very Transcendence, said he, is an

Argu-
Concerning HAPPINESS,
Part II. Argument on its behalf. Were it of a Rank inferior, it would not be that Perfection, which we seek. Would you have it, said I, beyond Nature? If you mean, replied he, beyond any particular or individual Nature, most undoubtedly I would.—As you are a Lover of Painting, you shall hear a Story on the Subject.

"In ancient days, while Greece was flourishing in Liberty and Arts, a celebrated Painter, having drawn many excellent Pictures for a certain free State, and been generously and honourably rewarded for his Labours, at last made an Offer to paint them a Helen, as a Model and Exemplar of the most exquisite Beauty. The Proposal was readily accepted, when the Artist informed them, that in order to draw one Fair, it was necessary he should contemplate many. He demanded therefore a Sight of all their finest Women. The State, to assist the Work, assented to his Request. They were exhibited before him."
"him; he selected the most beautiful; Part II.
"and from these formed his Helen, more
"beautiful than them all."

You have heard the Fact, and what are we to infer?—Or can there be any other Inference than this—that the Standard of Perfection, with respect to the Beauty of Bodies, was not (as this Artist thought) to be discovered in any Individual; but being dispersed by Nature in Portions thro' the many, was from thence, and thence only, to be collected and recognized?

It appears, said I, he thought so. The Picture, continued he, is lost, but we have Statues still remaining. If there be Truth in the Testimony of the best and fairest Judges, no Woman ever equalled the Delicacy of the Medicean Venus, nor Man the Strength and Dignity of the Farneslian Hercules. It is generally, said I, so believed.

And will you, said he, from this unparalleled and transcendent Excellence, deny these
Concerning *Happiness*, Part II.

these Works of Art to be truly and strictly *Natural*? Their Excellence, replied I, must be confessed by All; but how they can be called so strictly *Natural*, I must own a little startles me. That the *Limbs* and their *Proportions*, said he, are selected from *Nature*, you will hardly I believe doubt, after the Story just related.

I replied, it was admitted. The *Parts* therefore of these Works are *Natural*. They are. And may not the same be asserted, as to the *Arrangement* of these Parts? Must not *this* too be *natural*, as it is analogous we know to *Nature*? It must. If so, then is the *Whole* *Natural*. So indeed, said I, it should seem. It cannot, replied he, be otherwise, if it be a *Fact* beyond dispute, that the *Whole* is nothing more, than the *Parts* under such *Arrangement*.

Enough, said I, you have satisfied me.

If I have, said he, it is but to *transfer* what we have asserted of this *subordinate* Beauty, to Beauty of a *higher Order*; it is but
but to pass from the External, to the Moral and Internal. For here we say, by parity of Reason, that no where in any particular Nature is the perfect Character to be seen intire. Yet one is brave; another is temperate; a third is liberal; and a fourth is prudent. So that in the Multitude of mixed imperfect Characters, as before in the Multitude of imperfect Bodies, is expressed that idea, that Moral Standard of Perfection, by which all are tried and compared to one another, and at last upon the whole are either justified or condemned—that Standard of Perfection, which cannot be but most Natural, as it is purely collected from Individuals of Nature, and is the Test of all the Merit to which they aspire. I acknowledge, said I, your Argument.

I might add, said he, if there were Occasion, other Arguments which would surprize you. I might inform you of the natural Pre-eminence, and high Rank of Specific Ideas;—that every Individual was but
Concerning HAPPINESS,

Part II. but their Type, or Shadow;—that the Mind or Intellect was the Region of Possibles;—that whatever is Possible, to the Mind, actually Is; nor any thing a Non-entity, except what implies a Contradiction;—that the genuine Sphere and genuine Cylinder, tho' Forms perhaps too perfect, ever to exist conjoined to Matter, were yet as true and real Beings, as the grossest Objects of Sense; were the Source of infinite Truths, which wholly depend on them, and which, as Truths, have a Being most unalterable and eternal. But these are Reasonings, which rather belong to another Philosophy; and if you are satisfied without them, they are at best but superfluous.

He waited not for my Answer, but proceeded as follows. It is thus, said he, have I endeavoured, as far as in my power, to give you an Idea of the perfect Character: a Character, which I am neither so absurd, as to impute to myself; nor so rigorous and unfair, as to require of others. We have proposed it only, as an Exem-
PLAR OF Imitation, which tho' None we think can equal, yet All at least may follow—an Exemplar of Imitation, which in proportion as we approach, so we advance proportionably in Merit and in Worth—an Exemplar, which, were we more selfish, we should be Fools to reject; if it be true, that to be Happy, is the ultimate Wish of us all, and that Happiness and Moral Worth so reciprocally correspond, that there can be no degree of the one, without an equal Degree of the other. If there be Truth, said I, in your Reasonings, it cannot certainly be otherwise.

He continued, by saying—The Proficiency of Socrates, and indeed of every honest Man, was sufficient to convince us, could we be steadfast to our Purpose, that some Progress at least might be made toward this Perfection—How far, we knew not—The Field was open—The Race was free and common to All—Nor was the Prize, as usual, reserved only to the First; but All, who run, might depend on a Reward, having
Concerning H A P P I N E S S,

Part II. having the Voice of Nature, would they but listen, to assure them,

* Nemo ex hoc numero mibi non donatus abibit.

§ 9. Here he paused, and left me to meditate on what he had spoken. For some time we passed on in mutual Silence, till observing me on my part little inclined to break it, What, said he, engages you with an Attention so earnest? I was wondering, said I, whence it should happen, that in a Discourse of such a nature, you should say so little of Religion, of Providence, and a Deity. I have not, replied he, omitted them, because not intimately united to Morals; but because what ever we treat accurately, should be treated separately and apart. Multiplicity of Matter naturally tends to Confusion. They are weak Minds indeed, which dread a rational Suspence; and much more so, when in the Event, it only leads to a surer Knowledge,

* ÆNEID. I. v. N. 305.
ledge, and oftens strengthens the very Subject, on which we suspend. Could I however repeat you the Words of a venerable Sage, (for I can call him no other) whom once I heard disserting on the Topic of Religion, and whom still I hear, when ever I think on him; you might accept perhaps my Religious Theories as candidly, as you have my Moral. I pressed him to repeat them, with which he willingly complied.

The Speaker, said he, whose Words I am attempting to relate, and whom for the present I name Theophilus, was of a Character truly amiable in every part. When young, he had been fortunate in a liberal Education; had been a Friend to the Muses, and approved himself such to the Public. As Life declined, he wisely retired, and dedicated his Time almost wholly to Contemplation. Yet could he never forget the Muses, whom once he loved. He retained in his Discourse (and so in the Sequel you will soon find) a large

Part II.
Concerning Happiness,

Part II. Portion of that rapturous, anti-prosaic Stile, in which those Ladies usually choose to express themselves.

We were walking, not (as now) in the cheerful Face of Day, but late in the Evening, when the Sun had long been set. Circumstances of Solemnity were not wanting to affect us; the Poets could not have feigned any more happy—a running Stream, an ancient Wood, a still Night, and a bright Moonshine.—I, for my own part, induced by the Occasion, fell insensibly into a Reverie about Inhabitants in the Moon. From thence I wandered to other heavenly Bodies, and talked of States there, and Empires, and I know not what.

Who lives in the Moon, said he, is perhaps more than we can well learn. It is enough, if we can be satisfied, by the help of our best Faculties, that Intelligence is not confined to this little Earth, which we inhabit; that tho' Men were not, the World would not want Spectators, to contemplate its
A D I A L O G U E.  

its Beauty, and adore the Wisdom of its Author.

"This whole Universe itself is but one City or Commonwealth—a System of Substances variously formed, and variously actuated agreeably to those forms—a System of Substances both immensely great and small, Rational, Animal, Vegetable, and Inanimate.

"As many Families make one Village, many Villages one Province, many Provinces one Empire; so many Empires, Oceans, Waftes, and Wilds, combined, compose that Earth on which we live. Other Combinations make a Planet or a Moon; and these again, united, make one Planetary System. What higher Combinations subsist, we know not, their Gradation and Ascent it is impossible we should discover. Yet the generous Mind, not deterred by this Im-

"menalty, intrepidly passes on, thro' Regions unknown, from greater System Q " to
Concerning H A P P I N E S S,

Part II. "to greater, till it arrive at that greatest,
"where Imagination stops, and can advance no farther. In this last, this mighty, this stupendous Idea, it beholds the Universe itself, of which every Thing is a Part, and with respect to which not the smallest Atom is either foreign or detached.

"Wide as its Extent, is the Wisdom of its Workmanship, not bounded and narrow, like the humbler Works of Art. These are all of Origin no higher than Human. We can readily trace them to their utmost Limit, and with accuracy discern both their Beginning and their End. But where the Microscope that can shew us, from what Point Wisdom begins in Nature? Where the Telescope that can descry, to what Infinitude it extends? The more diligent our Search, the more accurate our Scrutiny, the more only are we convinced, that our Labours can never finish; that Subjects inex-
**A Dialogue.**

"inexhaustible remain behind, still unexplored.

"Hence the Mind truly wise, quitting the Study of Particulars, as knowing their Multitude to be infinite and incomprehensible, turns its intellectual Eye to what is general and comprehensive, and thro' Generals learns to see, and recognize whatever exists.

"It perceives in this view, that every Substance, of every degree, has its Nature, its proper Make, Constitution or Form, by which it acts, and by which it suffers. It perceives it so to fare with every natural Form around us, as with those Tools and Instruments by which Art worketh its Wonders. The Saw is destined to one Act; the Mallet, to another; the Wheel answers this Purpose; and the Lever answers a different. So Nature uses the Vegetable, the Brute, and the Rational, agreeably to the proper Form and Constitution of every Kind. The
Concerning HAPPINESS,

Part II. "Vegetable proceeds with perfect Insensibility. The Brute possesses a Sense of what is pleasurable and painful, but stops at mere Sensation, and is unable to go farther. The Rational, like the Brute, has all the Powers of mere Sensation, but enjoys superadded a farther transcendent Faculty, by which it is made conscious, not only of what it feels, but of the Powers themselves, which are the Sources of those very Feelings; a Faculty, which recognizing both itself and all Things else, becomes a Canon, a Corrector, and a Standard Universal.

"Hence to the Rational alone is imparted that Master-Science, of what they are, where they are, and the End to which they are destined.

"Happy, too happy, did they know their own Felicity; did they reverence the Dignity of their own superior Character, and never wretchedly degrade themselves into Natures to them subor-
"dinate. And yet alas! it is a Truth too certain, that as the Rational only are susceptible of a Happiness truly excellent, so these only merge themselves into Miseries past Indurance.

"Assist us then, Thou Power Divine, with the Light of that Reason, by which Thou lightenest the World; by which Grace and Beauty is diffused thro' every Part, and the Welfare of the Whole is ever uniformly upheld; that Reason, of which our own is but a Particle or Spark, like some Promethean Fire, caught from Heaven above. So teach us to know ourselves, that we may attain that Knowledge, which alone is worth attaining. Check our vain, our idle Researches into the Laws, and Natures, and Motions of other Beings, till we have learnt and can practise those, which peculiarly respect ourselves. Teach us to be fit Actors in that general Drama, where Thou hast allotted every Being, great and small, its
Concerning **Happiness**, 

**Part II.** "proper Part, the due Performance of which is the only End of its Existence.

"Enable us to curb Desire within the Bounds of what is *Natural*. Enable us even to suspend it, till we can employ it to our Emolument. Be our first Work to have escaped from *wrong Opinion*, and *bad Habit*; that the Mind, thus rendered sincere and incorrupt, may with Safety proceed to seek its genuine Good and Happiness.

"When we are thus previously exercised, thus duly prepared, let not our Love there stop, where it first begins; but insensibly conduct it, by thy invisible Influence, from lower Objects to higher, till it arrive at that *Supreme*, where only it can find what is adequate and full. Teach us to love *Thee*, and *Thy Divine Administration*—

"to regard the Universe itself as our true and genuine Country, not that little casual Spot, where we first drew vital Air."
A Dialogue.

"Air. Teach us each to regard Himself, but as a Part of this great Whole; a Part which for its Welfare we are as patiently to resign, as we resign a single Limb for the Welfare of our whole Body. Let our Life be a continued Scene of Acquiescence and of Gratitude; of Gratitude, for what we enjoy; of Acquiescence, in what we suffer; as both can only be referable to that concatenated Order of Events, which cannot but be best, as being by Thee approved and chosen.

"In as much as Futurity is hidden from our Sight, we can have no other Rule of Choice, by which to govern our Conduct, than what seems consonant to the Welfare of our own particular Natures. If it appear not contrary to Duty and moral Office, (and how should we judge, but from what appears?) Thou canst not but forgive us, if we prefer Health to Sickness; the Safety of Life and Limb, to Maiming or to Death. Q. 4 "But
Concerning HAPPINESS,

Part II. "But did we know that these Incidents, or any other were appointed us; were fated in that Order of incontrollable Events, by which Thou preservest and adornest the Whole, it then becomes our Duty, to meet them with Magnanimity; to co-operate with Cheerfulness in what ever Thou ordainest; that so we may know no other Will, than thine alone, and that the Harmony of our particular Minds with thy Universal, may be steady and uninterrupted thro' the Period of our Existence.

"Yet, since to attain this Height, this transcendent Height, is but barely possible, if possible, to the most perfect Humanity: regard what within us is Congenial to Thee; raise us above ourselves, and warm us into Enthusiasm. But let our Enthusiasm be such, as befits the Citizens of Thy Polity; liberal, gentle, rational, and humane—not such as to debase us into poor and wretched Slaves, as if Thou wert our Tyrant, not
"not our kind and common Father;" not our kind and common Father;
"much less such as to transform us into much less such as to transform us into
"savages Beasts of Prey, sullen, gloomy, savage Beasts of Prey, sullen, gloomy,
"dark, and fierce; prone to persecute, to dark, and fierce; prone to persecute, to
"ravage, and destroy, as if the Lust of ravage, and destroy, as if the Lust of
"Massacre could be grateful to thy Good- Massacre could be grateful to thy Good-
"ness. Permit us rather madly to avow ness. Permit us rather madly to avow
"Villainy in thy Defiance, than impiously Villainy in thy Defiance, than impiously
"to assert it under colour of thy Service. to assert it under colour of thy Service.
"Turn our Mind's Eye from every Idea Turn our Mind's Eye from every Idea
"of this Character; from the Servile, Ab- of this Character; from the Servile, Ab-
"ject, Horrid and Ghastly, to the Gener- ject, Horrid and Ghastly, to the Gener-
"rous, Lovely, Fair and Godlike.

"Here let us dwell;——be here our Here let us dwell;——be here our
"Study and Delight. So shall we be en- Study and Delight. So shall we be en-
"abled, in the silent Mirror of Contem- abled, in the silent Mirror of Contem-
"plation, to behold those Forms, which plation, to behold those Forms, which
"are hidden to Human Eyes—that ani- are hidden to Human Eyes—that ani-
"mating Wisdom, which pervades and mating Wisdom, which pervades and
"rules the Whole—that Law irresistible, rules the Whole—that Law irresistible,
"immutable, supreme, which leads the immutable, supreme, which leads the
"Willing, and compels the Averse, to co- Willing, and compels the Averse, to co-
"operate in their Station to the general operate in their Station to the general
"Welfare—that Magic Divine, which Welfare—that Magic Divine, which
"by
Concerning **Happiness**, 

Part II. "by an Efficacy past Comprehension, can transform every Appearance, the most hideous, into Beauty, and exhibit all things **Fair** and **Good** to Thee, **Essence Increate**, who art of purer **Eyes**, than ever to behold Iniquity.

"Be these our Morning, these our Evening Meditations—with these may our Minds be unchangeably tinged—that loving Thee with a Love most disinterested and sincere; enamoured of thy Polity, and thy **Divine Administration**; welcoming every Event with Cheerfulness and Magnanimity, as being best upon the Whole, because ordained of Thee; proposing nothing of ourselves, but with a Reserve that Thou permittest; acquiescing in every Obstruction, as ultimately referable to thy Providence—in a word, that working this Conduct, by due exercise, into perfect **Habit**; we may never murmur, never repine; never miss what we would obtain, or fall into that which we would avoid;..."
avoid; but being happy with that tran-
scendent Happiness, of which no one 
can deprive us; and blest with that Di-
vine Liberty, which no Tyrant can an-
noy; we may dare address Thee with 
pious Confidence, as the Philosophic Bard 
of old,

"Conduct me, Thou, of Beings Cause Divine, 
"Where-e'er I'm destin'd in thy great Design. 
"Active I follow on: for should my Will 
"Resist, I'm impious; but must follow still."

In this manner did Theophilus, said he, 
pursue the Subject, to which I had led him. He adorned his Sentiments with 
Expressions even more splendid than I 
have now employed. The Speaker, the 
Speech, the happy Circumstances which 
concurred, the Night's Beauty and Still-
ness, with the Romantic Scene where we 
were walking, all together gave the Whole 
such an Energy and Solemnity, as it is im-
possible you should feel from the Coldness 
of a bare Recital. I, continued he, for 
my
Concerning **Happiness**, Part II.

my own part, returned home sensibly touched, and retained the strongest Feelings of what I had heard, till the following Morning. Then the Business of the Day gently obliterated all, and left me by Night as little of a Philosopher, as I had ever been before.

§ 10. **And is it possible,** said I, so soon to have forgotten, what seems so striking and sublime, as the Subject you have been now treating? **It is Habit,** replied he, is all in all. **It is Practice and Exercise,** which can only make us truly any thing. Is it not evidently so, in the most common vulgar Arts? Did mere *Theory* alone ever make the meanest Mechanic? **And is the Supreme Artist of Life and Manners to be formed more easily, than such a one? Happy for us, could we prove it near so easy.** But believe me, my Friend, good Things are not so cheap. *Nothing is to be had gratis,* much less that which is most valuable.
Yet however for our Comfort, we have this to encourage us, that, tho' the Difficulty of acquiring Habits be great and painful, yet nothing so easy, so pleasant, as their Energies, when once wrought by Exercise to a due Standard of Perfection. I know you have made some Progress in Music. Mark well what you can do, as a Proficient this way—You can do that, which without Habit, as much exceeds the wisest Man, as to walk upon the Waves, or to ascend a Cliff perpendicular. You can even do it with Facility; and (left you should think I flatter) not you yourself alone, but a thousand others beside, whose low Rank and Genius no way raise them above the Multitude. If then you are so well assured of this Force of Habit in one Instance, judge not in other Instances by your own present Insufficiency. Be not shocked at the apparent Greatness of the perfect Moral Character, when you compare it to the Weakness and Imperfection of your own. On the contrary, when these dark,
Concerning **Happiness**, Part II.

dark, these melancholy Thoughts affail you, immediately turn your Mind to the Consideration of Habit. Remember how easy its Energies to those, who possess it; and yet how impracticable to such, as possess it not.

It must be owned, said I, that this is a Satisfaction, and may be some kind of Assistance in a melancholy Hour. And yet this very Doctrine naturally leads to another Objection.—Does not the Difficulty of attaining Habit too well support a certain Assertion, that, defend Virtue as we will, it is but a Scheme of Self-denial?

By Self-denial, said he, you mean, I suppose, something like what follows—

*Appetite* bids me eat; *Reason* bids me forbear—If I obey Reason, I deny Appetite; and Appetite being a Part of myself, to deny it, is a Self-denial. What is true thus in Luxury, is true also in other Subjects; is evident in Matters of Lucre, of Power, of Resentment, or whatever else we pursue by
A Dialogue.

by the Dictate of any Passion. You appear, said I, to have stated the Objection justly.

To return then to our Instance, said he, of Luxury. Appetite bids me eat; Reason bids me forbear—If I obey Reason, I deny Appetite—and if I obey Appetite, do I not deny Reason? Can I act either way, without rejecting one of them? And is not Reason a Part of myself, as notoriously as Appetite?

Or to take another Example—I have a Deposit in my Hands. Avarice bids me retain—Conscience bids me restore. Is there not a reciprocal Denial, let me obey which I will? And is not Conscience a Part of me, as truly as Avarice?

Poor Self indeed must be denied, take which Party we will. But why should Virtue be arraigned of thwarting it, more than Vice her contrary?—Make the most of the Argument, it can come but to this—
this—If Self-denial be an Objection to Virtue, so is it to Vice—If Self-denial be no Objection to Vice, no more can it be to Virtue. A wonderful and important Conclusion indeed!

He continued by saying, that the Soul of Man appeared not as a single Faculty, but as compounded of many—that as these Faculties were not always in perfect Peace one with another, so there were few Actions which we could perform, where they would be all found to concur. What then are we to do? Suspend till they agree?—That were indeed impossible.—Nothing therefore can remain, but to weigh well their several Pretensions; to hear all, that each has to offer in its behalf; and finally to pursue the Dictates of the Wisest and the Best. This done, as for the Self-denial, which we force upon the rest; with regard to our own Character, it is a Matter of Honour and Praise—with regard to the Faculties denied, it is a Matter of as small Weight, as to contemn the Noise and Clamours of a mad
mad and senseless Mob, in deference to the sober Voice of the worthier, better Citizens. And what Man could be justified, should he reject these, and prefer a Rabble?

§ 10. In this place he paused again, and I took occasion to acknowledge, that my Objection appeared obviated. As the Day advanced apace, he advised that we might return home; and walking along leisurely, thus resumed to himself the Discourse.

I dare say, continued he, you have seen many a wise Head shake, in pronouncing that sad Truth, how we are governed all by Interest.—And what do they think should govern us else? Our Loss, our Damage, our Disinterest?—Ridiculous indeed! We should be Ideots in such case, more than rational Animals. The only Question is, where Interest truly lies? For if this once be well adjusted, no Maxim can be more harmless.
I find myself existing upon a little Spot, surrounded every way by an immense unknown Expansion. — Where am I? What Sort of a Place do I inhabit? Is it exactly accommodated, in every Instance, to my Convenience? Is there no Excess of Cold, none of Heat, to offend me? Am I never annoyed by Animals, either of my own kind, or a different? Is every thing subservient to me, as tho' I had ordered all myself? — No — nothing like it — the farthest from it possible — The World appears not then originally made for the private Convenience of me alone? — It does not. — But is it not possible so to accommodate it, by my own particular Industry? — — If to accommodate Man and Beasts, Heaven and Earth; if this be beyond me, it is not possible — What Consequence then follows? Or can there be any other than this — If I seek an Interest of my own, detached from that of
"How then must I determine? Have I no Interest at all?—If I have not, I am a Fool for staying here. It is a smoaky House, and the sooner out of it, the better—But why no Interest?—Can I be contented with none, but one separate and detached?—Is a Social Interest joined with others such an Absurdity, as not to be admitted? The Bee, the Beaver, and the Tribes of herding Animals, are enough to convince me, that the thing is, somewhere at least, possible. How then am I assured, that it is not equally true of Man?—Admit it; and what follows?—If so, then Honour and Justice are my Interest—then the whole Train of Moral Virtues are my Interest; without some Portion of which, not even Thieves can maintain Society.
Part II.  "But farther still—I stop not here—
"I pursue this Social Interest, as far as I
"can trace my several Relations. I pass
"from my own Stock, my own Neigh-
"bourhood, my own Nation, to the whole
"Race of Mankind, as dispersed through-
"out the Earth.—Am I not related to them
"all, by the mutual Aids of Commerce;
"by the general Intercourse of Arts and
"Letters; by that common Nature, of
"which we all participate?—Again—
"I must have Food and Cloathing.—
"Without a proper genial Warmth,
"I instantly perish.—Am I not rela-
ted, in this view, to the very Earth
"itself? To the distant Sun, from
"whose beams I derive Vigour? To that
"stupendous Course and Order of the infi-
"nite Host of Heaven, by which the Times
"and Seasons ever uniformly pass on?—
"Were this Order once confounded, I
"could not probably survive a Moment;
"so absolutely do I depend on this common
"general Welfare.

"What
"What then have I to do, but to Part II. enlarge Virtue into Piety? Not only Honour and Justice, and what I owe to Man, is my Interest; but Gratitude, also Acquiescence, Resignation, Adoration, and all I owe to this great Polity, and its greater Governor, our common Parent.

"But if all these Moral and Divine Habits be my Interest, I need not surely seek for a better, I have an Interest compatible with the Spot on which I live—I have an Interest which may exist, without altering the Plan of Providence; without mending or marring the general Order of Events,—I can bear whatever happens with manlike Magnanimity; can be contented, and fully happy in the Good, which I possess; and can pass thro' this turbid, this fickle, fleeting Period, without Bewailings, or Envyings, or Murmurings, or Complaints."
Part II. And thus my Friend, have you my Sentiments, as it were abridged; my Sentiments on that Subject, which engages every one of us. For who would be unhappy? Who would not, if he knew how, enjoy one perpetual Felicity? Who are there existing, who do not at every Instant, seek it? It is the Wish, the Employ, not of the Rational Man only, but of the Sot, the Glutton, the very lowest of our kind. For my own System, whether a just one, you may now examine, if you think proper. I can only say on its behalf, if it happen to be erroneous, it is a grateful Error, which I cherish and am fond of. And yet if really such, I shall never deem it so sacred, as not willingly, upon Conviction, to resign it up to Truth.

Little passed after this worth relating. We had not far to walk, and we fell into common Topics. Yet one Observation of his I must not omit. It was what
what follows.—When we are once, said he, well habituated to this chief, this moral science, then logic and physics become two profitable adjuncts: logic, to secure to us the possession of our opinions; that, if an adversary attack, we may not basely give them up: physics, to explain the reason and oeconomy of natural events, that we may know something of that universe, where our dwelling has been appointed us. But let me add a saying (and may its remembrance never escape you) while you find this great, this master-science wanting, value logic but as sophistry, and physics but as raree-shew; for both, assure yourself, will be found nothing better.

It was soon after this that our walk ended. With it ended a conversation, which had long engaged us; and which, according to my promise, I have here endeavoured to transcribe.

THE END.
Advertisement to the Reader.

The Author has chosen to separate all Notes from his first and third Treatises, and thus subjoin them to the End, because those Treatises, being written in Dialogue, from their Nature and Genius admit not of Interruption. One of his Reasons for adding Notes was, to give Weight to his Assertions from the Authority of Antient Writers. But his chief and principal Reason was, to excite (if possible) the Curiosity of Readers, to examine with stricter Attention those valuable Remains of antient Literature. Should he obtain this End, he shall think his Labours (such as they are) abundantly rewarded.
NOTES ON TREATISE the First; CONCERNING ART.

NOTE I. p. 6. All Art is Cause.] Artis maxime proprium, creare & gignere. Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. 2. c. 22. "Esti de τέχνη μᾶκα χεὶ γένεσιν. All Art is employed in Production, that is, in making something to be. Aristotle. Ethic. Nicom. l. 6. c. 4.

The active efficient Causes have been ranged and enumerated after different manners. In the same Ethics, they are enumerated thus—αἰτία γὰρ δοκεῖσθαι εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη, καὶ τέχνη ἐτει δὲ νέος, καὶ πῶς τὸ δὲ ἀνθρώπως. The several Causes appear to be Nature, Necessity, and Chance; and besides these, Mind or Intelligence, and whatever operates by or thro’ Man. l. 3. c. 3. The Paraphrast Andronicus, in explaining this last Passage, Πῶς τὸ δὲ ἀνθρώπως, adds οἶον τέχνη, ἤ ἀλλὰ τις ψάξει, as for instance, Art, or any other human Action.
Alexander Aphrodisiensis speaks of efficient Causes as follows: 'Alla μὴν τὰ κυρίως ἀυτῶν τὸν κακόν τε, καὶ τέχνην, καὶ προοίμιον. The Causes, which are strictly and properly efficient, are Nature; Art, and each Man's particular Choice of Action. Πεί Ψυχής, p. 160. B. Edit. Ald.

In what Manner Art is distinguished from the rest of these efficient Causes, the subsequent Notes will attempt to explain.


Note III. p. 12. Art is Man becoming a Cause, Intentional and Habitual.] Aristotle, in his Rhetoric, thus accurately enumerates all the possible manners, either direct or indirect, in which Mankind may be said to act or do any thing. Πάντες δὴ σπάτισαι πάντας, τὰ μὲν ἐ δὴ ἀυλές τὰ δὲ, δὴ ἀυλές τῶν μὲν ἐν μὴ δὴ ἀυλές, τὰ μὲν διὰ τοῦχην σπάτισαι, τὰ δὲ ἐς ἀνάγνωσι τῶν δ' ἐς ἀνάγνωσι, τὰ μὲν βία, τὰ δὲ φύσει ὡς αἰσθά, ὥσα μὴ δὴ ἀυλές σπάτισαι, τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦχης τὰ δὲ φύσει τὰ δὲ βίας. Οσα δὲ δὴ ἀυλές καὶ ὡν ἀυλόν ἀλλοι, τὰ μὲν δὲ ἐδος, τὰ δὲ δὴ ὀρέξει καὶ τὰ μὲν δὲν ἔρωτικὴν ὀρέξειν, τὰ δὲ δὲ ἀλόγισιν ἔτι δὲ ἢ μὲν βάλεις, μεία λόγον ὀρέξεις ἀγαθῆ—ἀλόγοι δ' ὀρέξεις, ὀγνή καὶ ἐπιθυμία ὡς πάνθα ὡς σπάτισιν, ἀνάγνωσι σπάτισιν δὴ ἀκές ἐπὶ διὰ τοῦχην, διὰ βίαν, διὰ φύσις.
All Men do all Things, either of themselves, or not of themselves. The Things which they do not of themselves, they do either by Chance, or from Necessity; and the Things done from Necessity, they do either by Compulsion, which is External Necessity, or by Nature, which is Internal. So that all Things whatsoever, which Men do not of themselves, they do either by Chance, or from Compulsion, or by Nature.

Again, the Things which they do of themselves, and of which they are themselves proper the Causes, some they do thro' Custom and acquired Habit, others thro' original and natural Desire. Farther, the Things done thro' natural Desire they do, either thro' such Desire assisted by Reason, or thro' such Desire devoid of Reason. If it be assisted by Reason, then it assumes the Denomination of Will,—on the contrary, the irrational Desires are Anger and Appetite.

Hence it appears that all Things whatever, which Men do, they necessarily do thro' one of these seven Causes; either thro' Chance, Compulsion, Nature, Custom, Will, Anger, Appetite. Arift. Rhet. l. i. c. 10.

It remains, agreeably to this Enumeration, to consider with which of these Causes we ought to arrange Art.

As to Chance, it may be observed in general of all Casual Events, that they always exclude Intention or Design: But Intention and Design, are from Art.
Art inseparable. Thus is the Difference between Art and Chance manifest.

As to External Compulsion, we have it thus described——Βλεν ό ἕν ἀρχὴν ἐξωθεν. That is, an Act of Compulsion, the efficient Principle of which is from without, independent of the Doer. Ethic. Nic. l. 3. c. 1. Again, in the same Treatife, l. 6. c. 4. we are told of the Works of Art, that they are such, ὃν ἀρχὴν ἐν τῷ θεῷ, the efficient Principle of which is in the Doer or Agent. Thus therefore is Art distinguished from Compulsion.

These two Causes, Chance and Compulsion, are mentioned and considered in the Dialogue, Pages 6 and 7.

Nature, or rather Natural Necessity, is that Cause, thro' which we breathe, perspire, digest, circulate our Blood, &c. Will, Anger, and Appetite, are (as already observed) but so many Species of Natural Desire, considered either as assisted by Reason, or else as devoid of it. Now tho' Natural Desire and Natural Necessity differ, because in the one we act spontaneously, in the other not spontaneously, yet both of them meet in the common Genus of Natural Power. Moreover this is true of all Natural Power, that the Power itself is prior to any Energies or Acts of that Power. 'Ου γὰρ ἐν τῇ πολλῇ ιδεῖν ὑπολογίσαι τὰς ἀναθήσεις ἔλαβομεν, άλλ’ ἀνάπτασι, ἔχοις ἐχεσάμεθα, ἥ χρησάμενον ἔχομεν. For [to instance in the natural Powers of Sensation] it was not from often seeing, and often hearing, that we acquired
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acquired those Senses; but on the contrary, being first possessed of them, we then used them, not through any Use or Exercise did we come to possess them. Arist. Ethic. l. 2. c. i.

Now the contrary to this is true in the case of any Powers or Faculties not natural, but acquired by Custom and Usage. For here there are many Energies and Acts, which must necessarily precede the Existence of such Power or Habit, it being evident (as is said in the same Chapter) that ἐν τῶν ὀμοιῶν ἐνεργείων ἀν ἔξεσ ὑποκοιλιᾷ, from similar and homogeneous Energies it is that Habits are obtained. So again, in the same Place, ἡ γὰρ δὲι μαθῶσας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιώνεις μαθάνυμεν· οἷον ὑποκοιλίας ὑπόκοιλι τῆς καὶ μυθαίς ἔννοιας ὑπακούει. The Things which we are to do by having learnt, we learn by doing. Thus by building Men become Builders, and by practising Music they become Musicians.

Thus therefore is Art distinguished from all Natural Power of Man, whether Natural Necessity, Will, Anger, or Appetite. But Art has been already distinguished from Chance and Compulsion. So that being clearly not the same with six of those seven Causes, by which all Men do all Things, it must needs be referred to the seventh, that is, to Custom or Habit.

It must be observed, the natural Causes or Powers in Man, considered as distinct from Art, are treated in the Dialogue, Pages 8 and 9.

AND
AND now, as we have shewn Art to be a certain Cause working in Man, it remains to shew how it is distinguished from those other Causes beside Man, which we suppose to operate in the Universe. These are either such Causes as are below him, like the Vegetative Power, which operates in Vegetables, the Sensitive in Animals; or else such Causes as are above him, like God, and whatever is else of Intelligence more than human.

The Causes below us may be all included in the common Genus of Nature; and of Nature we may say univerfally, as well of Nature without us as within us, that its several Operations, contrary to those of Art, are not in the least degree derived from Custom or Usage. Thus the Author above cited—

Ουδεν γὰρ τῶν φύσεων ἄλλως ἑκάστου· οὐδὲν οὐκ θεώς φύσεως κάτω φερόμενος, ἀν ἀν ἑπιθετί ἄνω φέρεται, ὅ´ ἀν μυρίως ἄλυν ἑκατετείς ἄνω ἐπιθετίν, ὅδε τὸ τῶρ κάτω. None of those Things, which are what they are by Nature, can be altered by being accustomed. Thus a Stone, which by Nature is carried downward, can never be accustomed to mount upwards; no, not tho' any one should ten thousand times attempt it, by throwing the Stone upward. The same may be said of accustomed Fire to move downward. Ethic. Nicom. 1. 2. c. 1. Again, in the Works of Nature, such as Trees, Animals, and the like, the efficient Principle, is vitally united to the Subjects, wherein it operates.—ἐν ἄλοις ἐχει τὰῦς τὴν ἄρχων. Ethic. Nicom. 1. 6. c. 4. But in the Works of Art, such as Statues or Houses, the efficient Principle is disunited from the Subjects, and exists not in the Things done or made.
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but in the Deor or Artist — ὁν ἢ ἄρχη ἐν τῷ ζωὴν ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιήματι. Ethic. Nic. l. 6. c. 4. It is indeed possible that, even in Works of Art, the Subject and efficient Cause may be united, as in the Case of a Physician becoming his own Patient, and curing himself. But then it must be remembered that this Union is κατὰ συμβεβεβηκός, merely accidental, and no way essential to the constituting of Art, considered as Art. By this therefore is Art clearly distinguished from Nature, whose Definition informs us that it is—ἄρχη τίς καὶ ἄλλα τῇ κυνηθικα καὶ ἴσοι μὲν ἐν ὧ ὑπάρχει ἄρχης, καὶ ἀπόκτεν καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβεβηκός. A certain Principle or Cause of moving and ceasing to move, in some Subject wherein such Principle exists immediately, essentially, and not by way of Accident. Arist. Natur. Auct. l. 2. c. i.

The Causes, which are of Rank Superior to Man, such as the Deity, can have nothing to do with Art, because being (as is said in the Dialogue, p. II.) perfect and complete, and knowing all from the Beginning, they can never admit of what is additional and secondary. Art therefore can only belong to Beings, like Men, who being imperfect, know their Wants, and endeavour to remove them by Helps secondary and subsequent. It was from a like Consideration that Pythagoras called himself a Philosopher, that is to say (according to his own Explication of the Name) a Lover and Seeker of what was wise and good, but not a Postsellor, which he deemed a character above him. Consonant to this we read in Plato’s Banquet, ἵκατι ἡδεῖς.
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God philosophizes, or desires to become wife, for He is so already. Nor, if there be any other Being wife, doth he philosophize for the same Reason. On the other hand, neither do the Indocil philosophize; for this is the Misfortune of Indocility, without being virtuous, good or prudent, to appear to ones self sufficient in all these Respects. In general therefore, he who thinketh himself in no want, desireth not that, which he thinks himself not to need. Who then, said Socrates to Diotima, (the Speaker of this Narration) Who are those who philosophize, if they are neither the Wise nor the Indocil? That (replied she) may be now conspicuous even to a Child. They are those of middle Rank, between these Extremes. Plat. p. 203. tom. 3. Edit. Serrani.

Here we see (agreeably to what is said in the Dialogue, pages 11. and 12.) that as to acquired or secondary Habits, some Beings are too excellent for them, and others too base; and that the Deity above all is in the number of those transcendent, and is thus, as a Cause, distinguished from Art. Vid. Amm. Σεφι Εφευ. p. 26. b. et omnino εις καιτη. p. 127, 128.

There are, besides the Deity and Nature now spoken of, certain other external Causes, which are mentioned in the first Note as distinct from Art; namely Chance and Necessity. But of these hereafter, when we consider the Subject of Art.
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Note IV. p. 13. Faculties, Powers, &c. are obscure and hidden Things—energies and Operations lie open to the Senses.] 'Ει δὲ χρή λέγειν τι ἐκατον τῶν, οἷον τι τὸ νοημικὸν, ἢ τι τὸ ἀισθητικὸν, ἀφότερον ἑπισκεπτεῖσθαι, τι τὸ νοεῖν, καὶ τι τὸ ἐνεργεῖαιησθαι: ἀφότεροι γὰρ καὶ σαφέ- στεραι σκόπε ἡμᾶς τῶν δυνάμεων εἰσίν ἐν ἑνεργεῖαι, σαφεν- ἰσχύομεν γὰρ ἑιλαίος, καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπισκεπτούμεν. If we are to explain what each of these Things are, as for instance, what the intelligent Principle, what the sensitive, we must first inquire what it is to think, what to see, hear, and use the Senses. For with respect to us Men, the Energies are prior and more evident than the Powers, because it is in the Energies we are first conversant, and comprehend the Powers from them. Themist: in lib. 2. de Animâ, p. 76. Edit. Ald. Fol. Aristot. de An. II. 4.


As to those low Habits here mentioned, from which we distinguish Art by the Number and Dignity of its Precepts, they fall in general under the Denomination of Μαθαυτεχνία, of which Quintilian gives the following Account. Μαθαυτεχνία quoque est quaedam, id est, supervacua Artis Imitatio, quae nihil sane nec boni nec mali habeat, sed vanum laborem: qualis illius fuit, qui grana ciceris, ex spatio distantia missa, in acum continuo & sine frustratione inferebat; quem, cum speclassefet Alexander, donasse dicitur ejusdem.
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leguminis modio. Quod quidem præmium fuit illo opere dignissimum. Inst. Orat. l. 2. c. 20.

Note VI. p. 17. AN HABITUAL POWER IN MAN OF BECOMING THE CAUSE OF SOME EFFECT, ACCORDING TO A SYSTEM OF VARIOUS AND WELL-APPROVED PRECEPTS—]

The Peripatetic Definition of Art is "Εξίς μελα Λοις ἀρνοῖς ἄνθρωποι—an efficient Habit, joined with sound and true Reason. Ariftot. Ethic. Nic. 1. 6. c. 4.

The Stoic Definition, as we find it in Sext. Empir. adversus Logicos, p. 392. is, Σύστημα εκ καλακάθων ἕγγεγυμνασμένων πρὸς τὰ τέλε ἐνχρηστον τῶν εν τῷ βίῳ. Thus translated by Cicero in Diodemes de Grammat. l. 2. Ars est Perceptionum exercitatarum collectio, ad unum exitum vitae utilem pertinentium. And again by Quintilian, Inst. Orat. l. 2. c. 18. Artem confquare ex perceptionibus consentientibus & coe exercitatis ad finem utilem vitae. The same Definition is also alluded to in the Academics of Cicero, l. 2. c. 7. where it is said—Ars vero quæ potest esse, nisi quæ non ex una, aut duabus, sed ex multis animi perceptionibus conflat?

There is a third Definition of Art cited by Quintilian in the same place, and ascribed by him to Cleanthes—Ars est potæstas viâ (id est, ordine) efficiens. The Greek, from which this Latin Definition is taken, is fuller and more philosophical. The Words are—"Εξίς ἐν ναι βασίλεια πολλὰ φαντασίας—which may be rendered, an Habit, which proceeds in a Road or Method, having a Sense withal of what it is about. The
NOTES on TREATISE the First.


Now if we compare these Definitions with that in the Dialogue, we shall find them all to correspond. The Habitual Power in Man of becoming the Cause of some Effect, is the same as ἐξε ξων in the Peripatetic Definition. According to a System of various and well-approved Precepts, is the same as μείμα λόγις ἐνθέθης. For sound and true Reason must needs be the Basis of all such Precepts.

Again, as to the second Definition—The Words Σύσμα καθηκόντων [a System of Comprehensions, or of certain and evident Truths] correspond to the latter Part of the Definition in the Dialogue—According to a System of various and well-approved Precepts. The Word ἔγγευμακαμένων [that is to say, worked in by Habit and Exercise] corresponds to the first Part, that Art is a Cause founded in Habit. And the rest [ὡς τι τέλει, &c. that is to say, a System which has respect to some useful and serviceable End or Purpose in Human Life] shews the System here mentioned to regard Practice and Action, not Theory and Speculation. And thus does it correspond with the Definition of the Dialogue, where it is said that Art is an Habitual Power not of merely contemplating and knowing, but of becoming the Cause of some Effect. It is not indeed expressed in the Dialogue, that this Effect has respect to the Utility of Human Life, because this latter Circumstance is referred to the Definition of the final Cause of Art, given page 29.
As to the third Definition of Art, *potestas viae efficiens*, a Power of operating methodically, it may be observed, that by being called an *operating Power*, it is distinguished from Powers *purely speculative*: and as it is said to operate methodically, or in a Road and regular Process, it is distinguished from *Chance* as well as blind *Necessity*. And thus far it corresponds with what is offered in the Dialogue. But it does not appear from this Definition, whether the Power therein mentioned be *Original* and *Natural*, or *Secondary* and *Habitual*, because Powers of either sort may operate methodically. And perhaps Cleanthes intended not to distinguish so far, but took *Art* in that *larger* and more general Sense, adopted sometimes by the *Stoics*; as when they describe *Nature herself* to be a Πῦς τεχνηῶν ὁδὸς καθίζουσα γένεσιν, an artificial Fire, proceeding methodically to Production or Creation. For it is not to be imagined, they intended by this to insinuate that *Nature* was a *Fire*, which had learnt by *Habit* so to operate. On the contrary, by artificial it is probable they intended no more than some active efficient *Principle*, working with *Reason*, *Order*, and *Method*; of which Principle they considered *Fire* to be the properest vehicle, as being of all Bodies the most *subtle*, and that into which the rest are all ultimately *resolvable*. *Vide Diog. Laert. l. 7. Sect. 156. Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. 2. c. 22.*

**Note VII. page 22. It should seem that the common or universal Subject of Art was — All those contingent Natures, which lie within the Reach of Human Powers to influence.]**
NOTES on TREATISE the First.

The Cause here treated is the Material, the 'Τοι, or 'Ποιητήμενον, or τὸ ἐξ ἑνελέα τι ἐνυπάρχοντος.

Of a Contingent we have the following Definition—"Δεικτός ἐνδεξεσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἐνδεξόμενον, ἀ μὴ ἐνδεξόμενον. ἐὰν τὰ ἐνδεξόμενα, τεθέντο ἐν πάρχει, ἐκεῖν ἐγαί διὰ τὸν ἄθλον. I call that a Contingent, which not being necessary, but being supposed to be, there will follow nothing impossible from such supposition." Arist. Anal. prior. l. i. c. 13. Diog. Laert. l. 3. § 10.

That this is true in Works of Art, is evident. It is not necessary, that a given Fragment of such a Rock should assume the figure of Hercules: but there follows nothing impossible, if we suppose it so figured. It is for this reason, that the Subject of Art is in the Dialogue called a Contingent.

But however, to explain the whole of what is said in this Place, it is necessary to go backward, and deduce what we would say from some remoter Considerations.

The Peripatetics held the End or Aim of their Philosophy to be the discovering and knowing the ἀρχή, the primary and creative Principle of all Things. They pursued this Inquiry, when they reasoned analytically, that is to say, upwards, by beginning their Contemplation from those things, which are to us first in the Order of our Comprehension, and so ascending gradually to that which is truly first in the real Order of Beings. Ammon. εἰς Ἑ. ἐπο. p. 36.

§ 4
The first and original Objects of our Comprehension are those nearer and more immediate, viz. the Objects of Sense, with which we are surrounded on every side. These Objects we perceive to be all in motion; and the Motions are multiform, various, and often opposite to each other. The Consequences of this we perpetually behold. By such Motions we see that not only the mere local Site of these Beings is changed, but their very Bulk, and Figure, and Qualities; nay more than this, even the Beings themselves are made to separate and perish, while new Beings arise from the Re-assemblage of the scattered Parts, which Parts different Motions can as well bring together, as disunite. The Beings or Objects of the Character here described, the Peripatetics denoted under the common Appellation of the τὰ μινήμενα καὶ φασίδια, the Beings moving and corruptible.

From these moving and perishable Objects, they passed to those sublimer and more transcendent Objects of Sense, which they saw adorn the Heavens. Here likewise they discovered Motion; but then this Motion was uniform and constant; affecting not the Beings moved, save in the relation of local Site. As therefore they beheld no Change in the Form and Essence of these Beings, they deemed them (upon their Hypothesis) incorruptible, and out of them established another Class of Beings, that is to say, the τὰ μινήμενα καὶ ἀφθασία, the Beings moving and incorruptible.

From these sublimer Objects of Sense, they passed to Objects of pure Intelleci; to Bodies devoid of all Motion, and of all Quality, save that inseparable one of
of Figure; such Bodies for instance as the Cube, the Sphere, and the rest of Bodies mathematical. From mathematical Bodies, and the Truths resulting from them, they passed to the Contemplation of Truth in general; to the Soul, and its Powers both of Intuition and Syllogization; to Being universal, and above both Time and Place; and thus at last to that supreme Cause, the great Principle of the whole, which is ever the same immutable and eternal. The several Objects of this intellectual Comprehension they filed not merely ἄφθασια, but ἄφθασια καὶ θνησκό, Beings incorruptible and immoveable. V. inf. Note xvii.

In this manner did the Peripatetics speculate. And hence was it they established to themselves three Species of Philosophical Employment—one about Beings motionless and eternal; another, about Beings movable and eternal; and a third, about Beings moveable and perishable. The first they held the proper Employment of the Metaphysician; the two last of the Astronomer and the Naturalist.

Τὸ δὲ τρεῖς αἱ ζαρασμαλεῖαι ἤ μὲν αὐτὶ ἀνίμηνον ἢ δὲ, αὐτὶ καὶ ἀνίμηνον μὲν, ἄφθασιν δὲ· ἤ δὲ, αὐτὶ τὰ ἐφαθάλα. Ιδείνα τρεις sunt tractiones; una, de immobili: altera de eo, quod movetur quidem, sed est interitus expers; tertia de rebus, interitui obnoxiiis. Aristot. Natural. A1uc. l. 2. c. 7. Τὸ νῦν τρεῖς αἱ ζαρασμαλεῖαι. ἤ μὲν, αὐτὶ καὶ ἀνίμηνον καὶ φθασία. ἤ δὲ αὐτὶ καὶ ἀνίμηνον, ἄφθασια δὲ· ἤ δὲ, αὐτὶ καὶ ἀνίμηνον καὶ ἄφθασια. Themísti Paraphrasis in loc.

Τὸ τρεῖς Συμβολαίον Περίφωςικον Εἰσαγωγήν εὐκλικά ἐλεγχότα ἐξήνευσαν αὐτὸς παραφράσιος τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἀναφοράς τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους.
The Author of the Dialogue has had Reference to this threefold Division of Subjects, as may be seen in that Part of his Dialogue, which gives occasion to the present Comment. He has chosen however to file the τὰ Ὁφάντα, or Heavenly Bodies, rather Contingents of higher Order, than Beings necessary, as imagining the former to be their truer Character.

It may be here added, that the Peripatetics confined Φύσις, or Nature, for the most part, to this Earth of our's, where they considered her as the active Principle of Life in Plants and Animals. Hence therefore they distinguished not her Effects from those of Art, by their Necessity (for the Effects of both they treated as contingent) but from the Cause in Natural Subjects.
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Subjects operating within, in Artificial without, as has been already observed, p. 256, 257. See Diog. Laert. p. 459.

It may be farther added, that they placed these Effects of Art and Nature, and indeed all other Contingents whatever, in a middle Rank between Things Necessary, and Things Impossible. The Reason was evident. Things Necessary could not but be; Things Impossible could not be; but Contingents were τὰ ἐνοχένα καὶ ἑναὶ καὶ μὴ ἑναι, that is, were equally susceptible both of Being and Non-being.

But still tho' all Contingents admitted on their Hypothesis both of Being and Non-being, yet they supposed some to have a greater Tendency to Existence, and others to have a less. The first Species of these they stiled τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πόσῳ, the Things which happen for the most part; the last, τὰ ἐπὶ ἐκαστὸν, the Things which happen less frequently.

Now as it is evident that both Nature and Art oftener obtain their End, than miss it (for complete Animals are more frequently born than Monsters, and the Musician, if an Artift, strikes oftener the right String than the wrong) hence it was, that they ranged the Effects of Nature and Art among those Contingents which were τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πόσῳ, Contingents of greater Frequency. But yet as these Effects were not from the Hypothesis necessary, and contrary to these upon occasion happened, hence it was, that whenever either Nature or Art became Causes of the τὰ ἐπὶ ἐκαστὸν, those rarer Events,
Events, in such case they (Nature and Art) were considered by these Philosophers as ἀντίκα καὶ συμβεβηκός, Causes by way of Accident, and not according to their own Essence and distinguishing Character. In such Instances it was, that they assumed the Names of Τύχη and Ἀυτομάτων, Fortune and Chance, Τύχη having mostly Reference to Works of Men, Ἀυτομάτων to Works of Nature. The Instances given by Themistius, in cases of Chance and Fortune, are as follow. A Tile falls from a Houfe. The End of its falling is to arrive at that lower Place, whither Nature would carry it by the common Law of Gravity. In falling it strikes and wounds a Passenger. This last Event is from Chance. Again, a Man digs in his Garden, to plant. In digging, he discovers a hidden Treasure. This last Event is from Fortune. And thus, adds Themistius, ἡ ἀντίκα παράξεις καὶ μία, ἀλλὰ μὲν καὶ ἀντίκα ἀντίκα, ἀλλὰ ὡς κατὰ συμβεβηκός. The same individual Action is the Cause of one Thing from its own peculiar Character, and of another Thing, by way of Accident. And again, ἐὰν μὲν ἐν καὶ τῶν ἑταῖρων συμβεβηκόν ἡ τῆς φύσεως ἡ τῆς παράξεως ἀντίκα καὶ μία ἡ ἀλλακτική, ἀλλὰ ἢ κατὰ ἀντίκα, ἡ γὰρ τέτων χάριν ὡς παράξεως ὡς ἀνθρώπων, ὡς κατὰ κατανεμήθη ἡ ἀλλακτική, κατὰ συμβεβηκός.——Of these Events we may call Nature or Human Will in a manner the Cause, but yet not so from themselves, and according to their own peculiar Essence; for it was not for the sake of what happened that either the Passenger went forth, or the Tile fell downward, but if any Thing it was by Accident. Themist. in lib. 2. Natur. Aufcult. p. 26. Edit. Ald. See also Ariflot. Natur. Aufcult. l. 2. c. 4, 5, 6. Amenon in Pradcam. p. 113. b. This Doctrine came originally
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originally from Plato, whose Definition of Fortune was, 
\(\Sigma\mu\pi\tau\omicron\alpha\varphi\varepsilon\omicron\varsigma\ \lambda\omicron\varphi\omicron\alpha\omicron\varepsilon\xi\varepsilon\omicron\varsigma\\), a Symptom, or thing 
co-incident either with Nature or Human Will. Vid. 
Suidam in Voc. Ἐμακρέμν.

It must be here observed, that κατὰ συμβεβηκὼς [by accident] means in no Part of these Quotations 
accidental, as standing for casual; for this would be 
mere Tautology, as to what is here said concerning 
Chance. It means rather something by way of Ap-
pendage; something Adventitious; in other Words, it 
means Accident, as adhering to Substance, without 
which it can have no Being, tho' suppose it absent or 
taken away, the Nature of Substance is no way affected. 
It was in this Sense the Peripatetics supposed Chance 
and Fortune to be Accidents or Appendages to Nature, 
and Mind. According therefore to them, the Suppo-
tition of Chance and Fortune was so far from excluding 
Nature and Mind from the Universe, that they de-
monstrably proved their Existence in it. For admitting 
their Account of Chance and Fortune to be just; if we 
grant the Accidents to exist, much more must we grant 
the Subjects, and this too with that superior Dignity 
and Priority of Existence, which is evidently due to 
all Subjects above their Accidents. Well therefore did 
the Philosopher conclude ὑπερον ἀφα τῷ Ἀντώμαλον, καὶ ἡ 
Τῆχν τῷ Νῆ, καὶ τῆς Φύσεως. Subsequent in Existence, 
are Chance and Fortune to Mind and Nature. 

From what has been said, we see the Reason of 
that Enumeration of Causes mentioned in the Be-
ginning of the first Note, where they are described to 

To
The whole Chapter indeed is well worth perusal. But we shall not venture to lengthen this Note, which may be probably deemed too long already, and which can be only excused, as giving some Sample of a Philosophy, which, from its Rarity perhaps, may possibly furnish some Amusement.
NOTES on TREATISE the First.

Note VIII. p. 23. I mean, said he, by Beginning, that Cause for the sake of which, &c.

As the Cause here spoken of, is that Cause usually called Final, it may be asked, how it comes in this Place to be considered as a Beginning. The Answer is, that what comes last in Practice, stands in Theory first; or in other Words, the Order of Ideas in the Intelligence of the Artist is exactly inverted, with respect to the Order of his Energies.

Thus Ammonius——

For in general the End of Theory is the Beginning of Practice; and so reciprocally, the End of Practice, the Beginning of Theory. Thus for instance: An Architect, being ordered to build a House, says to himself, I am ordered to build a House; that is to say, a certain Defence,
NOTES on TREATISE the First.

Defence, to protect against the Rains and the Heats. But this cannot be without a Roof or Covering. From this Point therefore he begins his Theory. He proceeds and says——But there can be no Roof, if there be no Walls; and there can be no Walls, without some Foundations; nor can there be laid Foundations, without opening the Earth. At this Point, the Theory is at an End. Hence therefore commences the Practice or Action. For first he opens the Earth; then lays the Foundation; then raises the Walls; and lastly puts on the Roof, which is the End of the Action or Practice, [but Beginning of the Theory] as the Beginning of the Practice was the End of the Theory. See also Arist. Ethic. Nicom. 1. 3. c. 3. et de Animâ, l. 3. 3.


Note X. p. 26. Or is it not absurd to suppose there should be an Art of Impos-
NOTES on TREATISE the First.

IMPOSSIBILITIES?] What is here said concerning the Difference between those Things for which we may possibly wish, and those which we actually pursue, is expressed in the Ethics of Aristotle, 1. 3. c. 2.

There is indeed no determined Choice of Action with respect to Things impossible; and if any one should say he had so determined, he would appear to be a Fool. But there may be a Willing or Longing after Things impossible; as for instance, never to die.

Note XI. p. 27. The Suggestions of Will, and uninstructed Instinct.] Will, ἑλπίς, or ὤρεξις καγυίκη; uninstructed Instinct, ὤρεξις ἀλόγις. See before, Note III.

Note XII. p. 29. The Want or Absence of something appearing good; relative to human Life, and attainable by Man, but superior to his natural and uninstructed Faculties.

The Cause here described is the τὸ ἐ ἐνεκα, or final.—Aristotle in his Physics, 1. 2. c. 3. in enumerating the various Sorts of Causes, reckons among the rest—τὸ δ' ὡς τὸ τέλθ, καὶ τ' ἀγαθον τῶν ἄλλων. τὸ γὰρ ε ἐνεκα βέλησον, καὶ τέλθ τῶν ἄλλων ἐβέλει εἰναι. To these may be added that Cause, which is considered as the End, and Good of all the rest. For that, for whose Sake all the others are deemed
NOTES on TREATISE the First.

deemed necessary, has just pretensions to be best, and to be
the End of them all. To this he subjoins, consonant
to what is said in the Dialogue——

Let it
make no Difference whether we call this End, real
Good, or only apparent Good. So in the Beginning
of his Ethics——

Every Art, and every orderly Speculation,
so likewise every Action, and determined Choice of Pur-
suit, appear all of them to tend toward some Good.

Well therefore have they pronounced Good to be that,
toward which all things tend. See also Plat. in Gorg.

In the Definition here treated, the Words [relative to Human Life] express that Part of the Stoic
Definition of Art [πρὸς τὶ τέλεων ένεκχεισι τῶν ἐν
τῷ έίναν.] They were omitted in the Definition p. 17,
as more properly belonging to the present Definition,
which respects Art in its final Cause. See page 261.

THAT what is perfect and self-sufficient is above
the secondary Helps of ART; that our own Weakness
and Insufficiency, and the Prospect of procuring that ab-
sent Good, by which we all hope to supply ourselves,
where deficient; that this is the Source not only of
all Arts, but (joined to social Affection) is the Origin
and Cement of HUMAN SOCIETY; see (besides the
Place here treated) pages 11, 12; and of the third
Treatise, p. 147 to p. 157.

Thus
Thus the Poet in Stobæus, p. 515.

Χρεϊῷ ἄγνω εἰδίδασκεν ὅτι οὐκ εἶχεν ἀνευθὺν;

Need *all Things taught*: *What cannot need invent?*

Agreeably also to this, Virgil, in his first *Georgic*, having told us of the various Changes to the worse, which happened in the *natural* World immediately subsequent to the *Golden Age*, goes on to enumerate the several *Inventions* of Men, which were the *natural Result of this* their newly *indigent State*. He at last sums up the whole by laying——

*Tum variae venere artes: labor omnia vicit.*

*Improbus, & duris urgens in rebus egestas.*

*Where* (according to the Doctrine in the Dialogue) W*ant* is made the *Beginning* or *Origin* of *Arts*. The Poet even refers this *Dispensation*, this Introduction of *Indigence*, *Care*, and *Solicitude*, to the immediate Will of *Providence*, acting for the Good of Mankind; left Plenty should lull them into slothful *Lethargy*, so as to forget their *noblest* and *most active* *Faculties*.

—— *Pater ipse colendi*

*Haud facilem esse viam voluit, primusque per artem*

*Movit agros, curis acuens mortalia corda,*

*Nec torpere gravi passiis sua regna veterno.*

*Note XIII. p. 32. Co-existent, replied he, as in a Statue,* &c. *Successive, as in*

T2 A TUNE
A Tune or Dance, &c.] This Division of Beings or Productions we find mentioned by Aristotle in his Physics, (l. 3. c. 8.) where explaining his Doctrine concerning Infinite, he says—\(\alpha\alpha\)\(\varepsilon\)\(\varepsilon\)\(\tau\)\(\varepsilon\)\(\iota\)\(\theta\)\(\iota\)\(\iota\)\(\varphi\)\(\iota\)\(\alpha\)\(\nu\)\(\iota\)\(\nu\)\(\delta\)\(\iota\)\(\iota\)\(\circ\)\(\nu\)\(\iota\)\(\iota\)\(\kappa\)\(\iota\)\(\iota\)\(\nu\)\(\iota\).

In as much as Being is manifold, such as is the Being of a Day or public Festival, (which exist by continually becoming something farther) such also is the Being and Nature of Infinite. The same Sentiment soon after is more fully explained and opened.

\(\Omega\)\(\nu\)\(\tau\)\(\varepsilon\)\(\tau\)\(\iota\)\(\varepsilon\)\(\theta\)\(\iota\)\(\varepsilon\)\(\iota\)\(\lambda\)\(\mu\)\(\epsilon\)\(\rho\)\(\varepsilon\)\(\alpha\)\(\nu\)\(\iota\)\(\zeta\)\(\epsilon\)\(\nu\).
We are not to conceive of Infinite, as of a positive particular Substance, like a Man or a House; but rather as we pronounce Existence of a Day or public Festival, which have their Essence, not as sensible, individual Substances, but by a continued Procedure of Being and ceasing to be. Vid. Scalig. de Caufl. Ling. Lat. 3. C. 72. p. 124. Aristot. Categ. Cap. 6. Ammon. Com. et; Cal. p. 82. b. Scal. Poetic. L. 3. C. 1. p. 82.

**Note XIV. p. 32. What is Human Life, but a Compound of Parts thus fleeting, &c.** It is not inelegantly said in the Ethics so often referred to—\(\Upsilon\)\(\de\)\(\varepsilon\)\(\varphi\)\(\iota\)\(\alpha\)\(\nu\)\(\iota\)\(\iota\)\(\varepsilon\)\(\nu\)\(\iota\)\(\iota\)\(\kappa\)\(\iota\)\(\iota\)\(\nu\)\(\iota\)\(\iota\)\(\varepsilon\). Life is a certain Energy, and each Man energizes about those Subjects,
NOTES on TREATISE THE FIRST.

Subject, and with those Faculties, for which he hath the greatest Affection; the Musician, with his Hearing, about Sounds harmonious; the Studious, with his Intellect, about Matters of Speculation; and in like manner each Man else of the various sorts beside. Ethic. Nicom. l. 10. c. 4.

NOTE XV. p. 34. EVERY ART WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED AND ENDED IN A WORK OR ENERGY.] The Cause here treated is the Formal, called by various Names; the έος, the νόμος, the τι εδι, the τὸ τί ἐν εἴμαι Vid. Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. L. v. c. 113. p. 232. Imperfectum autem Graeci, &c,

In the Beginning of the above cited Ethics, after the Author has told us that every Art, and Human Action tend to some Good or End, he adds Διαφορὰ δὲ τις φαίνεται τῶν τέχνων: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐσχ ἐνεργείας τὰ δὲ σι χ' ἀντὶς, ἐγγα τινά.—But there appears a Difference in Ends: For some are Energies; some, over and above these Energies, are certain Works. In Quintilian's Institutes the same Distinction, with respect to the End of Arts, is mentioned, l. 2. c. 18. Vid. Plat. in Dio. Laert. L. 3. C. 84. p. 216. C. 110. p. 225.

But here perhaps it may be asked, if all Arts are ended and accomplished in some Energy or Work, and this Energy or Work be almost universally that absent Good, toward which they all tend, and for the sake of which they are all exerted? (for a Dance, which is an Energy, and a House, which is a Work, are certain absent Goods or Pleasures, for the sake of which
certain Arts operate) if this be allowed, it may be asked, whence then the Difference between the Formal Cause and the Final; the Final, as in Note XII. it has been already treated?

The Answer to this is, that they concur and are the same. *τὸ μὲν γὰρ τι ἐστι, καὶ τὸ δὲ ἔνεκα, ἐν ἐστί.* The Formal Cause and the Final are one. *Arist. Nat. Ausc. 1. 2. c. 7.* If they differ, it is (as Joannes Grammaticus observes in commenting on this Place) a Difference rather in the Time and Manner of our viewing them, than in their own Essence and Nature. It may not perhaps be improper to transcribe his own Words, *Tαὐδον τὸ ἀριθμὸ τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ εἴδος, τῇ σχέσει μόνη διαφέρου, ὡς ἐφιγνώται, καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ὡς γινόμενον, καὶ μόνω ὡς ἔως ἔφαγνώται, τέλος ἐστίν ὅταν δὲ ὡς ὡδὴ γενόμενον, εἴδος.* The End and the Form are numerically the same, differing (as has been said) in the Relation only, and Time. For thus the same Thing, while considered as in its Progress to Completion, but as not yet complete, is so long an End; when considered as actually complete, is no longer an End, but a Form. And thus is this Question one way answered, by acknowledging that these two Causes co-incide, and differ not in their Essence or real Character, but rather in the Time and Manner of our contemplating them.

But there is another Answer, and that is derived from the twofold Nature of final Causes. According to this Doctrine, Arts have not only a nearer and more immediate End, (as a Ship is the End of Ship-building, or Navigation the End of Pilotry) but they have a still remoter and higher End, a τέλος τε-
NOTES on TREATISE the First.

κυβηταλων, that is to say, MAN, Human-kind, or (in other Words) the Utility or Elegance of Human Life. Thus the Stagirite. Ἐσμεν γὰρ όντες καὶ ἴμεῖν τέλειοι. διὰτοῦ γὰρ τοῦ ἦ ἐνέχθκε. For we ourselves also are in some sort an END; for the final Cause is twofold. Natur. Auscult. 1. 2. c. 2. If therefore we have respect to this ultimate END, these two Causes will be found to differ, and be really distinct from each other.

And thus it is that in some respects they agree, and in others they differ, according to the above Distinctions established by this Philosophy.

Note XVI. p. 38. O ART! THOU DISTINGUISHING ATTRIBUTE, &c.] This alludes to a capital Distinction of Art, taken from a View of her different Ends. ART may in some respects be said to finish NATURE, in others to imitate her. She finishes her, where Nature, having given the Powers, is of herself unable to give them Perfection. It is thus the Gymnastic Arts, Dancing, Riding, &c. finish the Corporeal Powers; while the sublimer Arts, Logic, Rhetoric, Moral Virtue, &c. finish the Mental. Where she does not finish Nature, she imitates her, as in Sculpture, Painting, Dramatic Poetry, &c.

Aristotle expresses the above sentiment, as follows. ὸνως τε ἢ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ, ἀν ἢ φύσις ἄδυναλει ἀπεργάζεσθαι, τὰ δὲ μιμεῖται. Physic. L. 2. C. 8.
Note XVII. p. 44. The Efficient, the Material, the Final, and the Formal.] That is to say, τὸ νῦν ἀναν.; ὥς ἡ ἑκάστος, τὸ δὲ ἐνεκα, τὸ Εἰς.


Quid sit hoc, aperiam. ἄσ πρώτα statuæ causa est: nunquam enim fäcla esset, nisi fuisset id, ex quo ea sunderetur, ducetururve. Secunda causa, Artifex est: non potuisset enim ἀς illud in habitum statuæ figurari, nisi accessisset perita manus. Tertia causa est Forma: neque enim statuæ istringstream Doryphoros aut Diadumenos vocaretur, nisi hæc illi esset impressa facies. Quarta causa est, faciendi Propositionem: nam nisi hoc fuisset, fäcla non esset. Quid est Propositionem? Quod invitavit artificem, quod ille secutus fecit. Vel pecunia est hoc; si venditurus fabricavit; vel gloria, si laboravit in nomen; vel religio, si donum templum paravit. Ergo & hæc Causa est, propter quam sit. An non putas inter causas fæsti operis numerandum, quo remoto faciunt non esset.

Aristotle's own Words are as follow. Ἕνα μὲν ἐν τρόπῳ ἄντιον λέγεται τὸ ἡ ἡ γίνεται τι ἐνστάσεσχοντος· οἶον, ὁ χαλκὸς τὰ ἀνδριάντος, καὶ ὁ ἀργυρὸς· τῆς φιάλης, καὶ τὰ τῶν γένν. Ἀλλον δὲ, ὃ
NOTES on TREATISE the First.

to εἴδωλε, καὶ τὸ σαράπάδευγμα. τὰ τὸ δὲ εἶναι ὁ λόγος·
οὐ τὰ τὰ μέρη τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. "Ετι, δὴ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἦν ἡ ἀρχή,
καὶ οἱ όνοματα τὰ δύο ἄρχον ἐν, καὶ ὁ λὸγος ἔτη μὲν τὰ μέρη τὰ ἐν
tὰ δύο ἄριστον ἐν, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. "Ετι, δὴ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἦν ἡ ἀρχή,
καὶ οἱ ὀνόματα τὰ δύο ἄρχον ἐν, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. "Ετι, δὴ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἦν ἡ ἀρχή,
καὶ οἱ όνοματα τὰ δύο ἄρχον ἐν, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. "Ετι, δὴ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἦν ἡ ἀρχή,
καὶ οἱ όνοματα τὰ δύο ἄρχον ἐν, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἐν τῷ λόγῳ.

In one manner that may be called a Cause, out of
which, existing as a Part of it, any thing is made or
compound. Thus is Brass the Cause of a Statue,
Silver of a Cup, and so also the higher Genera, in
which these are included [as Metal, the Genus in-
cluding Brass and Silver; Body, the Genus including
Metal, &c. &c.] In another way, the Form and Ex-
emplar of any Thing is its Cause; that is to say, in other
Words, the Definition, the Detail or Narrative of its
Essence [that which, characterizing it to be such a par-
ticular thing, distinguishes it from all things else] and of
this Definition the several higher Genera. Thus the Cause
of the Diapason or Octave is the Proportion of two to
one; and more generally than that, is Number; and is
moreover the several Parts, out of which this Definition
is formed. Add to this Cause, that other, from whence
the original Principle of Change, or of ceasing to
change; as for Instance, the Person who deliberates is
the Cause of that which results from such Delibera-
tion; the Father is the Cause of the Son; and in gene-
ral, the Efficient, of the Thing effected; the Power
changing, of the Thing changed. Besides these Causes,
there
there is that also, which is considered as the End; that is to say, the Cause, for the sake of which the thing is done. Thus the Cause of Exercising is Health. For if it be asked, Why does he use Exercise? We say, To preserve his Health; and having said thus much, we think we have given the proper Cause. Aristot. Natur. Aucult. l. 2. c. 3.

Addition to NOTE III.

The Peripatetic Definition of Nature, given p. 257, tho' in some degree illustrated p. 266, yet being still from its Brevity perhaps obscure, the following Explication of it is subjoined.

In the first place, by Nature the Peripatetics meant that Vital Principle in Plants, Brutes, and Men, by which they are said to live, and to be distinguished from Things inanimate. Nature therefore being another Name for Life or a vital Principle, the first Act of this Principle, throughout all Subjects, is universally found to be of the following kind; namely, to advance the Subject, which it enlivens, from a Seed or Embryo to something better and more perfect. This Progression, as well in Plants as in Animals, is called Growth. And thus is it that Nature is a Principle of Motion.—But then this Progression or Growth is not infinite. When the Subject is mature, that is, hath obtained its Completion and perfect Form, then the Progression ceases. Here therefore the Business of the vital Principle becomes different. It is from henceforward no longer employed to acquire a Form, but to preserve to its Subject a Form already acquired. And thus is it
it that nature is a principle of rest, stability, or ceasing to move. and such indeed she continues to be, maintaining, as long as possible, the form committed to her care, till time and external causes in the first place impair it, and induce at length its dissolution, which is death.

and thus it has been shewn how nature may be called a principle both of motion and ceasing to move.

as to the rest of the definition, namely, that nature is a principle, which inheres in its subject immediately, essentially, and not by way of accident; no more is meant by this, than that the nature or life in every being, which hath such principle, is really and truly a part of that being, and not detached and separate from it, like the pilot from the ship, the musician from the instrument. for to these subjects tho' those artists are principles of motion and rest, yet do they in no sense participate with them in vital sympathy and union.

end of the notes on treatise the first.
NOTES ON TREATISE the Third; CONCERNING HAPPINESS.


NOTE II. p. 113. Practice too often creeps, &c.] See p. 136. and Note X.

NOTE III. p. 114. The Sovereign Good is that, the Possession of which renders us happy.] Κτίσει γὰρ ἀγαθῶν, οἱ ἐνδούμοιες, ἐνδούμοιες. By the Possession of Things good, are the
The Reader will be pleased to observe, that, in all Quotations from the Dissertations of Epictetus collected by Arrian, the Author refers to the late Edition in two Volumes Quarto, published by his learned and ingenious friend, Mr. Upton.

Note IV. p. 115. Certain original characteristics and pre-conceptions, &c.] The pre-conceptions here spoken of, are called by the Latins Prænotiones, or Anticipations; by the Greeks, προσθέσεις, or ἑνωμεῖαι, with the occasional epithets of either κοινα, ἐμφύσιοι, or φυσικαί.

It is evident that all Men, without the least Help of Art, exert a kind of Natural Logic; can in some degree refute, and prove, and render a Reason.

Now this cannot be (as the meanest Proficient in Logic well knows) without general Ideas, and general Propositions, because a Syllogism of Particulars is an Impossibility. There must be therefore some natural Faculty to provide us these Generals. This Faculty cannot be any of the Sensés, for they all respect Particulars only. Nor can it be the reasoning or syllogizing Faculty, for this does not form such Generals, but use them when formed. There only therefore remains the Faculty called Nūς, that is to say, the Inductive Faculty; the Faculty, which, by Induction of similar Individuals, forms out of the particular
NOTES on TREATISE the Third.

particular and the many what is general and one. This Species of Apprehension is evidently our first and earliest Knowledge, because all Knowledge by Reasoning dates its Origin from it, and because, except these two, no other knowledge is possible.

As therefore every Ear, not absolutely depraved, is able to make some general Distinctions of Sound; and in like manner every Eye, with respect to Objects of Vision; and as this general Use of these Faculties, by being diffused through all Individuals, may be called common Hearing, and common Vision, as opposed to those more accurate Energies, peculiar only to Artists: So fares it with respect to the Intelleét. There are Truths, or Universals of so obvious a kind, that every Mind, or Intelleét, not absolutely depraved, without the least Help of Art, can hardly fail to recognize them. The Recognition of these, or at least the Ability to recognize them, is called Κενῶς Νᾶς, COMMON SENSE, as being a Sense common to all, except Lunatics and Ideots.

FARTHER, as this Power is called Κενῶς Νᾶς, so the several Propositions, which are its proper Objects, are called πρεκούσια, or Preconceptions, as being previous to all other Conceptions. It is easy to gather from what has been said, that these πρεκούσια, must be general, as being formed by Induction; as also natural, by being common to all Men, and previous to all Instruction. Hence therefore their Definition. "Ει: δ' ἦ πρεκούσια, ένσως οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ὁλοκαίων. "A PRE-CONCEPTION is the natural Apprehension of what is general, or universal." Diog. Laert.
NOTES on TREATISE the Third.

Laert. l. 7. f. 54. See also Arrian. Epiel. l. i. c. 22.
l. 3. c. 6. Cic. de Naturâ Deor. l. i. c. 16, 17.

Note V. p. 115.—And that the Difference lay only in the applying them to Particulars.] This was called Ἐφαρμογὴ τῶν θεραπευέων ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρες ἡσίαις—τὰς φυσικὰς θεραπευέων ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρες ἡσίαις. Arr. Epiel. l. i. c. 22. p. 114, 116. Edit. Upt. See an eminent Instance, illustrating the Truth of this Reasoning, in the same Author, l. 4. c. 1. p. 545. Ἐννέαμεν γὰρ, οImageButton him c. Boet. de Cons. L. 3. Prose. 2. p. 106.

Note VI. p. 120. Why are there, who seek Recesses, &c.] Multi autem & sunt, & fuerunt, qui eam, quam dico, tranquillitatem expetentes, a negotis publicis se removerint, ad etiumque persu-gerint.—His idem propositum fuit, quod regibus; ut ne quâ re egerent, ne cui pararent, libertate uterentur: cujus proprium est sic vivere, ut velis. Quare cum hoc commune sit potentiae cupidorum cum ipsis, quos dixi, etiosis: alteri se adipisici id pessum arbitrantur, si opes magnas habeant; alteri si contenti sint & suo, & parvo. Cic. de Offic. l. i. c. 20, 21.

Note VII. p. 121.—The Sovereign Good, they have taught us, ought to be, &c.] The original Pre-conceptions of the Sovereign Good here recited, may be justified by the following Authorities, from among many which are omitted.
Agreeable to Nature,—Neque ulla alia in re, nisi in Natura, quærendum esse illud Summum bonum, quo omnia referrentur. Cic. Acad. l. i. c. 5. p. 27. Edit. Dav. 

Conducive to well-being.—Epicletus calls that Truth or Knowledge, which respects our real Happiness [ἡν ἀληθείαν τὴν περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας] the Truth or Knowledge, which regards not mere Living, but which conduces to Living well [ἐ τὴν περὶ τῷ ZHN, ἀλλὰ τὴν περὶ τῷ ET ZHN.] Arrian. Epict. I. i. c. 4. p. 28. Edit. Upt. Αὐτον όνομα περὶ εὐδαιμονίας ἔννοιαν — TO ZHN KATA ΨΥΣΙΝ, καὶ τὸν κατὰ φύσιν βιὸν, ΕΤΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑΝ λέγοντι περὶ τῆς, TO ET ZHN, καὶ τὸ εὗ βιῶν, καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμίαν, ΕΤΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑΝ φαίνει εἶναι. Our common Pre-conceptions concerning Happiness call it the Living according to Nature; farther than this, they say it is Living or Existing well; the Life of well-being. Alex. Aphrod. περὶ ψιχ. p. 157. Edit. Ald. 

Accommodate to all Places and Times—Antoninus, speaking of that Happiness, which he deemed our Sovereign Good, calls it something which was in our Power ΠΑΝΤΑΧΟΤ οὐΑΙ ΑΙΗΝΕΚΟΣ, every where and perpetually. l. 7. f. 54. 


NOTES on TREATISE the Third. 289
NOTES on TREATISE the Third.

Davif: So immediately after, in the same page—

An dubium est, quin nihil sit habendum in eo generc

quo vita beata completur, si id possit amitti; nihil

enim interarescre, nihil exstingui, &c. 

Kai τις

αυτη ἡ ἐνεργη, ἢν ὁ τυχὼν ἐμποδίσας δύναται, ἢ λέγω

Καίσαρ ἢ Καίσαρος φιλΘ, ἀλλὰ κόραξ, ἀνυπνης, τυχε-

ρετος, ἀλα τρισμύρια; ἢ δ' ΕΤΡΟΙΑ ὑδὲν ὡτος

ἐκεί ὡς ΤΟ ΔΙΗΝΕΚΕΣ καὶ ΑΝΕΜΠΟΔΙ-

ΣΤΟΝ. And what sort of Happiness is this, which

any thing intervening may embarrass; I say not Cæsar,

or Cæsar's Friend, but a Crow, a Piper, a Fever, a

thousand things beside? Happiness surely implies

nothing so much, as PERPETUITY and being su-

PERIOR TO HINDRANCE OR IMPEDIMENT. Ar-

rian. Epiδη. l. 4. c. 4. p. 585. Edit. Upt. See also

l. 2. c. II. p. 227.

Self-derived.—Atque hoc dabitis, ut opinor si

modo sit aliquid esse beatum, id oportere totum

poni in potestate Sapientis: nam si amitti

vita beata potest, beata esse non potest. Cic. de Fin. l. 2.

c. 27. p. 163.—και τοις μεν κατ' ἀλήθειαν κακοῖς ἐνα

μη̃ κερεπτην ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἐπ' ἀληθ[oi θεόι] το ὁμα

θεοιο. That Man might not fall into real Evils, the

Gods have put the whole in his own Power. M.

Ant. l. 2. l. II. Τι γὰρ ἢω, ὃ ζηνικ εἰσ ἄνθρωπος ;

Eυγάθηναι, ἐνθαμώνοντας, ΠΑΝΤΑ ΩΣ ΘΕΛΕΙ

ΠΟΙΕΙΝ, μὴν κολυugas, μὴν ἀναγκάζονται. For

what is it, that every Man seeks? To be securely

fixed, to be happy, TO DO ALL THINGS ACCORD-

ING TO HIS OWN WILL, not to be hindered, not
to be compelled. Arr. Epiδη. l. 4. c. I. p. 539, 540.

Aristotle joins self-derived and indeprivable in his idea of
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of Good. Τάγαθον δ' οίκεῖον τι καὶ δυσαφαίρετον εἶναι μαθείνομεθα. Eth. Nic. 1. i. c. 5.

Note VIII. p. 125. The Political and Lucrative, the Contemplative and Pleasurable.] This fourfold Distinction of Lives is mentioned in Aristotle's Ethics, 1. i. c. 5.

Note IX. p. 131.—Pleasure Whom Love attends, &c. alluding to Homer, Iliad Ζ. V. 214.

Note X. p. 136. Suppose an Event were to happen—Not an Inundation, &c.] See Arrian. Epict. 1. 4. c. 4. which Chapter is peculiarly addressed to the Seekers of Leisure Retirement, and Study. Part of it has been already quoted, p. 290. καὶ τίς αυτὴ ἐγὼ, &c. See also the same Author, 1. 4. c. i. p. 567. Πῶς ἀνέκεισ, &c. and of the Dialogue here commented, p. 113.

Note XI. p. 137.—Is Acting a Circumstance, &c.] Etenim cognitio contemplacioque naturae manca quodammodo atque inchoata sit, si nulla aetio rerum consequatur. Ea autem aetio in hominum commodis tuendis maxime cernitur. Cic. de Offic. 1. i. c. 43. The whole Chapter, as well as the Subsequent, is well worthy of Perusal.

Note XII. p. 140.—If a Piece of Metal be tendered us, &c.] See Arr. Epict. 1. i. c. 10. p. 110. Ὅρατε καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ νομίσματι, &c.

Note XIII. p. 144.—Are alienated from it, or are indifferent to it?] Placet his, inquit, quorum ratio mihi probatur, simul atque natum sit animal
animal (hinc enim est ordiendum) ipsum sibi conciliari, & commendari ad se conservandum, & suum statum, & ad ea quae conservantia sunt ejus statús, diligentia; alienari autem ab interitu, iijque rebus, quae interitum videantur afferre. Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 5. p. 211. Edit. Dav. See also l. 5. c. 9. De Offic. l. i. c. 4. 'Oueiímeba πρὸς αὑτῶς ἐνθὺς γενόμενοι. Plut. Mor. p. 1038. b.

Note XIV. p. 155. Let it not be forgot then, said he, in favour of Society, &c.] The whole Argument to prove Society natural to Man, from p. 147 to the page here cited, is taken from the second Book of Plato's Republic. See Plat. tom. 2. p. 369, &c. Edit. Serrani. See also the fame Argument hinted at in the Protagoras of Plato, p. 322. C. Edit. Serr. Tom. i.

Note XV. p. 156.—Are not the Powers and Capacities of Speech, &c.] The Argument in favour of Society, from our beingpossessed of λόγος, or the speaking Faculty, seems to have been much insifted on by the best Authors of Antiquity.

Διότι δὲ πολιτικῶν ὁ ’Ανθρωπος ζῶν, πάσης μελίτης καὶ πάντι ἀγελάως ζόνος μᾶλλον, ἄλοιχον. 'Ουδεν γὰρ, ὡς φάμεν, μάτην ἢ φύσις τοιεί· λόγον δὲ μόνον Ἀνθρωπος ἐξει τῶν ζώων. Ἡ μὲν ἐν φύσι τῷ ἡδεθε- καὶ λυπηθη ἐστὶ σημεῖον· διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὕπαρχει ζώοις· μέχρι γὰρ τότε τῆς φύσις ἀλλ' ἐπεκλεισε, ὡς ἀνθρώπους τῷ λυπηθῆ καὶ ἡδεθεθε, καὶ ταῦτα σημαίνειν ἄλλοις. 'Ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ διηλῶν ἐστὶ τῷ σύμφερον, καὶ τῷ θελεθέρῳ· ὡς καὶ τῷ δίκαιον, καὶ τῷ ἄλλον. Τότε γὰρ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζωά τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢδον, τὸ
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The Reason why MAN is a SOCIAL ANIMAL, more than any Bee, or any herding Species whatever, is evident from hence. Nature, we say, makes nothing in vain; and Man, of all Animals, is only possessed of SPEECH. Bare Sound indeed may be the Sign of what is pleasurable or painful; and for that reason is it common even to other Animals also. For so far we perceive even their Nature can go, that they have a Sense of those Feelings, and signify them to each other. But Speech is made to indicate what is expedient, and what hurtful, and in consequence of this, what is just and unjust. It is therefore given to Men, because this, with respect to other Animals, is to Men alone peculiar, that of Good and Evil, Just and Unjust, they only possess a Sense or Feeling. Now it is the Participation or Community of these, which makes and constitutes both a FAMILY, and a POLITY. Aristotle, Polit. l. i. c. 2.

Ideas are Images of Things in the Soul; and Sounds are declarative of these Ideas. And for this reason were these Sounds imparted to us by Nature, not only that we might indicate to each other these Ideas, but that we might be enabled to COMMUNICATE and LIVE IN ASSOCIATIONS. For MAN is by Nature a SOCIAL ANIMAL. Ammon. in l. de Interpr. p. 16. b.
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Thus Cicero, speaking of Human Nature—Omitto opportunitates habilitatesque reliqui corporis, moderationem vocis, orationis vim, quae conciliatrix est humanae maxime societatis. De Legg. l. i. c. 9. p. 35. Edit Davis.

Again in his Offices—Sed quae natura principia sint communitatis & societatis humanae, repetendum altius videtur. Est enim primum, quod cernitur in universi generis humani societate. Eius enim vinculum est Ratio, & Oratio; quae docendo, disiendo, communicando, disceptando, dijudicando, conciliat inter se homines, conjungitque naturali quadam societate. De Offic. l. i. c. 16.


Note XVI. p. 166.—It is from among the few, &c.] In omni enim arte, vel studio, vel quavis scientia, vel in ipsa virtute, optumum quodque rarissi-
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mum est. Cic. de Fin. l. 2. c. 25. p. 158. Edit. Dav. Thus too Aristotle joins the rare and the excellent.—

Note XVII. p. 167.—Working ever uniformly according to this Idea of Perfection, &c.

Thus, Boethius, addressing the Deity,

O qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas,
Terrarum coelique Sator, qui tempus ab aevo
Ire jubes, stabilisque manens das cumfà moveri;
Quem non externæ pepulerunt fingere causæ
Materiæ fluitantis opus; verum insita Summi
Forma boni, livore carens: Tu cumfà superno
Ducis ab exemplo, pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse
Mundum mente gerens, similique in imagine formans.
Consol. Philos. l. 3. Metr. 9.

Note XVIII. p. 167.—From some hidden higher Motive, &c.] Μυθολ. δε μηδε ταῦτα [sc. τα τέφατα] παρὰ φύσιν ēισιν, ἀλλα τῇ μὲν με-
ρικὴ φύσει ἐν φύσει, ἀλλὰ παρὰ φύσιν τῇ δὲ καθολικῶν, καὶ φύσει καὶ κατὰ φύσιν: Ἦ μὲν γὰρ μερικὴ φύσις ἐνος ἐιδική τοιαυτῇ, καὶ μίαν τέφηνι φένγει: Διὸ
tūto τῇ μὲν τὰ ἀνθρώπων φύσει τὸ τέφατ ἐφε φύσει εἰσὶν ἐφε κατὰ φύσιν τῇ δ' ὅλη φύσει ἐνετὶ μηδὲν τῷ
παντὶ παρὰ φύσιν (ὡς ἂν γὰρ καλὸν ἐν τῷ παντὶ) ὅνε
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quod fieri non poteft : nec, si id factum est quod potuit fieri, portentum debet videri. Cic. de Divin. l. 2. c. 28. p. 189. Edit. Davis.

Note XIX. p. 169.—Man is a social Rational Animal.] Ζωὸν λογικὸν, καὶ πολιτικὸν, λογικὸν καὶ κοινωνικὸν, λογικὸν καὶ ήμερον, these are Descriptions of Humanity, which we meet in every Page of Epicletus and Antoninus.

It seems indeed to have been a received Opinion of old, that so intimate was the Relation between these two Attributes, that wherever there was Rationality, Sociality followed of course. Thus Antoninus,—ἐσι δὲ τὸ λογικὸν, ἐνδει καὶ πολιτικὸν. l. 10. f. 2. And again, more fully—καὶ τοίνυν τὰν τὸ τῆς νοσεῖς φύσεως μέτοχον, ἀπὸ τὸ συνήθεσι συναισθησιν, ἴ καὶ μᾶλλον ὅσα γὰρ ἐστὶνεν παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα, τοστέρον καὶ ἀπὸ τὸ συγκινηθάνυ τῷ οἰκείῳ καὶ συγκινηθάνητοι ἐτοιμότερον. l. 9. f. 9.

It is not perhaps foreign to the present Subject to observe, that were the Eyes of any two Men whatever to view the same Object, they would each, from their different Place, and their different Organization, behold it differently, and have a different Image. But were all the Minds in the Universe to recognize the same Truth, they would all recognize it as one, their Recognition would be uniform, and themselves in a manner would be one also. The Reason is, Perception by the Senses admits of more and less, better and worse; but Perception by the Intellec, like Truth, its Object, admits of no degrees, and is either nothing at all, or else total, uniform, complete, and one.

Hence
Hence therefore one Source of the Society, and as it were Communion of all Minds, considered as Minds, namely, the Unity of Truth, their common Object.

Again, every just and perfect Society stands on the Basis of certain Laws. But Law is nothing more, than right and perfect Reason, seen in bidding and forbidding, according to the Nature and Essence of those Beings, to which it is a Law. If therefore this Universe be one whole, or general Society, there must be some common, general Law for its Conduct and Welfare; and this Law must, of consequence, be some right and perfect Reason, which passes thro' all things, and extends to every Part. Well therefore might Antoninus say in the Beginning of this Note, that every thing rational, was of course social, since Reason and Law appear to be the same, and Law to be the Support and Basis of all Society. Thus too Cicero—sequitur, ut eadem sit in his [sc. Diis] quae humano generi Ratio; eadem Veritas utrobique sit; eademque Lex, quae est recti præceptio, pravique depulsio. De Nat. Deor. I. 2. c. 31. p. 180. See also the same Author, De Legg. I. 1. c. 8, 12, 15. p. 29, 41, 51. Edit. Davii. De Fin. I. 2. c. 14. p. 123. See also Diog. Laert. 1. 7. f. 88. M. Anton. I. 5. c. 16. I. 6. c. 23. Aris. Polit. as quoted in Note XV.

Note XX. p. 169. Nothing can be pursuable, which is destructive of Society.] Si enim sic erimus affecti, ut propter suum quique emolumentum spolet, aut violet alterum, disrupsi necesset eam, quae maxime est secundum naturam, humani generis Societatem. Cic. de Offic. I. 3. c. 5.SCRIPTIONS ON TREATISE THE THIRD.
Note XXI. p. 173.—For Contraries are ever recognized through the same Habit, &c. Δοκεὶ δὲ καὶ η ἀπάτη, καὶ η ἐπιστήμη τῶν ἐναντίων, η ἀνυφα. There seems to be one and the same error, and one and the same Science, with respect to things contrary. Arist. de Anim. 1. 3. c. 3. This by Themistius, in his Paraphrase, is thus illustrated. Τῶν ἐναντίων μία ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, καὶ μία ἀγνοία: ο γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς ὑφέλεμον γνώσκων, καὶ τὸ κακὸν στὶ βλασφέων αναπηγαίνει: καὶ ο περὶ δαίτερον ἐξαπατώμενος, ἐξαπατάται καὶ περὶ δαίτερον. Of Things contrary there is one Science, and one Ignorance. For thus he, who knows Good to be something beneficial, knows Evil at the same time to be something pernicious; and he, who is deceived with respect to one of these, is deceived also with respect to the other. See the Io of Plato, p. 531. T. 1. Edit. Serr.

Note XXII. p. 174.—Those four Grand Virtues, &c. Stobæus having told us, that of the Virtues some were primary, some subordinate, adds—πρῶται δὲ τετραγώνων εἰναι, φρόνησιν, σωφροσύνην, ἀνδρείαν, δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν μὲν φρόνησιν, περὶ τὰ καθηκόντα γίνεσθαι. τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην περὶ τὰς ὁμοίας τῇ ἀνθρώπῳ. τὴν δὲ ἀνδρείαν, περὶ τὰς ὑπομονάς. τὴν δὲ δικαιοσύνην, περὶ τὰς ἀπονεμήσεις. The primary Virtues are four; Prudence, Temperance, Fortitude, and Justice: Prudence is employed in moral Offices; Temperance, in Mens natural Appetites and Pursuits; Fortitude, in Endurings; and Justice, in Distributions. Ecl. Ethic. p. 167.

That
That the Life according to Virtue, was deemed the Life according to Nature, appears from what is said by the same Author, in the Page following—

Πάσων δὲ τῶν τῶν ἀρετῶν τὸ τέλος εἶναι, τὸ ἀνοκάθως τῇ φύσει, ἐκάσην δὲ τῶν ἰδίων παρεξεσθαι τυχάνωλα τὸν ἄνθρωπον. The End of all these Virtues is, to live agreeably to Nature; and each of them, by those Means, which are peculiar to itself, is found to put a Man in possession of this End.

So likewise Cicero—Etenim quod summum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, convenienter nature vivere, id habet hanc, ut opinor, sententiam, cum virtute congruere semper. De Offic. 1. 3. c. 3.

Note XXIII. p. 174. That Life, where the Value of all Things is justly measured, &c.] See pages 143, 146, 168, 203, 204.

Note XXIV. p. 175. That, which being done, admits of a rational justification.] In the Original it is—ὄσα πράξεων ἔσων ἀπολογημένων. Diog. Laert. l. 7. f. 107. ὡσπη πράξεων ἔσων ἢτει τιν ἀπολογήαι. Sext. Emp. Adv. Mathem. l. 7. Thus rendered by Cicero—Officium id esse dicunt, quod cur factum sit, ratio probabilis reddi possit. De Offic. l. 1. c. 3. The Reason of its Greek Name, καθισμὸν is given by Simplicius. Καθισμὸν έτί τὰ γνώμενα κατὰ τὰ ἱκολα καὶ ἐπιθέληνον—Moral Offices are those things which are done agreeably
agreed to what is fitting, and expedient. Simplic. in Ench. c. 37.

Note XXV. p. 176.—And when our several Energies, exerted according to the Virtues above, have put us in possession of, &c.] This was the Idea of Happiness, adopted by the old Academy, or Platonics, Secundum naturam vivere, sic affectum, ut optimè affici possit, ad naturamque accommodatissimè. Cic. de Fin. l. 5. c. 9. p. 370. The Peripatetics, who were originally of thesame School, held the same. 'Ει δ’ ἐτως τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἄγαθον Ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίγνεται καὶ ἀρετὴν ——τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τελειοτάτην——ἐν βίω τελειώ. If this be admitted, it follows that Human Good or Happiness is, the energizing of the Soul according to the best and most consummiate Virtue, in a perfect and complete Life. Ethic. Nic. l. 1. c. 7. A perfect and complete Life, they explained to be such a Life as was no way deficient either as to its Duration, its bodily Health, and its being attended with a proper Competence of external Goods, and Prosperity. By the best and most consummiate Virtue, they not only meant that Virtue, which was in its kind most perfect, but which was the Virtue also of that Part, which is in each of us most excellent. For there are Virtues of the Body, such as Strength and Agility; and there are Virtues of the Senses, such as accurate Seeing, accurate Tasting; and the same of every Faculty, from the lowest to that which is supreme.

The sovereign Good or Happiness here spoken of, is again repeated, in other Words, p. 179. where it
is called, the Attaining the primary and just Requisites of our Nature, by a Conducl suitable to Virtue and moral Office.

**The Primary and Just Requisites her mentioned, are all Things requisite to the Use and Enjoyment of our Primary and Natural Perfections.** These Primary and Natural Perfections mean the Natural Accomplishments of both our Mind and Body. They were called by the Latins, Prima Natura, Prima secundum Naturam; by the Greeks, τὰ πρώτα κατὰ φύσιν, τὰ πρώτα τῆς φύσεως. In them were included Health, Strength, Agility, Beauty, perfect Sensations, Memory, Docility, Invention, &c. See Stob. Ecl. Eth. p. 163. Cic. de Fin. l. 5. c. 7. p. 364. A. Gell. l. 12. c. 5.

A like Sentiment of Happiness, to this here spoken of, is that mentioned by Cicero—*Virtute adhibitā frui primis a naturā datis.* De Fin. l. 2. c. 11. p. 113. It is there called the Opinion of the old Academics, and Peripatetics. It is again repeated by the same Author. *Honeste vivere, fruentem rebus iis, quas primas homini natura conciliet.* Acad. l. 2. c. 42. p. 240.

It is to be observed that Cicero, speaking of this Hypothesis, says that it proposed an Idea of Happiness, which was not properly in our own Power. *Hoc non est postum in nostrā actione: completur enim & ex eo genere vīta, quod virtutē finitur, & ex iis rebus quae secundum naturam sunt, neque sunt in nostrā potestate.* De Fin. l. 4. c. 6. p. 287.

**Hence**
Hence therefore the Deficiency of this Doctrine. However justifiable, however laudable its End, it could not insure a due Success to its Endeavours. And hence too the Force of what is objected to it in the Dialogue, from p. 177, to the End of the first Part.

Note XXVI. p. 185.—To place the Sovereign Good in Rectitude of Conduct, &c.] As the Conduct here mentioned implies a Conduct under the Direction of a befitting Rule or Law, and that, as opposed to wrong Conduct, which has either no rule at all, or at least one erroneous; it may not be an improper Place to enquire, what was the ancient Opinion concerning Law universal, that great and general Law, which stood opposed to the municipal Laws of particular Cities and Communities.

Est quidem vera Lex, recta ratio, naturæ congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna, quæ vocet ad officium jubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat—nec erit alia lex Romæ, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia post-hac; sed & omnes gentes, & omni tempore una lex, & sempiterna, & immortalis continebit; unusque erit communis quasi magister, & imperator omnium Deus. Ille hujus legis inventor, disceptator, lator. Qui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet, ac naturam hominis aspernabitur; hoc ipso luet maximas poenas, etiam si cætera supplicia, quæ putantur, effugerit. Fragm. Cic. de Rep. l. 3.
Lex est ratio summa, insita in natura, quae subet ea quae facienda sunt, prohibetque contraria. What follows is worth remarking. Eadem ratio, cum est in hominis mente confirmata & confecta, lex est. Cic. de Legg. l. i. c. 6. p. 22.

Again. Lex vera—ratio est recta summi Jovis. To which he subjoins, as above, Ergo ut illa divina mens summa lex est; ita cum in homine est, perfecta est in mente sapientis. De Legg. l. 2. c. 4, 5. p. 88.

It is in this Sense the Apostle tells us of the Gentiles, or Mankind in general, that they show the Work of the Law written in their Hearts, their Conscience also bearing witness, and their Thoughts the mean while accusing, or else excusing one another. Rom. i. 11.

As Cicero, in his Book of Laws above cited, follows the Stoic Discipline, so is it agreeable to their Reasoning, that he makes the original natural Law, of which we here treat, to be the Sovereign Reason of the Deity himself. Thus Chrysippus——Idem [scil. Chrysippus] legis perpetuae & externea vim, quae quasi dux vitae & magistra officiorum sit, Jovem dicit esse. Nat. Deor. l. i. c. 15. p. 41.

So by the same Philosophers in Laertius, we are ordered to live according to Nature, ἐὰν ἐνεργῶντας ᾧν ἀπαγορεύειν ἐσθεν ὅ νόμος ὁ κοινός, ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ ἀλὸς ὡν τῷ Δίῳ, καθηγεμόν τέτω τῆς τῶν ὀλων (for ὀλων) διουχήσεως ὅν, doing nothing, forbidden by the Universal Law, that
that is to say, by that right Reason, which passeth thro' all Things, and which is the same with Jove himself, the Governor and Conductor of this universal Administration. Laert. l. 7. f. 88. Edit. Aldobrand.

Agreeably to this Reasoning, Plutarch corrects those, who made Δίκη, a Goddess, and the Assessor of Jove; for, says he, ὁ Ζεὺς οὖν ἐξει μὲν τὴν Δίκην πάσῃδρον, ἀλλ' ἄνως Δίκη καὶ Θεότης ἐστι, καὶ νόμων ὁ πρακτικὸς καὶ τελευταῖος, Jove has not Δίκη or Right for his Assessor, but is himself Right, and Justice, and of all Laws the most antient and perfect. Moral. p. 781. B.

Thus Antoninus — τὸ δὲ λογικὸν ἔσω, τὸ ἔπειθαι τῷ τῆς ἀκόλουθος καὶ πολιτείας τῆς ἐνεργοῦσας λόγῳ καὶ ἔσωμα. The End of Rational Animals is to follow the Reason and sacred Law of that City, and most ancient Polity, [in which all rational Beings are included] l. 2. f. 16.

The most simple Account of this Law, which the Stoics gave, seems to be that recorded by Stobæus; according to which they called it ὁγον, ὁδὸν ὁδικος, προαείαν μὲν τῶν ποιήσεως, ἄπαξγενετικὸν δὲ τῶν ἑτερησιῶν, RIGHT REASON, ordaining what is to be done, and forbidding what is not to be done. Ecl. Ethic. 178. See also the Notes of Turnbull and Davis upon Cic. de Legg. l. 1. c. 6.

Having premised thus much concerning Law universal, it remains to say something of that Rectitude of Conduct, which is in this Part of the Dialogue
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Dialogue proposed as our Happiness. Rectitude of Conduct is intended to express the Term Kalóβους which Cicero translates retia Effestiio. Kalóβωμα he translates Rectum Faedrum. See De Fin. l. 3. c. 14. p. 242. Now the Definition of a Kalóβωμα, was Νόμως πρότεσα, a Thing commanded by Law; to which was opposed ἀμάζήμα, a Sin or Offence, which was defined Νόμις ἄπαγορεύμα, a Thing forbidden by Law. Plut. Mor. 1037. C. What Law is here meant, which thus commands or forbids, has been shewn above.

Hence therefore may be seen the Reason, why we have said thus much on the Nature and Idea of Law universal; so intimate being the Union between this and right Conduct, that we find the latter is nothing more than a perfect Obedience to the former.

Hence too we see the Reason, why in one view it was deemed Happiness, to be void of Error or Offence, ἀμαμάζήμοις ἐπαυ, as we find it in Arrian. Epist. l. 4. c. 8. p. 633. For to be thus inculpable was the necessary Result of Rectitude of Conduct, or rather in a manner the same thing with it.

I cannot conclude this Note, without remarking on an elegant Allusion of Antoninus to the primary Signification of the Word Kalóβους, that is to say, καὶὰ ὑδῆς, right onwards, straight and directly forwards. Speaking of the Reasoning Faculty, how, without looking farther, it rests contented in its own Energies, he adds——Καὶὸ καλόβους εἰς τοῖς ἀφάξις ὄνομάζοις, τὴν ὀρθότητι τῆς ὑδῆς σημαίνειται.

For which Reason Actions of this sort

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are called Rectitudes, as denoting the Direction of their Progression right onwards. l. 5. f. 14.
So again in the same Sense, εὐθείαν περείχειν, to keep on, the straight Road. l. 5. f. 3. l. 10. f. 11.

One would imagine that our Countryman Milton, had this Reasoning in view, when in his 19th Sonnet, speaking of his own Blindness, he says with a becoming Magnanimity,

—Yet I argue not
Against Heav'n's Hand or Will; nor hate one jot
Of Heart or Hope; but still bear up, and steer
Right onwards.—

The whole Sonnet is not unworthy of Perusal, being both sublime and simple.

Note XXVII. p. 185.—The mere doing whatever is correspondent to such an end, even tho' we never attain it—
Thus Epicletus in Arrian, speaking of Address to Men in Power, and admitting such Address, when justified by certain Motives, adds, that such Address ought to be made, without Admiration, or Flattery. Upon this an Objector demands of him, τοὺς ἐν τίχω, ἐὰν δέομαι; But how then am I to obtain that, which I want? ——The Philosopher answers, Ἕγὼ δὲ σοι λέγω, ὅτι ὃς ΤΕΤΞΟΜΕΝΟΣ ἀπέχει. ἐκι δὲ μόνον, ἵνα παρέκεις τὸ σεισθέναι κατεργήσω; Did I ever say to thee, that thou shouldst go and address, as tho' thou wert to succeed; and not rather with this only view, that thou mightest do that, which is becoming thy Character? ——And soon after,
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when an Objection is urged from Appearance, and the Opinion of Mankind, he answers,—ἐὰν οὖθ' ὅτι ἁνὴρ καλὸς καὶ ἄγαθος ἔδει πωςι τῷ δόξαι ἕνα, ἀλλὰ τῷ ΠΕΠΡΑΧΘΑΙ ΚΑΛΩΣ; Knowest thou not, that a fair and good Man does nothing for the sake of Appearance, but for the sake only of having done well and fairly? Arr. Epist. l. 3. c. 24. p. 497, 498. This Doctrine indeed seems to have been the Basis of the Stoic Morals; the Principle, which included, according to these Philosophers, as well Honour and Honesty, as Good and Happiness. Thus Cicero—Facere omnia, ut adipiscamur quae secundum naturam sint, et si ea non adaequamur, id esse & honestum, & solum per se expetendum & summum bonum Stoici dicunt. De Fin. l. 5. c. 7. p. 365, 6. To this is consonant that Sentiment of theirs in Plutarch—Τὴν μὲν φύσιν ἂνθιν ἀδιάφορον εἶναι· τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσιν ἀφιλογείν, ἄγαθον· And again—τὸ κατὰ φύσιν, τῆς ἐνυπάρχον εἶναι· τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀδιάφορα εἶναι. Plut. Mor. 1060. D. E. See below, Note XXX. Socrates was of the same Opinion, as appears from all parts of the Platonic and Xenophontean Dialogues. Take one Example out of many.—τὸν ἄγαθὸν ἐς καὶ καλὸς ἀφάνειν ἀ ἄν ἀφάνεις τὸν δὲ ἐς ἀφάνεια, μακάριονε καὶ ἐνυπάρχον εἶναι. Gorg. Plat. p. 507. Ed. Serr.

Note XXVIII. p. 185.—What if we make our natural State the Standard only to determine our Conduct, &c.] It is in this sense we find it elegantly said in Plutarch by the last mentioned Philosophers—τοιχεῖα τῆς ἐνυπάρχον τῆς φύσιν, καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν—that our natural State and what is consonant to it, are the Elements.
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of Happiness,—and just before, the same natural State is called τὸ καθκονόμα ἀρχῆ, καὶ ὑμᾶς τὰς ἄρετὰς, the Source of Moral Office; and the Subject Matter of Virtue. Plut. Mor. 1069. E. F. Atque etiam illud perspicuum est, constitui necesse esse initium, quod sapientia, cum quid agere incipiatur, sequatur; idque initium esse naturæ accommodatum: nam aliter appetitio, &c. Cic. Acad. l. 2. c. 8. p. 85, 86. Initia proponi necesse esse apta & accommodata naturæ quorum ex selectione Virtus possit exisere. De Fin. l. 4. c. 17. p. 316. Cum vero illa, quae officia esse dixi, profiscantur ab initis naturæ; ea ad haec referri necesse est: ut reele dici possit, omnia officia eo referri, ut adipsicamur principia naturæ; nec tamen ut hoc sit bonorum ultimum—De Fin. l. 3. c. 6. p. 217.

Note XXIX. p. 185.—We should not want a Good to correspond, &c.] Plutarch quotes the following Sentiment of Chrysippus, who patronized this Idea of Good—Τὸν ως άγαθῶν καὶ μακῶν λόγον, ἐν ἁυτὸς έσταγει και δοµιµάξει, συµµωνόταλον ἐναί φησι τῷ βίῳ, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἐμφύτων απλεθαίνα προσήψεων. Plut. Mor. 1041. E.

Note XXX. p. 187.—Yet we look not for his Reputation, &c.] What Quintilian says of Rhetoric, may with great propriety be transferred to Morality. Noster orator, Arsque a nobis finita, non sunt posita in eventu. Tendit quidem ad victoriam, qui dicit; sed, cum bene dixit, etiam si non vincat, id quod arte continetur, efficat. Nam & gubernator vult salvâ nave in portum pervenire: si tamen tempusstat fuerit abruptus, non ideo minus erit gubernator, dicetque notum illud; dum clavum rectum teneam. Et medicus sanitatem ægri petit: si tamen æut
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aut valetudinis vi, aut intemperantiä ægri, aliove quo cafu summa non contingit; dum ipse omnia secundum rationem fecerit, medicinae fine non excidit. Ita oratori bene dixisse, finis est. Nam est ars ea—in actu posita, non in eventu. Inst. Orat. l. 2. c. 17.

Note XXXI. p. 187.—HE FOR A SUBJECT HAS THE WHOLE OF HUMAN LIFE, &c.] 'Ousía τα ἀγαθά, προοίμεσις θυσίας τα ἁκαὶ προοίμεσις θυσίας. Τι ἦν τα ἐκλογής; 'Τλαὶ τή προοίμεσις, περὶ ἀς ἀναστρεφομέν τενέξει τι ιδίς ἁγαθὸς ἡ κακός. The Essence of Good, is a peculiar Direction of Mind; and the Essence of Evil, is a peculiar Direction also. What then are EXTERNALS? They serve as SUBJECTS to the Mind's Direction, from conversing with which it obtains its proper Good or Evil. Arr. Epict. l. 1. c. 29. Again—Αἱ ὅλαι, ἀδίάφοροι ἢ δὲ χρήσις αὐλόν ἢ ἀδίάφοροι. The SUBJECTS are indifferent, but not so the USE of them. Arr. Epict. l. 2. c. 5.

Thus HORACE:

Non pessidentem multa vocaveris
Reté beatum; rectius occupat
Nomen beati, qui Deorum
Muneribus sapienter uti,
Duramque callet pauperiem pati,
Peiusque leto flagitium timet:
Non ille, &c.

Od. l. iv. 9.

Even the Comic Poet seems not to have been unacquainted with this Doctrine:
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Ch. Quid narrat? Cl. Quid ille? miserum se esse.

Ch. Miserum? quem minus credere est?
Quid reliqui est, quin habeat quae quidem in homine dicuntur bona?

Parentis, patriam incolumem, amicos, genus, cognatos, divitias:

Atque haec perinde sunt ut illius animus, qui ea posbit:

Qui uti scit, ei bona; illi, qui non utitur recte, mala.


Vid. Platon. in Euthydemo, p. 281. Edit Serr. in retoricae §, εφω, δι Κλεινία, κινδυνεύει.

Note XXXII. p. 189.—The End in other Arts is ever distant, &c.] Sed in cæteris artibus cum dicitur Artificiosè, posterum quodam modo & consequens putandum est, quod illi εικενεμαξαίνει appellant; quod autem in quo Sapienter dicitur, id ad primo rectissime dicitur: quicquid enim a sapiente profiscitur, id continuo debet expletum esse omnibus suis partibus; in eo enim postum est id, quod dicimus esse expetendum. Nam ut peccatum est patriam prodere, parentes violare, fana decapellarì, quæ sunt in effectu: sic timere, sic mœrere, sic in libidine esse, peccatum est, etiam sine effectu. Verum ut haec, non in posteris & in consequentibus, sed in primis continuo peccata sunt: sic ea quæ profiscuntur a virtute, susceptione prima, non perfectione, recta sunt judicanda. Cic. de Fin. I. 3. c. 9. p. 228. Tά διά τέλης τούχανει [η λογική συνή] ὡς ἐν τῷ τῷ βίῳ αὐτοῖς ἐτίμη· ἄχ, ὡσπερ ἐπὶ ἑρχόμενος καὶ ὑποκριτώς καὶ τῶν τοιότων ἀτελεῖς.
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Note XXXIII. p. 191.—Recollect then, said he, Do you not remember that one Pre-conception, &c.] In this, and the subsequent Pages, the general Pre-conceptions of Good are applied to the particular Hypothesis of Good, advanced in this Treatise. See before, p. 115, 121, 122.

Note XXXIV. p. 192.—And is there any Time or Place, whence rectitude of Conduct may be excluded?] ΠΑΝΤΑΧΟΥ καὶ ΔΗΝΕΚΩΣ ἐπὶ σοὶ ἐστι, καὶ τῇ παράζη συμβεβεί θεότητος ἐναρετεία, καὶ τῶς παρὰ

X 4
NOTE XXXV. p. 192.—Where it shall not be in his Power to act bravely and honestly.] Mήσει ἐν μοι λέγε, τῶς γένησιν; ὡπως γὰρ ἄν γένησιν, σὺ ἀυλὸ δήσεις καλῶς, καὶ ἔτοι σοι τὸ ἀποθεῖν εὑρίσκωμα. Arrian. Epist. l. 4. c. 10. p. 650.

NOTE XXXVI. p. 195.—There are Instances innumerable of Men bad, as well as good, &c.] See a long Catalogue of these in Cicero's Tusculan Disputations; Spartan Boys; Barbarian Sages; Indian Wives; Egyptian Devotees, &c. &c. The whole Passage is worth reading. Tusc. Disp. l. 5; c. 27. p. 400, 401, &c.

NOTE XXXVII. p. 196.—This I write you (says he in one of his Epistles) while &c.] Τὴν μακαριὰν ἀγαθεῖς καὶ ἁμα τελεσθήσαν ἡμέραν τῇ βίᾳ, ἐγραφομεν ὑμῶν ταύτα· σφαλµεῖαν παρθενεῖ; καὶ δυσείρωνα πάθων, ἑπερθοῦν ἐν ἀπεκλητοῖς τῇ ἐν δαίμονις μεγάλοιο· αὐτοπαρεισχθῆν ὑπὲρ τῶν τῶν γεγονότων ἣν διαλογίσµων μνήµη—Dio. Laer. l. 10. f. 22. Cum ageremus vitæ beatum & eundem supremum diem, scribemus hac. Tanti autem morbi aderant vesicae & vesicorum, ut nihil ad eorum magnitudinem posset accedere. Compensabatur tamen cum his omnibus animi laetitia, quam capiēbam memoria rationum inventorumque nostrorum—Cic. de Fin. l. 2. c. 30. p. 173.

Soon after we have another Sentiment of Epicurus, that a rational Adversity was better than an irrational
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Tional Prosperity. The original Words are—κοιτηδος ειναι εδυνατος ατυχειν,  ε αδυνατως ευ δυναταιν. Dio. Laert. i. 10. f. 135.

Note XXXVIII. p. 198. O Crito, if it be pleasing to the Gods, &c.] The three Quotations in this Page are taken from Plato; the first from the Crito, quoted by Epictetus at the End of the Enchiridion, and in many other Places; the second from the Apology, quoted as frequently by the same Author; the third, from the Menexenus or Epitaph. Plat. Opera, tom. 2. p. 248. Edit. Serran. see also Cic. Tuscul. l. 5. c. 12.

Note XXXIX. p. 199. If you are for Numbers, replied he, what think you of the numerous Race of Patriots, &c.] Sed quid duces & principes nominem; cum legiones soribat Cato sepe alacris in eum locum profectas, unde redituras se non arbitrarentur? Pari animo Lacedaemonii in Thermopylis occiderunt: in quos Simonides,

Dic hoppes Spartae, nos te hic vidisse jacentes,
Dum sanctis patriae legibus obsequimur.

Note XI. Ibid.——Martyrs for Systems wrong, &c.] That there may be a bigotted Obstinacy in favour of what is absurd, as well as a rational Constancy in adhering to what is right, those Egyptians above mentioned may serve as Examples. Egyptiorum morem quis ignorant? quorum imbutae mentes pravitates erroribus quamvis carnificinam prius subi- erint, quam ibim aut aspidem aut felem aut canem aut croco—
crocodilum violent: quorun etiam si imprudentes quid-piam fecerint, paenam nullam recusent. Tuftul. Disp. l. 5. c. 27. p. 402. See before, Note XXXVI.

Note XLI. p. 200.—Celebrated to such a height, in the Religion, which we profess, &c.] It is probable that some Analogies of this sort induced a Father of the Church (and no less a one than St. Jerom) to say of the Stoics, who made moral Restitude the only Good,—nostro dogmati in plerisque concordant. Vid. Menag. in D. Laert. l. 7. f. 101. p. 300. and Gatakn. Prafat. in M. Anton. See also of this Treatise page 110. and below, Note XLIV.

Note XLII. p. 201. To live consistently, &c.] To live consistently is here explained to be living according to some one single consonant scheme or purpose; and our Good or Happiness is placed in such consistence, upon a supposition that those, who live inconsistently, and without any such uniform scheme, are of consequence miserable, and unhappy. Τὸ τέλειον, ὃ μὲν Ζήνων ἔτως ἀπέδωκεν, τὸ ὀμολογημένον ζήνη τῷ τὸ δ' ἐγὼ καθ' ἐνα λόγον καὶ σύμφωνον ζήνη, ὡς τῶν μακαμενῶν ζῶνων κακαδαμονίαν. Stob. Ecl. Ethic. p. 171.

This consistence was called in Greek ὀμολογία, in Latin Convenientia, and was sometimes by itself alone considered as the end. Τὴν ὀμολογίαν ἐγὼ τὸ τέλειον ζήνη. Stob. Ecl. Ethic. p. 172. See also Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 6. p. 216. So also in the same last named Treatise, c. 7. p. 220.—Ut enim histri-
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oni actio, saltatoris motus, non quivis, sed certus quidam est datus: sic vita agenda est certo genere quodam, non quolibet; quod genus CONVENIENS CONSENTANEOUMQUE dicimus. Nec enim gubernationi aut medicinae similem sapientiam esse arbitramur, sed actioni illi potius, quam modo dixi, & saltationi; ut in issa ARTE insti, NON FORIS petatur EXTREMUM, id est, artis effeactio.

It is upon this Principle we find it a Precept in Cicero's Offices——In primis autem constituen-
dum est, quos nos & quales esse velimus, & in quo genere vitae——l. i. c. 32. So likewise in the En-
chiridion of Epicletus, c. 33.——ΤάξΩν τινὰ ἡν χα-
ρακηνα σαιλι καὶ τύπων, ὃν φυλάξῃ ἐπί τε σεαυτῷ ἐκ, καὶ ἀνθρώπους ἐπιλυγχάονω. Ordain to thyself some Char-
racter and Model of Life, which thou mayst maintain both by thyself, and when thou art conversant with Mankind.

So much indeed was rested upon this Prin-
ciple of Confidence, that even to be any Thing con-
sistently, was held better than the contrary. Thus Epicletus.——Ἐνα σε δεὶ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, ἢ ἄγαθον ἢ
μακόν ἢ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν σε δεὶ έξεργάζεσθαι το σαιλι, ἢ τα ἐως——It behoves thee to be ONE UNIFORM
MAN, either good or bad; either to cultivate thy own Mind, or to cultivate Things external——Arr. Epićt.
l. 3. c. 15. p. 421. And more fully than this does he express himself in a place subsequent; where having first counselled against that False Complai-
fance, which makes us, to please Mankind, forget our proper Character, and having recommended as our Duty a Behaviour contrary, he adds——Ἐι δὲ μὴ ἄφεσιν τάως, ὥθεν ἐπώλυνων ἐπὶ τ' ἁνεσία γενέ
εἰς τῶν κωνιάδων, εἰς τῶν μοιχῶν——Διάφορα δ' ἐτω
πῶς——
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**During what I recommend to thee do not please, then turn thee totally to all that is contrary; become a profligate of the most profligate kind—Characters so different are not to be blended; thou canst not act at once Thersites and Agamemnon.**

**So too Horace:**

——*Quanto constanter idem*

*In vitii, tanto levius miser, ac prior ille*

*Qui jam contento, jam laxo fine laborat.*

Sat. 7. 1. 2. v. 18.

See also *Characteristics*, V. i. p. 131.

**Note XLIII. p. 203.—It is not merely to live consistently; but to live consistently with Nature.* *Omololymenos tis fuyei xyn.* Cleanthes in Stob. Ecl. Eth. p. 171.——*Congruenter naturae convenienterque vivere.* Cic. de Fin. 1. 3. c. 7. p. 221. The first Description of our End [to live consistently] was deemed defective, and therefore was this Addition made. See Stobæus in the Place cited. *Arr. Epicl. l. 3. c. i. p. 352.*

**Note XLIV. p. 204.—To live consistently with Nature is to live according to experience of those things, which happen around us.* *Telô eis to omololymenos tis fuyei xyn* ὑπὲρ ὃ Ἐρυσιππος σαφέτερον βωλύμενος ἑφοίτα, ἐξενεκτὸ τῶν τρίτων τῶν, Ζήν καὶ ἐμπετίσιαν τῶν φύσει συμβεβολιῶν. Stob. Ecl. Ethic. 171. Diog. Laert l. 7. c. 87. *His verbis* [sic].
NOTES on TREATISE the Thira.

[scil. vivere secundum naturam] tria significari Stoici dicunt. Unum ejusmodi, vivere adhibentem scientiam earum rerum, quæ naturâ evenirent—De Fin. l. 4. c. 6. p. 286. See also the same Treatise, l. 3. c. 9. p. 227. l. 2. c. 11. p. 113, where it is expressed—
Vivere cum intelligentiâ earum rerum quæ naturâ evenirent.

Note XLV. p. 205.—To live perpetually selecting, as far as possible, what is congruous to Nature, and rejecting what is contrary, making our End that Selecting, and that Rejecting only.]

'O τε 'Ανθισαλγος, to tενεψειεν τε, ἔγι τῇ δινημί, καὶ ἀπαρακός ἐκλέγεσθαι μὲν τὰ κατὰ φύσις, ἀπεκλέγεσθαι δὲ τὰ σαφῆ φύσιν, ὑποκακώνεις. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. 2. p. 497. Edit. Potter. This Sentiment was sometimes contradicted, and expressed as follows—τὸ εὐλογησείν εν ταῖς εὐλογίαις—sometimes, more concisely still, by the single Term τὸ εὐλογησείν. See Plutarch 1071, 1072. Cicero joins this, and the foregoing Descriptions of Happiness, together. Circumscriptis igitur his sententis, quas posui, & si quae similes earum sint; relinquitur, ut summum bonum sit, vivere scientiam adhibentem earum rerum, quæ naturâ eveniant, feligentem quæ secundum naturam, & quæ contra naturam sunt rejeicientem, id est, convenienter congruentesque naturæ vivere. De Fin. l. 3. c. 9. p. 227. See also De Fin. l. 2. c. 11. p. 113. See also Diog. Laert. l. 7. c. 83.—Stob. Ecl. Eth. 171.

Note XLVI. p. 207. To live in the discharge of moral Offices.] 'Αρχέδους ἰς 

[τελες]
NOTES on TREATISE the Third.

Soon after we meet the Phrases— **To live according to Nature; To live according to Virtue.** *'O Zήνων—téλΘ eিতε, το ὀμολογι-

méνως τῇ φύσει ξῖν, ὑπὲρ ἐνα καλ' ἀρείν ξῖν. Laert. 1. 7. c. 87.—Continent natura; quod esse voluntu
virtute id est, honestate vivere — De Fin. 1. 2. c. 11. p. 113. Where, as has been already observed page 174, and in the Note likewise on the Place, we find the Lives according to Nature and Virtue are con-

sidered as the same.

However, to make this Assertion plainer, (if it be not perhaps sufficiently plain already) it may not be improper to consider what Idea these Philosophers had of Virtue.

In Laertius (where he delivers the Sentiments of Zeno and his followers) Virtue is called Διάθεσις ὀμολογεῖσθαι, a confident Disposition; and soon after, ὕψιν ἀποτειμένη κατὰ τὴν ὀμολογίαν ἄνθρος τῇ βίοι.

A Mind formed to Confidence thro' every Part of Life. Laert. 7. c. 89.

In Stobæus (according to the Sentiments of the fame School) it is called Διάθεσις ξυρχὴς σύμφωνα ἀσθὶ αὐτί διόν τῶν βίων. A Disposition of Mind, con-

So Cicero in his Laws — Constant & perpetua ratio vitae, quae est Virtus.— l. i. c. 17. p. 55.

So Seneca in his 74th Epistle — Virtus enim convenientia constat: omnia opera ejus cum ipsa concordant, & congruent.

Thus therefore Consistence being the Essence of Virtue, and upon the Hypothesis here advanced, the Essence also of Happiness; it follows first that a Virtuous Life will be a Happy Life. But if a Happy one, then of course a Life according to Nature; since nothing can be Good, which is contrary to Nature, nor indeed which is not consonant, in the strictest manner, to it.

And here (as a proper Opportunity seems to offer) we cannot but take notice of the great Similitude of Sentiments, it may be even said the Unanimity of almost all Philosophers, on this important Subject concerning Ends and Happiness.

Those, whose Hypothesis we have followed in this Dialogue, supposed it to be Virtue and consistent Action, and that without regard to Fortune or Success. But even they, who from their Hypothesis made some Degree of Success requisite; who rested it not merely on right Action, but on a proportion of bodily Welfare, and good Fortune concomitant, even these made Right Action and Virtue to be Principal.
Thus Archytas, according to the Doctrine of the Pythagorean School. Εὐδαιμονίας χρήσις ἄρετάς ἐν ἀγάπῃ. Happiness is the Use or Exercise of Virtue, attended with external good Fortune. Opusc. Mytholog. p. 678. Consonant to this Sentiment, he says in the beginning of the same Treatise, ὁ μὲν ἄγα-βός ἀνήρ ὁυε ἑυμένως ἐνδαίμων ἐξ ἀνάγκας ἐτίμ ὁ δὲ ἐνδαίμων, καὶ ἄγαβος ἀνήρ ἐτί. The good Man is not of necessity Happy; [because, upon this Hypothesis, external Fortune may be wanting;] but the happy Man is of necessity Good, [because, upon the same Hypothesis, without Virtue was no Happiness.] Ibid. p. 673. Again—'Αιτε μὲν γὰρ κανοδαιμονέν ἀνάλυκα τὸν καλέν, αἰὲ ἔχοι υλιν (κακῶς τε γὰρ ἄμα χρεέθεια) αἰὲ σπανίζοι.—The bad Man (says he) must needs at all times be miserable, whether he have, or whether he want, the Materials of external Fortune; for if he have them, he would employ them ill. Ibid. p. 696. Thus we see this Philosopher, tho' he made Externals a Requisite to Happiness, yet still without Virtue he treats them as of no Importance. Again—Δυο δὲ ὀδι περικοπή έν τῷ βίω ἀ μὲν σκυθρωπόλερα, ἂν ὁ πλάκον ἐκάλεσαν 'Οδυσσέα ὁ δὲ ἐνδισυλάρα. τὰν ἔποδευε Νέτωρ. Ταν αὖν ἄγελαν φαμι δικασθαί (λεγε δικασθαί, Dorice pro Θέλεν) μὲν τάλαν, δύνασθαι δὲ καὶ τύναν. There are two Roads in Life distinct from each other; one the rougher, which the sufferings Ulysses went; the other more smooth, which was travelled by Neftor. Now of these Roads (says he) Virtue desires indeed the latter; and yet is she not unable to travel the former. Ibid. p. 696. From which lai Sentiment it appears, that he thought Virtue, even in any Fortune, was capable of producing at least some degree of Happiness.
As for the Socratic Doctrine on this Subject, it may be sufficiently seen by what is quoted from it, in the Dialogue pag. 198, 199. And as the Sentiments, there exhibited, are recorded by Plato, they may be called not only Socratic, but Platonic also. However, lest this should be liable to dispute, the following Sentiment is taken from Xenocrates, one of Plato's immediate Successors in the old Academy by him founded. Ξενοκράτης φησίν, 'Ευδαίμονα εἶναι τῶν τὴν ψυχήν ἐξονα σπεδαίαν τάδην γὰρ ἐνάσω ἐναι Δαίμων. Xenocrates held that he was Eudaemon, or Happy, who had a virtuous Mind; for that the Mind was every one's Daemon or Genius. Arist. Top. l. 2. c. 6.

Here we see Virtue made the Principle of Happiness, according to the Hypothesis of the Dialogue. There is an elegant Allusion in the Passage to the Etymology of the Word 'Ευδαίμων, which signifies both [Happy] and [possessed of a good Genius or Daemon], an Allusion which in translating it was not possible to preserve. See below, Note LVIII.

As for the Peripatetic School, we find their Idea of Happiness, as recorded by Laertius, to be in a manner the same with that of the Pythagoreans. It was καθός ἑρεθις εἰν βίω τεκλω—The Use or Exercise of Virtue in a complete and perfect Life. Laert. l. 5. c. 30. We have already, in Note XXV, cited the same Doctrine (though somewhat varied in Expression) from the Founder of the Peripatetics, in his first Book of Ethics. So again we learn from him—οτὶ σφάκης τινς καὶ ἑφειμα λέγονται...
to τέλος, that it is certain Actions and Energies which are to be deemed the End. *Ethic.* N. i. c. 8.—And again—"Σ ει γάρ ἄλλη ἡ ἐνεργεία τέλος. For it is the very Etiitude of Action, which is itself the End. *Ibid.* l. 6. c. 5. And again, 'Η ἑνεργεία ἐνέργεια τίς ἐστι—Happiness is a certain Energizing. l. 9. c. 9. And more explicitly than all these Passages in that elegant Simile, l. 1. c. 8.—"Ωσπερ δὲ ὀλυμπιάσιν ἅχ οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἵσχυσι-ταλις τεφανώμεν, ἀλλ' οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι (τέτων γὰρ τίνες νικῶσιν) έτοι καὶ τόν εύ τό βιόν καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν Οἱ ΠΡΑΤΤΟΝΤΕΣ ΟΡΘΩΣ ένέργοις γίγνονται.

For as in the Olympic Games, not those are crowned, who are handsomest and strongest, but those who combat and contend, (for it is from among these come the Victors;) so, with respect to things laudable and good in human Life, it is the right Actors only that attain the Possession of them. Nay, so much did this Philosopher make Happiness depend on right Action, that tho' he required some Portion of Externals to that Felicity, which he held supreme; yet still it was Honour and Virtue which were its principal Ingredients. Thus speaking of the Calamities and external Casualties of Life, which he confesses to be Impediments to a Happiness perfectly complete, he adds—ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τέτοιοι δια-κάμπει τὸ καλὸν, ἔπειτ' ἄρη τις ἐνυπόλος πολλᾶς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας, μὴ δὲ ἀναλυσίαν, ἀλλ' γεν-νάδας ἃν καὶ μεγαλόπρεπον. 'Ει δ' ἐίσιν δὲ ἐνέργειας κύριαι τῆς ζωῆς, καθάπερ ἐστομέν, ἐδέεις ἃν γένοιο τῶν μοχαιρίων ὡθεῖς; ἐδέπολε γὰρ σφάξει τὰ μισθαλ καὶ φαῦδα. Τόν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἐμφρόνα πά-ςας διόμεθα τὰς τύχας ἐνυποκόμων φέρειν, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αἰστικὰ πράξεων καθάπερ καὶ πρὸ—
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As for Epicurus, tho' he was an Advocate for Pleasure, yet so high was his Opinion of a wise and right Conduct, that he thought rational Adversity better than irrational Prosperity. See Dial. p. 197. Hence too he represented that Pleasure, which he esteemed our Sovereign Happiness, to be as inseparable from Virtue, as Virtue was from that. 

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It is impossible to live pleasurably, without living prudently, and honourably, and justly; or to live prudently and honourably and justly without living pleasurably. Epic. in Laert. l. 10. f. 132.

To conclude the whole, our Countryman Thomas Hobbes, though he professedly explodes all this Doctrine concerning Ends, yet seems insensibly to have established an End himself, and to have founded it (like others) in a certain ENERGY or ACTION. For thus it is he informs us, in his Treatise called Human Nature, that there can be no CONTENTMENT, but in PROCEEDING; and that FELICITY consists, not in HAVING—but in PROSPERING. And again, some time after, having admitted the Comparison of Human Life to a Race, he immediately subjoins—But this Race we must suppose to have no other GOAL, nor other GARLAND, but being FOREMOST and IN IT.

And thus much as to the concurring Sentiments of Philosophers on the Subject of Ends, here treated.

Note XLVII. p. 208.—Yet it in no manner takes away the Difference and Distinction of other things.]

Cum enim virtutis hoc proprium sit, earum rerum quae secundum natum sint, habere delictum; qui omnia sive exaequaverunt, ut in utramque partem ita paria redderent, uti nullâ selecione uterentur, virtutem ipsam sylulerunt. Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 4. p. 207.

Quid autem apertius, quam, si selectio nulla sit ab iis rebus, quae contra naturam sint, earum rerum quae sint secundum naturam, tollatur omnis ca, quae quaeratur
NOTES on TREATISE the Third.


Deinceps explicatur differentia rerum: quam si non-ullam esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristote; nec ullum sapientiae munus aut opus invenire-tur, cum inter eas res, quae ad vitam degendam pertine- rent, nihil omnino interesse; neque ullum deleatum haberu oporteret. Itaque cum esse satis constitutum, id solum esse bonum quod esse honestum, & id malum solum quod turpe; tum inter haec & illa, quae nihil valerent ad beate misere-reve vivendum, aliquid tamen, quo different, esse volvere-runt, ut essent eorum alia aestimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum. Ibid. I. 3. c. 15. p. 246.


Note XLVIII. p. 208. It suppresses no social and natural Affections, &c.] As much has been said concerning the Stoic APATHY, or Insensibility with respect to Passion, it may not be improper to inquire, what were their real Sentiments on this Subject.

Πάθος, which we usually render a Passion, is always rendered by Cicero, when speaking as a Stoic, Perturbatio, a Perturbation. As such therefore in the first place we say it ought always to be treated.

The Definition of the Term Πάθος, as given by these Philosophers, was ὅμως άποφασίζω, translated by Cicero, Appetitus vehementior. Tusc. I. 4. c. 9. p. 273. Now this Definition may be more easily
easily explained, if we first inquire, what they meant by ὑπον. Ὑπον they defined to be ὑπὸν ὑπον ἐστιν, a Tendency or Motion of the Soul toward something. Stob. Ecl. Ethic. p. 175. A πάθος therefore, or Perturbation, must have been, according to their Definition, a Tendency or Motion of the Soul, which was excessive and beyond Bounds. Stobæus, from whom this Definition is taken, in commenting upon it observes, ὧν λέγει περιπατεῖ ηλεονάζειν, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ ἐν περιπατήσας ἕσοσ· ὧν γὰρ δυνάμει, μᾶλλον δ' ἐνεργεία. that Zeno (its Author) does not call a Πάθος, something capable by Nature to pass into Excess, but something actually in Excess already, as having its Essence, not in mere Capacity, but in Actuality. Ecl. Eth. p. 159.

There is another Definition of the same Term, which makes it to be ἡ ἀλογον καὶ ἂρα φυσιν ὑπον ἐστι, a Motion of the Soul, irrational and contrary to Nature. D. Laert. 1. 7. s. 110. Andronicus Rhodius adds, to this latter Definition, the Words, δι' ὑπον ἂναὶ ὡς ἂν ἀκαθή, from the Opinion of something Good or Evil. Περὶ Πάθος. p. 523. So that its whole Idea is as follows. A Perturbation, or Stoic Passion, is a Motion of the Soul, irrational and contrary to Nature, arising from the Opinion of something Good or Evil. These last Words, founding the Πάθος, or Perturbation on Opinion, correspond to what Cicero says, where he gives it as the Sentiment of the Stoic Philosophers, omnes perturbationes judicio fieri & opinione, Tusc. 1. 4. c. 7. p. 276. Laertius informs us, that they even made the Perturbations themselves to be Judgments. Δοκεὶ δὲ ἄλοις τὰ πάθη μείζον ἐνα. Laert. 1. 7. s. 111. He subjoins an Instance to illustrate. Ἡτε γὰρ φιλαργυρεῖα ὑπόλυπες ἐστὶν τῷ τὸ ἀργύρῳ.
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γιόραν καλὸν εἶναι. For thus (says he) the Love of Money is the Judgment or Opinion, that Money is a thing good and excellent. Plutarch records the same Sentiment of theirs, in a fuller and more ample manner. Πάθος — λόγος σομηρός καὶ ἀκόλουθος, εĩ ἰδέας καὶ διαμαρμαρίζως κρίσεως σφοδράται καὶ ρώμαν προσκαλεῖν. A Perturbation is a vitious and intemperate Reasoning, which assumes Vehemence and Strength from bad and erroneous Judgment. Mor. p. 441. D.

To these Testimonies may be added that of Themistius. —καὶ ὃν καίοις οἱ ἀπό Ζηνώνος, τὰ παθῶ τῆς ἀθροπτινῆς ψυχῆς τῇ λόγῳ διασφορᾶς εἶναι τιθέμενοι, καὶ λόγῃ κρίσεις ἡμαρμαρίζως. Themist. Paraph. in Aristot. de Animâ, L. 3. p. 90. b. Edit. Aldinae.

The Substance of what is said above, seems to amount to this; that Πάθος, in a Stoic Sense, implied a Perturbation, and not a Passion, and that such Perturbation meant an irrational and violent Motion of the Soul, founded on Opinion or Judgment, which was erroneous and faulty.

Now from hence it follows, that the Man of perfect Character (according to their Hypothesis) must of necessity be ἀπαθής, Apathetic, or void of Perturbation. For such a Character, as has been shewn, implies perfect Rectitude of Conduct. But perfect Rectitude of Conduct implies perfect Rectitude of Judgment; and such Rectitude of Judgment excludes all Error and wrong Judgment: But if Error and wrong Judgment, then Perturbation of consequence, which they suppose to be derived from thence alone.

That this was the Sense, in which they understood Apathy, we have their own Authority, as
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given us by Laertius. Φασὶ δὲ καὶ ἀπαθὴ εἶναι τῶν σοφῶν, διὰ τὸ ἀνεμπθόλου εἶναι. Laert. 1. 7. p. 117. They say the wife Man is apathetic, by being superior to Error—by being superior to ERROR, if they may be credited themselves; not, as for the most part we absurdly imagine, by being superior to all Sense, and Feeling, and Affection. The Sentence immediately following the foregoing, looks as if these Philosophers had foreseen, how likely they were to be misunderstood. Εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἄλλον ἀπαθὴ τὸν φαιλον, ἐν ἵπτι λεγόμενον τῷ σκληρῷ καὶ ἀτρέψῳ—There is also another Sort of Apathetic Man, who is bad; who is the same in Character, as the hard and inflexible. To the same Purpose Epictetus. Ὄν δὲ γὰρ μὲ εἶναι ἀπαθὴν, ὡς ἀνδρῶνα, ἄλλα τὰς σχέσεις χρείαν τὰς φυσικὰς καὶ ἐπιθέτας, ὡς ἐνσεβής, ὡς ὑδόν, ὡς ἀθερδον, ὡς παιέρα, ὡς πολιτιν. For I AM NOT TO BE APATHETIC, LIKE A STATUE, but I am withal to observe Relations, both the natural and adventitious; as the Man of Religion, as the Son, as the Brother, as the Father, as the Citizen. Arr. Epict. l. 3. c. 2. p. 359.

Immediately before this, he tells us in the same Chapter, Πάθη γὰρ ἄλλως ἢ γινεῖαι, εἰ μὴ ὀφέξεως ἀπολυγχανάσθαι, ἢ ἐναλίσθης περιπταλάσθαι, that a Perturbation in no other way ever arises, but either when a Desire is frustrated, or an Aversion falls into that which it would avoid. Where it is observável, that he does not make either Desire or Aversion, Πάθη, or Perturbations, but only the Cause of Perturbations, when erroneously conducted.

Agreeably to this, in the second Chapter of the Enchiridion, we meet with Precepts about the Conduct
Conduct and Management of these two Affections—-
Not a word is said about lopping off either; on the contrary, Aversion we are directed how to employ immediately, and Desire we are only ordered to suspend for the present, because we want a proper Subject of fit excellence to excite it.

To this may be added, what the same Philosopher speaks, in his own Person, concerning himself. Arr. Epist. l. i. c. 21. 'Εγώ μὲν ἀφικάμα, ἂν ὀφέγγομεν καὶ ἐκκλίνω καὶ λᾶ ὕσσω—-I, for my part, am satisfied and contented, if I can desire and avoid agreeably to Nature. He did not remain it seems dissatisfied, till he had eradicated these Affections; but he was satisfied in reducing them to their natural Use.

In Laertius we read recorded for a Stoic Sentiment, that as the vicious Man had his πάθος, or Perturbations; so opposed to these, had the Virtuous his Εὐπαθεία, his Eupathies or Well feelings, translated by Cicero Constantia. The three chief of these were Βάλεν, Will, defined ὀρθής Εὐλογίς, rational Desire; Εὐλαθεία, Caution, defined Ἐκκλίνας Εὐλογίς, rational Aversion; and Χαρά, Joy, defined ἱπατίης Εὐλογίς, rational Exultation. To these three principal Eupathies belonged many subordinate Species; such as Εὐνυχίη, ἀγάπης ἡμίν, ἀρετής, τέλεια, ἐνφροσύνη, ἐυμυθία, &c. See Laer. l. 7. l. 115, 116. Andron. Rhod. ἔρι πάθων. Cic. Tusc. l. 4. c. 6.

Cicero makes Cato, under the Character of a Stoic, and in explaining their System, use the following expressions. Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur, intelligi natura fieri, ut liberi a parentibus amentur; a quo
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quo initio profectam communem humani generis societatem persequuntur. De Fin. 1. 3. c. 19. The same Sentiment of the Stoics is recorded by Laertius. Φάστος δέ (ὅς Σταύριος) καὶ τὴν αὐτὸς τὰ τέκνα φιλοσοφίαν φυσικὴν εἶναι ἄνθρωπος—They say Parental Affection is natural to them. l. 7. f. 120.

AGAIN, soon after, in the same Treatise de Finibus. Quodque nemo in summa solitudine vitam agere velit, ne cum infinita quidem voluptatum abundantia; facile intelligitur, nos ad conjunctionem congregationemque hominum, & ad naturalem communitatem esse natos. So Laertius. "Αλλὰ μὲν ὡς ἐν ἐρημίᾳ (φαστος), βιώνειν ος σπαθάριος: κοινωνίκος γὰρ φύτει, καὶ πραξικός. The virtuous Man (say they, the Stoics) will never be for living in Solitude; for he is by Nature social, and formed for Action, l. 7. l. 123.

AGAIN, Cicero, in the above-cited Treatise. Cum autem ad tuendos conservandosque homines hominem natum esse videamus: consentaneum est huic naturae, ut sapiens velit gerere, & administrare rempublicam; atque ut e natura vivat, uxorem adjungere, & velle ex ea liberos. Ne amores quidem sanétos a sapiente aliens esse arbitrantur—Ut vero conservetur omnis hominergo hominem societatis, conjunctioni, caritas; & emolumenta & detrimenta—communia esse voluerunt. De Fin. l. 3. c. 20, 21.

In Epictetus the leading Duties, or moral Offices of Man, are enumerated as follows. Πολιτεύεσθαι, γαμεῖν, παιδοφοιτεῖσθαι, θεών σέβειν, γονέων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καβόλα ἄφηγεσθαι, ἐκπλάνειν, ὀρμᾶν, ἀφορμᾶ, ὡς ἐκατον τέτων
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The fame Sentiments may be found repeated both in Stobæus and Laertius.

I shall only add one more Sentiment of these Philosophers, and that is concerning Friendship. Λέγουσι δὲ καὶ τὴν φίλιαν ἐν μόνοις τοῖς σπουδαίοις εἶναι—They say that Friendship exists among the Virtuous only. Laert. l. 7. f. 124.

The Sum of these Quotations appears to be this; that the Stoics, in the Character of their virtuous Man, included rational Desire, Aversion, and Exultation; included Love and parental Affection; Friendship, and a general Charity or Benevolence to all Man-kind; that they considered it as a Duty, arising from our very Nature, not to neglect the Welfare of public Society, but to be ever ready, according to our Rank, to act either the Magistrate or the private Citizen; that their Apathy was no more than a Freedom from Perturbation, from irrational and excessive Agitations of the Soul; and consequently that the strange Apathy, commonly laid to their Charge, and in the demolishing of which there have been so many Triumphs, was an imaginary Apathy, for which they were no way accountable.

Note XLIX. p. 209. It rejects no Gain, not inconsistent with Justice.] The Stoics were so far from rejecting Wealth, when acquired fairly, that they allowed their perfect Man, for the sake of enriching himself, to frequent the Courts of Kings, and teach Philosophy for a Stipend. Thus Plutarch from a Treatise of Chrysippus—Τον μὲν σοφὸν
So likewise the Stoic Hecato, in his Treatise of Offices, as quoted by Cicero, Sapientis esse, nihil contra mores, leges, instituta facientem, habere rationem rei familiaris. Neque enim solum nobis divites esse volumus, sed liberis, propinquis, amicis, maximeque reipublicae. Singulorum enim facultates & copia, divitiae sunt civitatis. De Offic. l. 3. c. 15.

Note L. p. 206—Universally as far as Virtue neither forbids nor dissuades, it endeavours to render Life, even in the most vulgar Acceptation, as chearful, joyous, and easy as possible.] Etenim quod summum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, Convenienter naturæ vivere, id habet hanc (ut opinor) sententiam, Cum virtute congruere semper: caetera autem, quæ secundum naturam effent, ita legere, si ea virtuti non repugnavent. Cic. de Offic. l. 3. c. 3.

Alexander Aphrodisiensis, speaking of the Stoic Doctrine concerning the external Conveniencies, and common Utilities of Life, delivers their Sentiment in the following Words—-αλλα και δια καθι-μένων ἀφενς τε σὺν τέτοις καὶ ἀφενς μόνης, μηδέποτ' ἄν τον σοφὸν τὴν ηεχαριστείνην ἔλεσθαι, εἰ ἐν αὐτῷ δυναλον τὴν μείλα τῶν ἄλλων λαβεῖν. Supposing there lay Virtue on the one side, attended with these Externals, and Virtue on the other side, alone by herself, the wife Man would never choose that Virtue, which was destitute and single, if it was in his Power to obtain that other, which
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which was accompanied with these Advantages. Πετοιον, p. 157.

Note LI. p. 209.—Nay, could it mend the Condition of Existence—by adding to the amallest Possessions the poorest, meanest Utensil, it would in no degree contemn, &c.]—Si ad illam vitam, quàcum virtute degatur, ampulla aut strigilis accedat, sumpturum sapientem eam vitam potius, cui hæc adjeta sint.—De Fin. 1. 4. c. 12. p. 300.

Note LII. p. 210.—Could it indeed choose its own Life, it would be always that, where most social Affections might be exerted, &c.] Itemque magis est secundum naturam, pro omnibus gentibus (si fieri possit) conservandis aut juvenidis maximos labores molestiasque suscipere, imitantem Herculem illum, quem hominum fama, beneficiornmemor, in concilio caelestium conlocavit, quam vivere in solitudine, non modo sine ullis molestis, sed etiam in maximis voluptatibus, abundantem omnibus copiis; ut excellas etiam pulcheritudine & viribus. Quocirca optimo quisque & splendidissimo ingenio longe illam vitam huic anteponit. Cic. de Offic. 1. 3. c. 5.

Note LIII. p. ibid.—It teaches us to consider Life, as one great important Drama, where, &c.] Thus Aristo the Chian—Ειπω γάρ ὁμοίως τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὑπομενή τὸν σοφὸν ὅς ὡς ὢδα Θεσίτε αἰτὶ Ἀγαμέμνον· πρῶτος ἄναλάθη ἑώρασεν ὑπομενήλαθ ὀργνικότατος. The wife Man is like the good Actor; who whether he assume the Character of Thersites or Agamemnon,
memnon, acts either of the two Parts with a becoming Propriety. D. Laert. l. 7. s. 160.

This Comparison of Life to a Drama or Stage-play, seems to have been a Comparison much approved by Authors of Antiquity. See Epicl. Enchi-rird. c.17. and the Notes of the late learned Editor Mr. Upton. See also M. Anton. l. 12. s. 36. and the Notes of Gataker. Plat. Gorg. p. 512. T. i. Ed. Serr.

Note LIV. p. 211.—It accepts all the Joys derived from their Success, &c. It fixes not, like the many, its Happiness on Success alone, &c.] One of the wisest Rules that ever was, with respect to the Enjoyment of External good Fortune, is that delivered by Epicletus; to enjoy it, ὡς δέδολαι, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον δέδολαι, in such manner as it is given, and for such Time as it is given, remembering that neither of these Conditions we have the Power to command. See Arr. Epicl. l. 4. c. i. p. 556. See also p. 573. of the same.

Note LV. Ibid. On the contrary, when this happens, it is then it retires into itself, and reflecting on what is fair, what is laudable, &c.] See before, p. 322. ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τάταις διαλάμπει, &c.

Note LVI. p. 212. All Men pursue Good, &c.] This is a Principle adopted by all the Stoics, and inculcated thro' every part of the Dissertations of Epicletus. Take an example or two out of many. Φύσις ὡς αὐτῇ πανίδος, τὸ διάσισέν ὁ ἁγαθὸν, φένειν τὸ μακόν—τὸ γὰρ ἁγαθὸν πιθανεῖτερον ἢ δὲν. It is the Nature
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Nature of every one to pursue Good, and fly Evil—
for nothing is more intimately allied to us than Good.
Arr. Epict. l. 4. c. 5. p. 606. Again, l. 2. c. 22.
p. 313. Πάν ζῶν ἐκεῖν ὦτος ὑπέιθεν, ὡς τῷ ἰδίῳ
συμφέρον. To nothing is every Animal so intimately
allied, as to its own peculiar Welfare, and In-
terest.

So Cicero. Omnes enim expetimus utilitatem,
ad eamque rapinur, nec facere aliter ullo modo possimus.
Edit. Serr. ibid. p. 499. E.

Note LVII. p. 213.—All derived from
Externals must fluctuate, as they fluc-
tuate.] See before, p. 126, 130, 133.

Note LVIII. Ibid.—When we place the
Sovereign Good in Mind.—] Dæmon or
Genius means every Man’s particular Mind, and
Reasoning Faculty. Δαιμών—砵τος ὃ ἑτὶ ἐκ
ἐκάσθε νὰ ὁν ὤνγο. M. Anton. l. 5. p. 27. Ge-
nium esse unius iniquisque animum rationalem; & ideo esse
singsulos singulorum—Varro in Fragram. It is from this
Interpretation of Genius, that the Word, which in
Greek expresses Happiness, is elegantly etymolo-
gized to mean A Goodness of Genius or Mind.
Ἐνθαμονία ὃ ἑτὶ δαιμων ἐγκάθος. M. Anton. l. 7. l. 17.
See Gataker on the Place. The Sentiment came
originally from the old Academics. See before, page
321.

Note LIX. p. 214.—Behold the true
and perfect Man: that Ornament, &c.
Quam gravis vero, quam magnifica, quam constans con-
sicitur
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ficitur persona sapientis? Quis, cum ratio docuerit, quod honestum est, id esse solum bonum, semper sit necessarius est beatus, vereque omnia ista nomina possident, quae inriderint ab imperitis solent. Rectius enim appellabitur rex; quam Tarquenius, qui nec se nec suas regere potuit: rectius magister populi, &c. Cic. de Fin. 1. 3. c. 22. p. 269. Ergo hic, quisquis est, qui moderatione & constantia quietus animo est, sibi ipse placatus; ut nec tabescat molestius, nec frangatur timore, nec sit tener quid expetens ardeat desiderio, nec alacritate solidi gestiens deliquescat; is est sapiens, quem quaerimus, is est beatus: cui nihil humanarum rerum aut intolerabile ad demittendum animum, aut nimis labile ad esferendum videri potest. Quid enim videatur ei magnum, &c. Tusc. Disp. 1. 4. c. 17. p. 298.

Note LX. p. 215.—Would not your system in such a case a little border upon the Chimerical? &c.] Chrysippus seems to have been sensible of this, if we may judge from a Passage of his, preferred in Plutarch. Dio καὶ διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἥτε μεγέθες καὶ τὴν κάλλιο, πολυσπάσαν δοθέων ὁμοίως λέγειν, καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὴν ἄνθρωπιν φύσιν. For this reason, thro’ the excessive Greatness and Beauty of what we assert, we appear to say things which look like Fictions, and not such as are suitable to Man and Human Nature. Mor. 1041. F.

Note LXI. p. 216.—In antient Days, when Greece, &c.] See Cic. de Invent. 1. 2. c. 1. See also Maximus Tyrius, Disp. 23. p. 277. of the late Quarto Edition; and Xenoph. Memor. 1. 3. c. 10.
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Note LXII. p. 219. — No where in any particular Nature is the perfect Character to be seen intire.] The Stoics themselves acknowledged, as we learn from Clemens of Alexandria, that their ὁ σοφὸς, or Perfect Man, was difficult to be found to an exceeding great degree; δυσευγετῶν ἄνω σφόδρα. Strom. p. 348. Sextus Empiricus gives it as their Opinion, that they had never as yet found him, μέχρι ταῦτα νυν ἀνευγετῶν ὁ λόγος καὶ ἀυθα μὴ σφόδρα. Adv. Phyf. p. 582. Edit. Lipsienf.

What Sextus says, seems to be confirmed by Cicero, who, speaking in his Offices the Language of a Stoic, has the following Expressions. Nec vero, cum duo Decii, aut duo Scipiones, fortes viri commemorantur, aut cum Fabricius Aristides ete justi nominantur; aut ab illis fortitudinis, aut ab his jusstitiae, tanquam a Sapientibus, petitur exemplum. Nemo enim horum sic Sapiens est, ut Sapientem volumus intelligi. Nec ii, qui sapientes habitu sunt, & nominati, M. Cato & C. Laelius, sapientes fuerunt; ne illi quidem septem: sed ex medio et officiorum frequentia similitudinem quandam gerebant, speciemque sapientum. De Offic. l. 3. c. 4. Again, in his Laelius, speaking of the same consummate Wisdom, he calls it, Sapientia quam adhuc mortalis nemo est consecutus.

So too Quintilian. Quod si defuit his viris summa virtus, sic quarentibus, an oratores fuerint, respondebatur, quo modo Stoici, si interrogentur, an Sapiens Zeno, an Cleanthes, an Chrysippus, respondent; magnos quidem illos ac venerabiles; non tamen id, quod natura bo-

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minis
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So likewise Seneca: Scis, quem nunc bonum virum dicam? Hujus secundae notae. Nam ille alter for-tasse, tanquam phænix, semel anno quingentesimo nascitur. Epist. 42.

Note LXIII. p. 219.—I MIGHT INFORM YOU OF THE NATURAL Pre-EMINENCE, AND HIGH RANK OF SPECIFIC IDEAS.] See Cicero in his Orator, near the Beginning. Sed ego si statuo, nihil esse in ullo genere tam pulchrum, quo non, &c. &c. See also the Verses of Boethius before cited, Note XVII. p. 295.

Note LXIV. p. 220, 221.—AN EXEMPLAR OF IMITATION, WHICH THO' NONE WE THINK CAN EQUAL; YET ALL AT LEAST MAY FOLLOW—AN EXEMPLAR, &c.] Seneca gives it as a general Confession of the greatest Philosophers, that the Doctrine they taught, was not quemadmodum ipsi vivérent, sed quemadmodum vivendum esset. De vita beátâ, c. 18.

There appears indeed to be one common Reasoning with respect to all Models, Exem-pIars, Standards, Correctors, whatever we call them, and whatever the Subjects, which they are destined to adjust. According to this Reasoning, if a Standard be less perfect than the Subject to be adjusted, such Adjusting (if it may be so called) becomes a Detriment. If it be but equally perfect, then
is the Adjusting superfluous. It remains therefore that it must be more perfect, and that to any Transcendence, any Accuracy conceivable. For suppose a Standard as highly accurate, as can be imagined. If the Subjects to be adjusted have a Nature suitable, then will they arrive, by such Standard, to a degree of Perfection, which thro' a Standard less accurate they could never possibly attain. On the contrary, if the Subjects be not so far capable, the Accuracy of the Standard will never be a hindrance, why they should not become as perfect, as their Nature will admit.

It seems to have been from some Sentiments of this kind, that the Stoics adorned their ὑσφός, or perfect Character, with Attributes so far superior to ordinary Humanity. Ἐκεῖνος ὁ ἄδικος, ἐκεῖνος ἀπροσδεσθης, ἐκεῖνος ἀδιάφορος μακάριος, τέλειος — 'Twas he was fortunate; 'twas he was above want; 'twas he was self-sufficient, and happy, and perfect. Plutarch. Mor. 1068. B. See Note LXII.

Some Philosophers have gone so far, as not to rest satisfied with the most perfect Idea of Humanity, but to substitute for our Exemplar, even the supreme Being, God Himself. Thus Plato, in his Theatetus, makes the great Object of our endeavours, to be ὑμένων τῷ θεῷ καθ' ὑπὸ δυνατῶν, the becoming like to God, as far as in our power. He immediately explains, what this resemblance is. Ὡμόμοιος δὲ, δι-ναίον καὶ ὅσιον μεθ' ἣφονῆσεος γενέσθαι. It is the becoming just and holy, along with Wisdom or Prudence. Plat. tom. 1. p. 176. Edit. Serrani. See this Sentiment explained by Ammonius, in V. Voces Porph. p. 5. See also Aristotle's Ethics, L. 10. C. 8. p. 465.
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**The Gospel appears to favour the same Hypothesis.** Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in Heaven is perfect. Matt. v. 48.

What has been above said, will be, it is hoped, a sufficient Apology for the Transcendence of the Character described in the Dialogue.

**Note LXV. p. 221. The Proficiency of Socrates—was sufficient to convince us—that some Progress, &c.] See Diog. Laert. l. 7. c. 91. p. 420. Τευμήριον δὲ τὸ ὑπαρκτὶν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν—τὸ γενέσθαι εἰς προκοπὴν τὸς σεσί Σωκράτην, καὶ Διογένην, &c.

**Note LXVI. p. Ibid.—Nor was the Prize, as usual, reserved only to the first; but all, who run, might depend upon a Reward, having, &c.] Verum ut transeundi sēs non sit, magna tamen est dignitas subsequendi. Quinœt. Inf. l. 12. c. 11. p. 760. Exigo itaque a me, non ut optimis par sim, sed ut malis melior. Senec. de Vitâ beatâ, c. 17. Όοδε γὰρ Μιλὸν ἔσομαι, καὶ ὅμως ἐν ἀμελῳ τῇ σώματι· ἔδε Κροῖς, καὶ ὅμως ἐν ἀμελῳ τῆς ἡπτεώς· ἔδε ἀπλαξίς ἅλλα τινὸς τῆς ἐπιμελείας, διὰ τὴν ἀπόγνωσιν τῶν ἁπρον, ἀφισάμεθα. For neither shall I be Milo, and yet I neglect not my Body; nor Croesus, and yet I neglect not my Estate; nor in general do we desist from the proper Care of any thing, thro' Despair of arriving at that which is supreme. Arr. Epict. l. 1. c. 2. See also Horat. Epist. l. 1. v. 28, &c.

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Note LXVII. p. 225.—This whole Universe—is one City or Commonwealth—]
'O κόσμος- ἔτει- μία ἑων ἐσι—Arr. Epicl. 1. 3. c. 24. p. 486. This was a Stoic Doctrine, of which Epicletus and the Emperor Marcus make perpetual mention. See of the last, l. 12. f. 36.

So Cicero, Universus hic mundus una civitas communis Deorum atque hominum existentiandus. De Legg. l. 1. c. 7. p. 29. See De Fin. l. 3. c. 19. De Nat, Deor. l. 2. c. 62.

Note LXVIII. p. 227.—Hence the Mind truly wise, quitting the Study of Particulars, &c.] The Platonics, considering Science as something ascertained, definite, and steady, would admit nothing to be its Object, which was vague, infinite, and passing. For this reason they excluded all Individuals, or Objects of Sense, and (as Ammonius expresses it,) raised themselves, in their Contemplations, from Beings particular to Beings universal, and which as such, from their own Nature, were eternal and definite. The whole Passage is worth transcribing. 'Εἰς ἡν ὁ πολιτικός, νῦσις πᾶσιν τῶν ὁνῶν ἡ ὁμοίματι εἰς. Ἐξήνθεαν ἦν οἱ φιλόσοφοι, τό τιν, ἄν τρόπον γένοιτο τῶν ὁνῶν ἐπιστήμων, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἑώραν τὰ καλὰ μέρος γεννικὰ καὶ φαρδὰ ὀνα, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἀπειρα, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη καίδιως καὶ πεπερασμένων ἐτὶ γνώσις (τὸ γὰρ γνωσὶν βασιλέα ὑπὸ τῆς γνώσεως περισσεάνοντας· τὸ δὲ ἀπειρον ἀπεριπληκτὸν) ἀναγαγὸν ἑκατὸς ἀπὸ τῶν μερίκων ἑτὶ τὰ καθὼς, καὶ ὁμοία ὁμοία καὶ πεπερασμένα. Ὡς γὰρ φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, Ἐπιστήμη εἰς ἡνια, ἡφαίτο τὸ εἰς Ἐπίδασιν ἵμας καὶ ὄρον τῶν.
Consonant to this, we learn it was the Advice of Plato, with respect to the Progress of our Speculations and Inquiries, when we proceed Synthetically, that is to say, from first Principles downwards, that we should descend from those higher Genera, which include many subordinate Species, down to the lowest Rank of Species, those which include only Individuals. But here it was his Opinion, that our Inquiries should stop, and, as to Individuals, let them wholly alone; because of these there could not possibly be any Science. 

Such was the Method of antient Philosophy. The Fashion at present appears to be somewhat altered, and the Business of Philosophers to be little else, than the collecting from every Quarter, into voluminous Records, an infinite Number of sensible, particular, and unconnected Facts, the chief Effect of which is to excite our Admiration. So that if that well-known Saying of Antiquity be true, it was Wonder which induced Men first to philosophize, we may say that Philosophy now ends, whence originally it began.

Note LX IX. p. 228.—A Faculty, which recognizing both itself, and all things else, becomes a Canon, a Corrector, and a Standard universal.] See before, p. 162.
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In Epicletus, l. i. c. i. p. 6. the Δύναμις λογική or reasoning Power, is called the Power ή και ἀυτὴν Θεωρεῖσα, καὶ τ' ἄλλα αἰτία. So Marcus—Τὰ ἑνδυνάμις λογικῆς δύναμιν ἐκαθαιρεῖ, ἐναὐτὴν διαφθραῖ, &c. The Properties of the reasoning Soul are, it beholdest itself; it formeth itself, &c. l. ii. c. i. So again Epicletus,—υπὲρ μὲν τὲ ὀργὴ καὶ ἀκέραι, καὶ τὴν Δίκη υπὲρ ἀυτὴ τί ἦν, καὶ τῶν συνεργῶν περὶ ἀυτὸ, υπὲρ κατόπων ἐνιαυτὸν, υπὸ τά ὀνόματα ἐνχαίρει τῷ Θεῷ μὲν μέιμον δ' ὦτι ἀλλὰ τι σοι δέδωκεν κρείττων ἀπάντων τέτοιον, τὸ χρησάμενον ἀυτὸ, τὸ δοκιμάζων, τὸ τὴν ἄξιαν ἐναυτόν λογικώς. For seeing, for hearing, and indeed for Life itself, and the various Means which co-operate to its Support; for the Fruits of the Earth, for Wine and Oil, for all these Things be thankful to God: yet be mindful that he hath given thee something else, which is better than all these; something which is to use them, to prove them, to compute the Value of each. Arr. Epiclt. l. 2. c. 23. p. 321.

Note LXX. p. 228.—That Master-Science, of what they are, where they are, and the End to which, &c.] See Arr. Epiclt. l. 2. c. 24. p. 337.—See also l. 1. c. 6. p. 36. and Pers. Satyr. 3. v. 66.

Note LXXI. Ibid.—And never wretchedly degrade themselves into Natures to them subordinate.] See Arr. Epiclt. l. 1. c. 3. p. 21. Διὰ τάτη τὴν συγγένειαν, οἱ μὲν ἄποκλινοντες, λόγους ὃμως γινόμεθα, ἀπητικοὶ οἳ ἐπιλέχοι καὶ βλασφεροὶ οἱ δὲ λέεις, ἀγριοὶ καὶ θημιώδεις καὶ ἀνήμεροι: οἱ πλείους δ' ἡμῶν ἀλώπτεκες, &c. Thro' this Z 4 Affinity
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Affinity (he means our Affinity to the Body, or baser Part) some of us, degenerating, become like Wolves, faithless, and treacherous, and mischievous; others, like Lions, fierce, and savage, and wild; but the greater Part turn Foxes, little, fraudulent, wretched Animals. Cum autem duobus modis id est, aut vi aut fraude, fiat injuria; fraus, quasi vulpecula, vis, lesnis videtur. Cic. de Offic. l. i. c. 19. See also Arr. Epicl. l. 2. 9. p. 210. In our own Language we seem to allude to this Degeneracy of Human Nature, when we call Men, by way of reproach, Sheepish, Bearish, Hogish, Ravenous, &c.

Note LXXII. p. 229.—That Reason, of which our own is but a Particle, or Spark, &c.]—αι ψυχαι μεν οτις εισιν ευδεδεμέναι και συναφεῖς τῷ θεῷ, ατε αυτῆ μόρια δοσιν, και αποσπάσματα.—Arr. Epicl. l. 1. c. 14. p. 81.—ο δειμων, ον εικάσω παροικιν και ιγνεμόναι ο Ζεὺς εδωκεν, απόσπασμα ισαυτη. ετθε δε εστιν ο εικάσω νυς και λογοθε. Mar. Ant. l. 5. l. 27. Humanus autem animus, scripturn ex mente divinum, cum nullo alio nisi cum ipso Deo (si hoc fas est dictu) comparari potest. Tusc. Disp. l. 5. c. 13. p. 371.

Note LXXIII. Ibid.—Fit Actors in that general Drama, where thou hast allotted every being, great and small, its proper Part, &c.] See before p. 210. and Note l III. See also Arr. Epicl. l. 3. c. 22. p. 444.—Συν ημιθει διωνασαι, &c. The Passage is sublime and great, but too long to be here inserted.

Note
Note LXXIV. p. 230.—Enable us to curb Desire, &c. Enable us even to suspend it, &c. Be our first Work to have escaped, &c. 'Απόσχιστε παλαιότατον όρεξεως: οὐκ ουτέ καὶ εὐρόγως φρεσκής. Abstain for a time from Desire altogether, that in time thou mayst be able to desire rationally. Arr. Epict. l. 3. c. 13. p. 414. Again the same Author — Σῆμερον—ορεξεῖ όυκ ἐκφήσαμεν, εἰκισθείς ξέρος μόνα τὰ φρουρεῖνα. — To day my Faculty of Desire I have not used at all; my Aversion I have employed with respect only to things, which are in my power. l. 4. c. 4. p. 588. See also Enchir. c. 2. and Charad. V. III. p. 202. Plat. Gorg. p. 505. B. Tom. 1. Edit. Serr. ἔρει δὲ φυγήν——

Horace seems also to have alluded to this Doctrine:

Virtus est, vitium fugere; & sapientia prima, Stultitia caruiisse——Epist. i. l. i. v. 41.


Note LXXVII. p. 231.—Teach us each to regard himself, but as a part of this
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this great Whole; a Part, &c.] Πῶς ἢ λέγεται τῶν ἐκτὸς των καλὰ φύσεω, &c. In what Sense then (says the Philosopher, since all is referable to one universal Providence) are some things called agreeable to our Nature, and others the contrary? The Answer is, They are so called, by considering ourselves as detached, and separate from the Whole. For thus may I say of the Foot, when considered so apart, that it is agreeable to its Nature, to be clean and free from Filth. But if we consider it as a Foot, that is, as something not detached, but the Member of a Body, it will behoove it both to pass into the Dirt, and to trample upon Thorns, and even upon occasion to be lopped off, for the Preservation of the Whole. Were not this the case, it would be no longer a Foot. Something therefore of this kind should we conceive with respect to ourselves.—What art thou? A Man. If thou consider thy Being as something separate and detached, it is agreeable to thy Nature, in this View of Independence, to live to extreme Age, to be rich, to be healthy. But if thou consider thyself as a Man, and as the Member of a certain Whole; for the sake of that Whole, it will occasionally behoove thee, at one while to be sick, at another while to fail and risque the Perils of Navigation, at another while to be in want, and at last to die perhaps before thy time. Why therefore dost thou bear those Events impatiently? Knowest thou not, that after the same manner as the Foot ceaseth to be a Foot, so dost thou too cease to be longer a Man? Arr. Epict. 1. 2. c. 5. p. 191.

Note LXXVIII. p. 231.—In as much as Futurity, &c.] Μέχρις ἂν ἀδύνα μοι ἢ τὰ ἔξω, ἀεὶ τῶν εὐφυείσων ἔχομαι, ἀρὸς τὸ τυχάνειν τῶν καλὰ φύσεων.
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φίλων* ἀντίς γὰρ μ' ὁ θεὸς τοιῶν ἐκλεκτῶν ἐποίησεν* ἐν δὲ τῇ ζησίᾳ, ὅτι οὐκέτι μοι παρειμαχθεῖν νῦν, καὶ ἄρμαν ἄν ἐπὶ ἀντόν καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἄρης, εἰ φέρεται ἐν εἰσεχόντι ἄρμαν ἄν ἐπὶ τοὺς πνεύμους. Arr. Epict. l. 2. c. 6. p. 195. It appears that the above Sentiment was of Chrysippus. In the tenth Chapter of the same Book we have it repeated, tho' in Words somewhat different. Διατίπτω καλῶν λέγων οἱ φιλόσοφοι, ὅπι, &c. So Seneca—Quicquid acciderit, sic ferre, quæsi tibi volueris accidere. Debuisses enim velle, si scieisses omnia ex decreto Dei fieri. Nat. Quæst. iii. in Præfat.

Note LXXIX. p. 232.—That we may know no other Will, than thine alone, and that the Harmony of our particular Minds with thy universal, &c.—] Εἶναι δ' ἀντὶ τοῦ τῆς ἐνδείξεως* ἀφήνων καὶ ἐφωνήν βιά, ὅταν πάντα πράσεηλα καὶ τὴν συμφωνίαν τὸ ἔως ἐκάσθι δὲ ὁμόνως* πάρος τὴν τὰ διὸν διόνυσσα δικαιο- σύνη. The Virtue of a happy Man, and the Felicity of Life— is this, when all things are transacted in Harmony of a Man’s Genius, with the Will of Him, who administers the Whole. Diog. Laert. l. 7. c. 88. p. 418. This is what Epictetus calls τὴν ἀντὶ βελτι- σμῷς συνάρμοζον τοῖς γιγαμενοῖς, to attune or harmonize one’s Mind to the things, which happen. Diff. l. 2. c. 14. p. 242.

Note LXXX. Ibid. Yet since to attain this Height—is but barely possible, &c.] See before, page 215, &c. See also Notes LX. and LXII.

Note LXXXI. p. 223.—Such as to transform us into Savage Beasts of Prey, sullen, &c.] See before, Note LXXI.
Note LXXXII. p. 233. That animating Wisdom, which pervades, and rules the Whole, &c.] This Power is called by the Emperor Marcus—τὸν δὲ τῆς ἀσίας δικοῦλα λόγον, καὶ—ὁμονομᾶσιν τὸ σῶμ. l. 5. f. 32.

Note LXXXIII. Ibid.—That Magic Divine, which, &c.]—καὶ τὸ χάσμα ἐν τῷ λέοντῷ, καὶ τὸ τυλικτήριον, καὶ σάσα κακογία, ὡς ἀκαθα, ὡς βόρβοθῷ, ἐνείνων ἐπιγεννήματα τῶν σωμάτων καὶ καλῶν μὴ ἐν αὐῃ ἀκλότρια τῶν, δέ σεβής, φαινάξα—ἀλλὰ τὴν σάλων σωμήν ἐπιλογίζεται. M. Ant. l. 6. f. 36—See also l. 4. f. 44. l. 3. f. 2. "Ὡσπερ γὰρ ἢ καυμαθία (Ἰωσίων) ἐπιγράμματα γελοία φέρεσθαι, ἢ καθ' ἐαυτὰ μὲν ἕτε φαῦλα, τῷ δὲ ὅπως ποιήματι ἀρχὴ τινὰ προτίθεσθαι ἦτος ἄρεις ἐν αὐτὴν ἐφ ἐαυτῆς τὴν καλίαν, τοῖς δ' ἀλλοις ἐν ἀρχηγός ἐστι. Chrystip. and Plutarch. p. 1065. D.

Oidē τι γίγνεται ἔργων ἐπὶ χεινοὶ οὕς δίκαια, Δαίμων, ὡστε καὶ αἰθέριον θεῖον πόλον, ὅτ' ἐπὶ σωφρίων Πλὴν ὅπως πάντες κακοὶ σφεδρήσων ἀνόιας. Ἄλλα οὐ καὶ τὰ περισσὰ ἐπίσωσα αὐθίνα θείαν, Καὶ ποσείν τὰ ἀκοσμα· καὶ ἐ γίνῃ σοὶ φίλα ἐστὶ. "Ὡδὲ γὰρ εἰς ἐν ἀπαντήν σωφρημονάς ἐσθαλα μνημοσίν, "Ὡσθ' ἐνα γίγνεσθαι πάνων λόγον αἰὲν ἐςλο. forl. ἐόλα.

Cleanthis Hymn. apud Steph. in Poeti Philos. p. 49, 50.

[The Reader will observe that the fourth of the above Verses is supplied by the Miscell. Observationes Criticae,
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Criticæ, Vol. VII. from a Manuscript of Vossius at Leyden.]

Note LXXXIV. p. 234.—With these may our Minds be unchangeably tinged, &c.]—βάπτεται γὰρ υπὸ τῶν φαντασιῶν ἡ ψυχῇ—M. Ant. l. 5. f. 16.

Note LXXXV. Ibid.—With a reserve, &c.] μεθ' ὑπεξαγέτεως. See Epict. Enchirid. c. 2. M. Ant. l. 4. f. 1. l. 5. f. 20. Seneca translates it, cum exceptione. See De Beneficiis, l. 4. f. 34.

Note LXXXVI. Ibid.—Never miss what we would obtain, or fall into that which we would avoid, &c.] μήτε ὅρεγόμενον ἀποτυχάνειν, μήτ' ἐνκλίνοις περιπέτειαν. Arr. Epict. l. 3. c. 12. p. 404.

Note LXXXVII. p. 235.—Conduct me, Thou, &c.]

"Αγε δέ μ', ὁ Ζεύ, καὶ σύ γ' ἢ παπρωμένη,
"Ωποὶ ποτ' ὑμῖν ἐιμὶ διατεταγμένοι.
"Ὡς ἔφομαί γ' ἄκοντος· ἤν δέ γε μὴ θέλω,
Κακὸς γενόμενοι; ἡδὲν ζήλου ἔφομαί.

Cleanthes in Epict. Ench. c. 52.

Thus translated by Seneca:

Duc me, parens, celsique dominator poli,
Quocunque placuit: nulla parendi mora est:

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Adsum impiger, fac nolle: comitabor gemens, Malusque patiar, quod bono licuit pati.

Epist. 107.

Note LXXXVIII. p. 236. It is Habit, replied he, is all in all. It is Practice and Exercise, which can only, &c. &c. to the End of the Paragraph]—Alla πολλὴς ἐχεῖ χρέαιν παρασκευής καὶ πόνα πολλὰ καὶ μαθημάτων. Τί ἐν; ἐπιτίκεις, ὅτι τὴν μεγίστην τέχνην ἀπὸ διώγμων ἐστὶν ἀπολαλεῖν;—But (says one, with respect to the virtuous Character) there is need of much Preparation, of much Labour and Learning. And what? Doest thou expect it should be possible (answers the Philosopher) to obtain, by little Pains, the chiefest GREATEST ART? Arr. Epist. l. i. c. 20. p. i ii. Ἀφιν δὲ ταύρῳ καὶ γίνεσαι, ἢ δὲ γεννᾷς ἀνθρώπῳ· ἀλλὰ δὲ χειμασθήσαι. παρασκευάσασθαι, καὶ μὴ εἰπὴ προσπηδαῖν ἐπὶ τὰ μακάν προσὸκοιτα. No robust and mighty Animal is complete at once; nor more is the brave and generous Man. It is necessary to undergo the severest Exercise and Preparation, and not rashly plunge into things, which are no way suitable. Ejufd. Difflert. l. i. c. 2. p. 18. See also the same Author, l. i. c. 15. p. 86. l. 2. c. 14. p. 243. Sed ut nec medici, nec imperatores, nec oratores, quamvis artis praecepa perceperint, quidquam magna laude dignum fine usu & exercitazione consequat: sic officii conservandi praecetesta traduntur illa quidem (ut facimus ipsi;) sed rei magnitudo usum quoque exercitacionemque desiderat. Cic. de Offic. l. i. c. 18. 

Note

Ethic. Nicom. l. 2. c. 1.
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Note LXXXIX. p. 236. Nothing is to be had gratis, &c.] Ἡθίνα ὑδίων γίνεται. Arr. Epictr. l. 4. c. 10. p. 653. The same Sentiment is often repeated by the same Author.

Note XC. p. 241.—We are all governed by Interest, &c.] See of the Dialogue, p. 212. 246. See also Notes LVI. and XCII.

Note XCI. p. 243.—It is a Smoaky House — Καυσώς ἐτὶ ἀπέρχομαι. M. Ant. l. 5. c. 29. See Arr. Epictr. l. 1. c. 25. p. 129.

Note XCII. Ibid. Is a social Interest, &c.] As the Stoics, above all Philosophers, opposed a lazy inactive Life, so they were perpetually recommending a proper regard to the Public, and encouraging the Practice of every social Duty. And tho’ they made the original Spring of every particular Man’s Action, to be Self-love, and the prospect of private Interest; yet so intimately united did they esteem this private Interest with the public, that they held it impossible to promote the former, and not at the same time promote the latter. Τοιάδ’ άνθρωπος τῷ λόγῳ ξῶν καταπελέσαι, ἵνα μικρὸς τῶν ἱδίων ἀγαθῶν δύναται τυπνάναι, ἐπ’ ἐν αἰς τῷ κοινῷ ἀφέλιμον προσφέρειν ὑπὸς ὀνείτι ἀνοικότιαν γίνεσθαι, τὸ πλῆθος ἵππη ἕνεκα πιστῶν. God hath so framed the Nature of the rational Animal, that it should not be able to obtain any private Goods, if it contribute not withal something profitable to the Community. Thus is there no longer any thing unsocial, in doing all things for the sake of self. Arr. Epictr. l. 1. c. 19. p. 106.
The Peripatetic Doctrine was much the same. 

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Note XCIII. p. 243.—If so, then Honour and Justice are my Interests, &c.] Thus Cicero, after having supposed a social common Interest to be the natural Interest of Man; subjoins immediately—Quod si ita est, una continemur omnes & eadem lege naturæ. Idque ipsum si ita est, certe violare alterum lege naturæ prohibemur. De Offic. l. 3. c. 6.

Note XCIV. Ibid.—Without some Portion of which not even Thieves, &c.]—Cujus (sc. Jusitiae) tanta vis est, ut ne illi quidem, qui maleficio & scelere pascuntur, possint sine ulla particular justitiae vivere. Nam qui eorum cuipiam, qui una latrocinantur, furatur aliquid aut eripit, is sibi ne in latrocinio quidem relinquit locum. Ille autem qui archi-
NOTES on TREATISE the Third.

archipirata dicitur, nisi æquiliter prædam, &c. De Offic. 1. 2. c. i. i.

— 'All' estin ἀνάληκ, φυσικῆς ἔσος τῆς κοινωνίας, εἶναι φύτει καὶ τὰ δίκαια, δὲ ἂν ἦν ἡ κοινωνία. "Ὅτι γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον συνέχει τὴν κοινωνίαν, δὴ λέγουσιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἄδικολότατων εἶναι δοκόντων' ἔτοι δὲ εἰσιν οἱ λατρεύοντες ἢ περί ἀλλήλων κοινωνία ὅποτε δίκαιοςναν σύνεται τῆς ἁρμόσ ἀλλήλων. Διὰ τοῦ γὰρ τὸ μὴ παλαιώθην ἀλλήλων, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ μετηθῆ, καὶ διὰ τὸ τιμᾶν τὸ ὑπεύθυνον δοκεῖν, καὶ τὸ τὰ συνείμενα φύλατεν, καὶ διὰ τὸ βοηθῶν τοὺς ἀσθενεύοντος, διὰ ταῦτα ἡ ἁρμόσ ἀλλήλων ἀυλοῖς κοινωνία συμμένει. Ῥώμ. χάν τὸν πάντων ἐς ὡς ἄδικοι συνέσαι. It is necessary, SOCIETY being natural, that JUSTICE should be natural also, by which Society exists. For that Justice holds Society together, is evident in those, who appear of all the most unjust, such I mean as Robbers or Banditti, whose Society with each other is preserved by their Justice to each other. For by not aspiring to any unequal Shares, and by never falsifying, and by submitting to what appears expedient, and by justly guarding the Booty amass'd together, and by assisting their weaker Companions, by these things it is, that their Society subsists; the contrary to all which they do by those, whom they injure. Alex. Aphrod. ἄριστα τε ψυχ. p. 156. Edit. Ald. See also Plat. de Repub. 1. 1. p. 351. tom. i. i. Edit. Serrani.

Note XCV. p. 245. What then have I to do, but to enlarge VIRTUE INTO PIETY? Not only Honour, &c.]
NOTES on TREATISE the Third.

All manner of Events, which any way affect a Man, arise either from within himself, or from Causes independent. In the former case, he maintains an active Part; in the latter, a passive. The active Part of his Character seems chiefly to be the Care of Virtue, for it is Virtue which teaches us what we are to act or do; the passive Part seems to belong more immediately to Piety, because by this we are enabled to resign and acquiesce, and bear with a manly Calmness whatever befals us. As therefore we are framed by Nature both to act and to suffer, and are placed in a Universe, where we are perpetually compelled to both; neither Virtue nor Piety is of itself sufficient, but to pass becomingly thro’ Life, we should participate of each.

Such appears to have been the Sentiment of the wise and good Emperor—ἀνήνευ ὅλων ἑαυτὸν ἰδιαιτήσαντις μὲν ἐς τὰ ὑπ’ ἑαυτῆς ἐνεργήμενα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἁλλοις συμπάθησι, τῇ τῶν ἁλλῶν φύσει. Τί δ’ ἐρεῖ τις, ἢ ὑποκεῖσαι προὶ ἑαυτῷ, ἢ παράξει καὶ ἑαυτῷ, ἢ δ’ ἐς τῶν βάλλεσαι, δύο τέτοιος ἀρκόμενος, ἑαυτὸς ἀλλοϊπραγείν τὸ τῶν πρασσόμενον, καὶ ὕπειρεν τὸ τῶν ἀπονεμόμενον ἑαυτῷ — Ἡ (the perfect Man) commits himself wholly to Justice, and the Universal Nature; to Justice, as to those things which are done by himself; and in all other Events, to the Nature of the Whole. What any one will say, or think about him, or act against him, he doth not so much as take into consideration; contented and abundantly satisfied with these two things, himself to do justly what is at this Instant doing, and to AP-PROVE.
NOTES on TREATISE the Third.

PROVE and LOVE what is at this Infant allotted him. M. Anton. l. 10. f. 11. Пάντα ἐκεῖνα, ἐφ' ὧν ἤκουσέν ὁ θεός, ἐκεῖν ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἀκούσει, ἐκεῖν μὲν ἄκειν ἄκουσε· τότε δὲ ἐστιν, ἐὰν σωφρόνες τότε δὲ ἐστιν, ἐὰν σωφρόν τὸ παρελθὸν καταλήπτης, καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἐπιτρέψῃς τῇ ἀρρώστῃ, καὶ τὸ παρὸν μόνον ἀπειθώνης πάρους 'ΟΣΙΟΤΗΤΑ καὶ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗ οὐσίωτέρα μὲν, ἣν ἐφθανες τὸ ἀπονεμώμενον· σοι γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ φύσις ἐφέρες, καὶ τῇ τέτῳ· δικαιοσύνην δὲ, ἣν ἠλευθέρους καὶ χρῆς σωματικῆς λέγεις τε τῇ ἀληθί, καὶ σωφρονεὶς τὰ καὶ λύμον καὶ καὶ ἄξιον—All those things, at which thou wouldest to arrive by a road round about, thou mayest instantly possess, if thou dost not grudge them to thyself; that is to say, in other words, if every thing past thou entirely quit, if the future thou trust to Providence, and the present alone thou adjust according to Piety and Justice: according to Piety, that so thou mayst approve, and love what is allotted, (for whatever it be, it was Nature brought it to thee, and thee to it;) according to Justice, that so thou mayst generously and without disguise both speak the Truth, and act what is consonant to [the general] Law, and the real Value of things. M. Ant. l. 12. c. i. See also l. 7. c. 54. and Plato's Gorgias, p. 507. Tom. i. Edit. Ser. καὶ μὴν ὁ γὰρ ὁμφῶν. κ. τ. λ.

Note XCVI. p. 245.—I have an Interest which may exist, without altering the Plan of Providence; without mending, &c.] Πανελεωθερια—τῷ ἐπὶ τὸ οὐσιῶτά ἐκεῖνα ὥτω δικαιότερα. ἐκεῖν, ὥστε, &c. To be instructed—that is to say, to learn so to will all things, as in fact they happen. And how do they happen? As He, who ordains them, hath ordained. Now he hath ordained that there should be Summer and Winter, and Plenty A a 2 and
and Famine, and Virtue and Vice, and all manner of Contrarieties, for the Harmony of the Whole; and to each of us both He given a Body, and its Members, and a Fortune, and certain Associates. Mindful therefore of this Order, ought we to come for Instruction, not indeed how we may alter what is already established, (for that neither is permitted us, nor would it be better so to be;) but how, while things continue around us, just as they are, and as is their Nature, we may still preserve our Judgment in harmony with all that happens. Arr. Epict. l. i. c. 12. p. 74.


Note XCVIII. Ibid.—If it happen to be erroneous, it is a grateful Error, which I cherish, &c.] 'Ei de exapathenia tivn edei mabev, oti tivn evtov aptrophi'etovn eden esti apa'pov i'pav, eto mlen nhkav tivn apatav tawvnh, ex nh avexcov eupav kai aptarakhov di'kasthai. Were a Man to be deceived, in having learnt concerning Externals, that all beyond our Power was to us as nothing; I for my own part, would desire a Deceit, which would enable me for the future to live tranquil and undisturbed. Arr. Epict. l. i. c. 4. p. 27.
Note XCIX. p. 247.—When we are once, said he, well habituated to this—moral Science, then Logic and Physics become two profitable Adjuncts, &c.

Ad easque virtutes, de quibus disputatum est, Dialecticam etiam adjungunt & Physicam, easque ambas virtutum nomine adpellant: alteram, quod habeat rationem ne cui falsa adsentiamur, neve, &c. Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 21. p. 265.

The threefold Division of Philosophy into Ethics, Physics, and Logic, was commonly received by most Sects of Philosophers. See Laert. l. 7. c. 39. See also Cicero in his Treatise de Lovibus, l. 1. c. 23. and in his Academics, l. 1. c. 5. Fuit ergo jam accepta a Platone philosophandi ratio triplex, &c. Plut. de Placit. Philo. p. 874.
ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following Notes, chiefly taken from Greek Manuscripts, are added partly to explain, partly to give the Reader a Specimen of certain Works, valuable for their Rarity, as well as for their Merit.
ADDITIONAL NOTE ON TREATISE the Second.

PAGE 54.—The necessary Arts seem to have been prior, &c.

The following Extract from a Manuscript of Philoponous may help to shew the comparative Priority of Arts and Sciences, by shewing (according to this Author) the order of their Revival in a new formed Society. Such Society he supposes to have arisen from scattered Individuals again assembling themselves, after former Societies had by various Incidents of War, Famine, Inundation, and the like, been dissipat'd and destroy'd.

Having spoken of the Effects of Deucalion's Flood, he proceeds as follows—Οὖτοι ὥσπερ ἐπὶ περιπληθοντες, μὴ ἔχοντες θεον ἀν τραφεῖν, ἐπεινῶν ὑπ' ἀνάγκης τὰ πρὸς χρήσιν, οὖν τὸ ἀλήθεια μόνοις σῖτον, ὡς ὁ σπείρειν, ὡς τι τοιῶν ἄλλοι καὶ ἐκάλεσαν τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπίνοιαν σοφίαν, τὴν εἰς τὰ ἀναγματα τὰ βία τὸ νοετελεῖς ἔξευρισκαν, καὶ σοφὸν τὸν ἐπινενοκότα.
Additional Note on Treatise the Second,

Πάλιν ἐπενόσταυ τέχνας, ὡς φησίν ὁ σοφίς,

—ὑποθημοσύνησιν Ἀθήνης,

ζ μόνον τὰς μέχρι τῆς εἰς τὸν βύων ἀνάγκης ἱσαμένας, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέχρι τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἀστίων προϊστάσας καὶ τὸτε πάλιν σοφίαν ἑκλόγασιν, καὶ τὴν εὐφόρα σοφῶν ὡς τὸ,

—σοφὸς ἥραρε τέκλων,

Ἐν εἰδὸς σοφίς—

—ὑποθημοσύνησιν δ’ Ἀθήνης εἴπεν, ἐπεὶ διὰ τὴν ὑπερθέλην τῶν εὐφόριατων εἰς θεὸν τὴν τέτων ἐπίνοιαν ἀνέφερεν.

Πάλιν, ἀπέθελεναν πρὸς τὰ σωματικὰ ὑσάγματα, καὶ ἐξεύρεν νόμους, καὶ σώζαν τὰ συνιώνα τὰς σώλεις καὶ τάφην πάλιν τὴν ἐπίνοιαν σοφῶν ἑκλόγασαν τοὺς τικτοὺς γὰρ ἠσαν οἱ ἐπιδί σοφοί, σωματικὰς τινὰς ἀρετὰς εὑρέτες.

Εἴτε λοιπὸν, ὅδ’ αἱροῦσθεν, καὶ ἐπὶ ἀυτὰ τὰ σώματα, καὶ τὴν ἀναμνήσθην αὐτῶν προηλθὸν φύσιν, καὶ τούτον ἑξιστερόν φυσικὸν ἑκάλεσαν ἑπωρίαν, καὶ σοφῶς τῆς τὴν τοιείαν μεταγίας σηκύν.

Τελευταῖον δ’ ἐπὶ ἀυτὰ λοιπὸν ἔρθασαν τὰ θεία, καὶ ὑπερκόσμια, καὶ ἀμετάκλητα παντελῶς, καὶ τὴν τάτων Γνώσιν κυριωτάτην σοφίαν ὁνόμασαν.

These therefore, that were thus left, not having whence they could support themselves, began thro necessity to contrive things relative to immediate Want, such as the grinding of Corn by Mills, or the sewing it, or something else of like kind; and such Contrivance,
Additional Note on Treatise the Second.

discovering what was conducive to the Necessaries of Life, they called Wisdom, and him a wise Man, who had been the Contriver.

Again, they contrived Arts (as Homer says)

By Precepts of Minerva———

that is, not only those Arts, that stop at the Necessity of Life, but those also that advance as far as the Fair and Elegant; and this too they called Wisdom, and the Inventor a wise Man. Thus the Poet:

———The Work

'Twas a wise Artist fram'd, his Wisdom taught

By Precepts of Minerva———

The last Words are added, because, from the Transcendence of the Inventions, they referred their contrivance to a Divinity.

Again, they turned their Eyes to Matters Political, and found out Laws, and the several things that constitute Cities, or civil Communities; and this Contrivance in its turn they called Wisdom, and of this sort were those celebrated Seven Wise Men, the Inventors of certain Virtues Political.

After this, still advancing in a road, they proceeded to corporeal Substances, and to Nature, their efficient Cause; and this Speculation, by a more specific Name, they called Natural Speculation, and those Persons wise, who pursued such Inquiries.

Last of all, they attained even to Beings divine, supramundane, and wholly unchangeable; and the Know-
Additional Note on Treatise the Second.

Knowledge of these they named the most excellent Wisdom.

A few Observations on this important Passage may not perhaps be improper.

Our first Observation is, that tho' we give it from Philoponus, yet is it by him (as he informs us) taken from a Work of Aristocles, an ancient Peripatetic, intitled, Περὶ φιλοσοφίας, Concerning Philosophy. Some indeed have conjectured that for Aristocles we ought to read Aristoteles, because the last published a Work under this title, which he quotes himself in his Treatise, De Animâ. Be this as it may, the Extract itself is valuable, not only for its Matter, but for being the Fragment of a Treatise now no longer extant.

Our next Observation is, that by Matters Political in their third Paragraph, the Author means not the first Associations of Mankind, for these were prior to almost every thing else, and were not referable to Art, but to the innate Impulse of the social Principle: He means on the contrary those more exquisite and artificial Forms, given to Societies already established, in order to render them happy, and rescue and preserve them from tyrannic Power. Such was the Polity given by Lycurgus to the Lacedemonians, by Solon to the Athenians, by Numa to the Romans, &c. Those great and good Men, in meditating their Institutions, had the same Sentiment with Alcidamas, according to that noble Fragment of his preferred in the Scholia upon Aristotle's Rhetoric—'Ειςεπειρός αὐτόν ἡκάλας θεος ἐδένα δύναν ἐφιάνειδείς. God hath sent forth all Men free; Nature hath made no Man a Slave.
Our third Observation is, that by the most excellent Science, in the last Paragraph, is meant the Science of Causes, and, above all others, of Causes efficient and final, as these necessarily imply pervading Reason, and superintending Wisdom. This Science, as Men were naturally led to it from the Contemplation of Effects, which Effects were the Tribe of Beings natural or physical, was, from being thus subsequent to these physical Inquiries, called Metaphysical; but with a View to itself, and the transcendent Eminence of its Object, was more properly called η ἀφάντ φιλοσοφία, the First Philosophy.

Our fourth Observation is on the Order of these Inventions, namely, Arts necessary; Arts elegant; Arts political; Science physical; Science metaphysical; in all, five Habits, or Modes of Wisdom. The necessary Arts it is evident must on all Accounts have come first. When these were once established, the Transition to the Elegant was easy and obvious. Inventions of Necessity, by the Super-additions of Dispatch, Facility, and the like, soon ripened into Inventions of Convenience; and again these, having in their very nature a certain Beauty and Grace, easily suggested Inventions of pure and simple Elegance.

That the Legislaters, tho' in Rank and Genius far superior to all natural Philosophers, should come before them in point of time, is owing to the nature of their Subject, which had a more immediate Connection with Man, and Human Happiness. It was not indeed till Societies were thoroughly established, and Peace had been well secured both internally and externally,
that Men had Leisure, or even Inclination, to reflect on the Objects round them, or to recognize that vast Mansion, in which they found themselves existing.

Lastly, as the tremendous Part of physical Events led weak Minds, who could not explain them, into the Abyss of dark and dreary Superstition; so those physical Events, which had Beauty and Order, being in their turn equally striking, and equally Objects of Admiration, led strong and generous Minds into Principles the very reverse. They conceived it probable, as their own Views were limited, that, even where Beauty and Order were not to them apparent, they might still in other views have a most real Existence. Farther, as these Observers could perceive nothing done either by themselves, or those of their own Species, which, if it in the least aspired to Utility, or Beauty, was not necessarily the Effect of a conscious and intelligent Cause, they were, from the superior Utility and Beauty of physical Effects, induced to infer a conscious and intelligent Cause of these, far superior to themselves; a Cause, which from the Universality of these Events, as well as from their Union and Sympathy, was not, as are the Sons of Men, a Multitude of limited Causes, but a simple Cause, universal and one; a Cause too, which, from the never-ceasing of its Events, was not, like the same human Beings, an intermittent Cause, but a Cause, ever operating, ever in Energy.

We see therefore the Reason why this First Philosophy was subsequent in point of Time to physical Speculation, and why of course to the other Habits or Modes of Wisdom here enumerated, tho' in its own Dignity and Importance far superior to them all.
Our fifth Observation is, that as a Nation may be said to be in a State of Perfection, which is in the full Possession of all these Habits, or Modes of Wisdom; so those Nations are nearest to Perfection, that possess them in the greatest Number, or in a state of the greatest Maturity.

A Man of Ingenuity might find rational Amusement from this Speculation, by comparing the same Nation as to these Matters, either with itself in different Periods, or with its Neighbours in the same Periods, either past or present. He might for example compare antient Britain with antient Greece; present Britain with present Greece; Britain in the Age of Crufades, with Britain in the Age of Elizabeth; present Britain, with her Colonies; with Italy, France, Holland, and the enlightened Countries; with Spain, Portugal, Barbary, &c. But this we leave, as foreign to our Work, and drawing us into a Theory, which merits a better place than an occasional Note.
ADDITIONAL NOTES
ON
TREATISE the Third.

PAGE 115.—And that the Difference lay only in the Applying them to Particulars.] So Proclus in his Manuscript Comment on the first Alcibiades of Plato, p. 139. ‘Ἡ κοινὴ καὶ ἀνισότροπος ἐννοια τὴν ἐυ-

δαιμονίαν τὴν ἀνταρκτικήν χαρακτηρίζει· ἠπατ(nein γὰρ τὸ ἔν, ἀκραὶ τέτων καὶ τὸ ἀνταρκτικός. καὶ ὡς ὅπως ἔνταξα καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης κατόρθωμεν κατὰ τὴν μέζονα σφάτεται δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐξάτηνα σφάτα-

σιν. Συνελογίζεται γὰρ ὅτι ἐγὼ διὰ σῶμα, καὶ γέν(ό),

καὶ φίλος, καὶ ἀληθῶν ἑυδαιμῶν· ὁ ἑυδαιμῶν ἀνευθεῖς·

ἐγὼ (φησίν) ἀνευθεῖς· ἐκὼν ὅτι μὲν ὁ ἑυδαιμῶν ἀνε-

θεῖς, ἀληθεῖς· ὅτι δὲ οὕτως ἑυδαιμῶν, θεοῦς· τὸ γὰρ συμπέρασμα θεοῦς διὰ τὴν ἐκάτηνα, καὶ ἄτος

ἔφθασες καὶ τὸν φιλόδονον,· καὶ τὸν φιλοχρήσματον, διὰ

ταῦτα θεοῦς· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἵππον, ὁ δὲ χρήμα-

τα τίθεται τὸ ἁγαθόν· ὅτι δὲ τῶν τὸ ἐφέτω ἁγαθῶν,
The universal and unperverted Idea of Man characterises Happiness by Self-sufficiency. For with whomever Well-being exists, with them the Self-sufficient exists also. You see therefore, how here again Alcibiades is right as to his Major Proposition, but mistaken as to the Minor. For thus it is he syllogizes—"I, on account of my Person and Family "and Friends and Wealth, am happy.—The Person "happy is superior to Want—therefore am I "superior to Want." Now that, the Person happy is superior to Want, is true; but that He was happy, was false. The Conclusion therefore is false thro' the Minor Proposition.

It is thus also You will find the Lover of Pleasure, and the Lover of Money, erring in their Reasonings, thro' the same Proposition. For one of them lays down the Good of Man to be Pleasure, the other to be Riches; but that every thing desirable is Good;
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It may be said indeed universally, that all Individuals produce the general Propositions, which they lay down, from their common or Universal Ideas, and from the Faculty of Reason: but that their minor Propositions are produced from Imagination, from Sense, and from irrational Passions. And hence it is, that about these last they differ one with another, while in the former they all agree. The Passions indeed may be considered within the Souls of Men as the Causes of Division and Distance; for they are Titanic, and distract and tear our Intellecl to pieces. But Reason is the same and common to all, as is also the Faculty of Speech, the Medium of its Promulgation. And hence it is, that Hermes (the Type of rational Discourse) is called common and universal, if we may be allowed to give of him an Ethical Explanation.

P. 185.—Fix our Happiness in the mere doing.] So Proclus—Πάσαι γὰρ αἱ τὰ συνεῖς πρᾶξεις πως ἀυτὸν ἔχοι τῆν ἀναφοράν· ἐνεργήσας ἐν ἐνεργειτικῷ καὶ θεοκρήτῳ, ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ τέλος ἔχει. All the Actions of the virtuous Man have reference to himself. When therefore he has energized beneficently and divinely, it is In the very Energy itself that he obtains his End.—This from the same MS. Comment as the Note preceding.

P. 220.—The genuine Sphere and genuine Cylinder, &c.] — ἀλλ' ἕνε ἡμέτερα ψυχή σωλ-
Additional Notes on Treatise the Third.

...and accents, and knowledge of him who is, and who is not. But let someone show, who, out of his investigating, whether he is able, and whether he is capable, to perceive and to produce objects much more accurate and pure, than those which are visibly apparent. It corrects therefore the apparent Circle, and says, how much that Circle wants of the Perfect one; and this it evidently does, by beholding some Form, which is fairer than the visible one, and more perfect. It is not indeed possible, that, without connection with any thing else, or without looking upon something more pure, it should say that this is not really Fair, this is not in every respect Equal: For by these very Assertions, it proves that it beholds that which is in every respect Fair, and in every respect Equal. From the MS. Comment of Proclus on the Parmenides, Book the Third.

Ibid.—The Source of infinite Truths, &c.] The Antients held four Methods or Procedures in their Dialectic for the Investigation of Truth: First the Divisible (ἡ διαίρεται) by which we divide and separate the real Attributes of Being; next the Definitive, (ἡ ὄρθωσις) by which we bring them again together, and by a just arrangement form them into Definitions; thirdly, the Demonstrative, (ἡ ἀποδεικνύει) in which we employ those Definitions, and by syllogizing descend thro' them.
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them from Causes to Effects; and lastly the Analytic (ἡ ἀναλυτικὴ) in which, by an inverse Proces we unravel Demonstrations, and so ascend from Effects to Causes.

Now to all these Methods they held ΕΙΔΗ, that is, Specific Forms or Ideas to be indispensible requisite, from their two important Characters of Permanence, and Comprehension.

Hence it is that Proclus, in the fifth Book of his Comment on the Parmenides, having gone thro’ the several Methods above mentioned, concludes with the following remark.

Εἰ οὖσα μὴ ἐστὶ τὰ ΕΙΔΗ, ἦμ ἐσονται αἱ διαλεκτικαὶ μέθοδοι, καθ’ ἃς τὰ δότα γινώσκωμεν, ἦδ’ ὥστι τρέφομεν τὴν διάνοιαν ἐξομεν’ αὐτῷ γὰρ ἡ δύναμις τῆς ψυχῆς, μάλιστα πωθῶσα τὴν ἄιτιαν, ἐπὶ τὰ ΕΙΔΗ καταφέρνει.

If therefore there are no Specific Ideas or Forms, there can be none of those Dialectic Methods, by which we come to the Knowledge of things, nor shall we know whither to direct our Discursive Faculty; for this is that Power of the Soul, which, desiring above all others the Cause or Reason of things, flies for that Purpose to Forms or Specific Ideas.

P. 226.—Not the smallest Atom is either foreign or detached.]—ὅδεν ἦν ἐν ἐστιν ὅταν ἄτιμα καὶ φαύλα ὤμ, δ’ ἐμ’ μετέχει τὰ ἀγαθά, κάμοι ἐμ’ ἐχει τὴν γένεσιν’ ἐπέτη καὶ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἔστι, εὑρισκείς καὶ ταύτην ἀλαθὲν’ καὶ ἀμφ’ ὅταν τοὺς ἐμ’, εὑρισκείς καὶ τὸ τοῦ μετέχον ἀλαθὲν τινὸς, καὶ ἐδ’ ἀλλὰς ὑποτίθητε δυνάμενον, ὃ τοῦ ἀλαθὲν κρονικάμενον, καὶ μεταλαμβάνῳ ἀγαθὲ τινὸς ἀλλ’ αἱ μὲν τῶν
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There is therefore nothing ignoble and base, which doth not participate of the Good Principle, and hath not from thence its Origin. Should you even instance Matter, you will find even that to be Good; should you instance Evil itself, you will find that also participating of some Good, and no otherwise able to subsist, than as coloured by Good, and partaking of it. The Opinions indeed of ordinary men are ashamed to refer little and contemptible Things to the [primary and] divine Cause, looking [in their reasonings] to the Nature of the Subjects, not to the Power of the Cause, and [to this necessary consequence] that if it be productive of the greater Effects, much more so is it of the inferior. But those on the contrary, who are truly Philosophers, referring all Things both great and small, that exist in the Universe, to a Providence, behold nothing fit to be rejected in this Mansion of Jove, but all Things Good, as having been established by a Providence, and Fair, as having been produced by a Cause, which is divine. Proclus in his manuscript Comment on the Parmenides of Plato.

P. 234.—Who art of purer Eyes, than ever to behold Iniquity.]—An Ear, that was to hear a musical Discord alone, would have Ideas of
Additional Notes on Treatise the Third.

Difsonance, unknown to that Ear, which, along with the Discord, was to hear its Preparation and Resolution. An Eye, that was to see only the Words—venis & caeco carpitur—would have Ideas of Absurdity, unknown to that Eye, which was to behold the Verse intire:

Vulnus alis venis, et caeco carpitur igni.

Numerous are the Ideas of Defect, Error, Absurdity, Falshood, &c. all referable to this Class; Ideas, which arise purely from partial and incomplete Comprehension, and which have no Existence, where the Comprehension is universal and complete. It seems to be from this reasoning, that Themistius asserts—τιμω-ωρός γαρ Νάσ, ἐκ ὅ τα σπείρα νοῶν, ἄλλ' ὅ τα αμείνο. The more respectable Mind is not that, which perceiveth the greater Number of Objects, but the better and more excellent ones. Them. in Aristot. de Anim. p. 92. Edit. Ald.

POST-
POSTSCRIPT.

We must not conclude, without saying a few words on the elegant Frontispiece, with which this Volume is adorned.

The Figure in the middle represents Nature; that, which is crowning her, Virtue; both after the antique. The several Genii, or Youths, represent the tribe of Arts, all of which are seen in various manners attending upon Nature, as having a necessary

*Reference to her in all their Operations.

Of Arts (as has been said already) some imitate Nature, others cultivate and finish her.

The Genii or Youths in the fore-ground represent the Imitative Arts; He with the Lyre, Music; He with the Scroll, Poetry; He with the Tablet, Painting. A Busto stands near them, to denote Sculpture; and they are grouped together from their known Affinity.

If we proceed, we may imagine the different Parts of the Column to denote Architecture; the Youth, plowing with Oxen, to denote Agriculture; two Arts, which have this in common, that they exert their Powers on the insensitive Parts of Nature. Not so the Youth, who is managing the Horse: In Him we see the Force of Art, where Nature is living and sensitive.

All

* P. 22.  † P. 38. 279. † P. 39. ‖ P. 40.
All thefe latter Arts are distinguished from the imitative, as being Powers, by which Nature is adorned and cultivated.

To the fane Class we may refer thofe Arts, characterized by the three Youths, placed immediately over Nature, of whom one holds a Basket of Flowers, which the others are throwing upon her; as also the two below, who are decorating her with a Festoon.

As these laft Youths by the feveral Employs appear to co-operate with the Figure representing Virtue, they may be fuppofed to exhibit thofe higher Arts of Cultivation, which peculiarly respect the rational Nature; thofe Arts, that Virtue prefides over, by prefcribing their Mode and Limits, and while thofe in an inferior Degree render Nature more accomplished, Virtue with a superior dignity places the Crown upon her Head.

Mr. Stuart, the ingenious Designer of this Piece, has not only distinguished himself as a Painter in the Disposition of his Figures, and in their graceful Attitudes; but has contrived withal, that each of them should have a meaning; each apply with Propriety to fome one of the feveral Treatifes.

The whole Design taken together, by exhibiting Nature as a passive Subject, on which Art in all its Species is seen to operate as an efficient Cause, has an immediate reference to the first Treatife, where Art is considered in a view the moft general and comprehensive.
POSTSCRIPT.

The three Youths, that bear the Symbols of a Lyre, a Scroll, and Tablet, by denoting the mimetic or imitative Arts, have reference to the Second Treatise, where those Arts in particular are examined and compared.

The two principal Figures in the Design, one of which is seen crowning the other, as they shew the Honours and Pre-eminence that Nature derives from Virtue, characterise very aptly the Subject of the third Treatise, which professes to prove, that the Perfection and Happiness of Human Nature are only to be obtained thro' the Medium of a moral and a virtuous Life.
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